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The federal government’s complicity in racial discrimination in the development and 
administration of housing policy has been well documented, but the government’s 
role in reproducing gendered federal housing policies in the United States has been 
largely unrecognized in the political science literature.  I argue that United States 
housing policy in the twentieth century is inextricably linked to perceptions of gender 
and the single family home, and the traditional nuclear family has been rendered a 
hegemonic entity.  The politics of housing cannot be understood without an analysis 
of the effects that conceptions of gender have had on housing policy and in turn of the 
effects of such policy on the cultural and social norms surrounding gender.  
Contemporary household regulation is the culmination of a gradual process of state-
building during which the state came to define and regulate the nuclear, heterosexual 
family.  Nuclear family hegemony began during the interwar period and was 
institutionalized under the New Deal, became naturalized from the 1950s to the 1970s 
 
 
through suburbanization and urban disinvestment, and developed into policymaking 
that was increasingly punitive in the 1990s for those outside the nuclear- and nuptial-
family norm.  The system of separate benefits for nuclear families and non-traditional 
households that was established decades earlier made public and subsidized housing 
ripe for attack in a growing culturally conservative atmosphere.  The HOPE VI 
program and the decision in HUD v. Rucker represent various ways in which the 
government implicated family in its attempts to regulate the homes of low-income, 
non-traditional households that are often headed by minority single and elderly 
women.  Although current housing policies reflect changed policy commitments from 
multiple administrations, present access to housing remains family-composition 
specific.  Nuclear family hegemony serves to reify distinctions based on sex; it
incorporated women’s economic dependence as an essential component of housing 
finance and endorsed a single standard for what a good family looked like.  In 
drawing boundaries around citizenship through federal housing policy, the state 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
The house is one of the greatest powers of integration for the thoughts, memories, 
and dreams of mankind.  The binding principle in this integration is the 
daydream.1 
 
The federal government’s complicity in racial discrimination in the development 
and administration of housing policy has been well documented (Vale 2000; Schill and 
Wachter 1995; Massey and Denton 1993), but the government’s role in reproducing 
gendered federal housing policies in the United States has been largely unrecogniz d in 
the political science literature.  I argue that United States housing policyin the twentieth 
century is inextricably linked to perceptions of gender and the single family home, and 
the traditional nuclear family has been rendered a hegemonic entity.  The politics of 
housing cannot be understood without an analysis of the effects that conceptions of 
gender have had on housing policy and in turn of the effects of such policy on the cultural 
and social norms surrounding gender.  Although current housing policies reflect changed 
policy commitments from multiple administrations, present access to housing remains 
family-composition specific, which means gender—alongside the more commonly 
recognized factors of race and class—is an integral part of the complex policy-making 
matrix.  More specifically, nuclear family hegemony serves to reify distinctions based on 
sex; it incorporated women’s economic dependence as an essential component of housing 
finance and endorsed a single standard for what a good family looked like.  This nuclear
family hegemony began during the interwar period and was institutionalized under the 
New Deal, became naturalized from 1950s to the 1970s through suburbanization and 
                                                
1 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1969) p. 6. 
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urban disinvestment, and developed into policymaking that was increasingly punitive in 
the 1990s for those outside the nuclear- and nuptial-family norm.   
Contemporary federal low-income housing programs continue to bear the mark of 
early housing programs, characterized by nuclear family and single-family home rhetoric 
organized around a male breadwinner model, and thus reinforces the nuclear family idea.  
Although federal housing policies have been shaped by numerous competing interests, 
the nuclear family has acted as the legitimate norm around which policy has been 
organized.  Both the federal government and the courts have contributed to this gendered 
structure of housing policy; the federal government, through the creation of public 
policies and the support of private business interests and the courts through the 
adjudication of housing-related issues, both of which nurture, tolerate, and endorse 
gender-stratified policies.  Obtaining and maintaining housing in the United States relies 
on the performance of gender, and more specifically, on the formation of nuclear or 
quasi-nuclear families.      
  While it is unnecessary to justify one’s interest in promoting racial 
equality in housing, gender equality in housing remains outside of the mainstream of 
what is considered a salient political topic that merits investigation.  It is useful to analyze 
gender and the family in housing policy not only to raise new insights about women and 
their political incorporation, but also to contribute to our understanding of political 
institutions and processes in American political development.  Furthermore, devolution 
and the move towards public/private partnerships have a significant impact on social 
policymaking.  With these trends disproportionately affecting women and children, it 
raises concerns for women’s equal citizenship and access to government services 
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increasingly dominated by the market.  An investigation of how United States 
policymakers have relied historically on shifting images of the nuclear family to create 
housing policy will help us understand contemporary regulation of low-income women 
and illuminate how family-centered policies are developing in other policy arenas.  It al o 
highlights how housing policy is utilized as a marker for family policies in the United 
States.  Although family-centered policy initiatives are generally associated with 
conservative lawmakers and right-wing ideology, the initiatives are in fact utilized by 
policymakers across the political spectrum, as well as by the Courts and social and 
economic institutions.  If stable households and equality of opportunity are fundamental 
goals of democratic regimes, housing policies that are based on hegemonic norms of 
gender, family, race, and sexuality cast doubts on the possibility of women’s equal 
citizenship.  In order to understand how the nuclear family is implicated in housing 
policy, it is necessary to explore both the history of government programs, as well s the 
ways in which ideology related to the home is represented.  This necessarily draws on 
different categories, such as race and whiteness, class, and gender, to highlight these 
functions.   
Like the racialized oppositional categories associated with race and ethnicity 
(whites as industrious and intelligent and blacks as lazy and ignorant), family bears a 
similar, yet unique stamp.  Our cultural perception of the nuclear family captures the 
oppositional categories of racial division and the legacy of racism, but also interacts with 
class and especially gender.  Although half of the households in the United States do not 
resemble the traditional nuclear family, it remains imprinted in our cultural imagination.  
Two-parent households are viewed as normal, the ideal environment within which to 
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raise children, and the breeding ground for raising good citizens.  These familis 
concurrently operate within a zone of relative autonomy and receive protection and 
benefits from the state.  To the extent that welfare-state regulation occurs, it is often 
invisible, downplayed, and not viewed as welfare.  What is unique is that these 
households are in fact guided by cultural and social norms, though ones that are 
supported by government policies.  Non-traditional and multi-generational families, on 
the other hand, are perceived as deviations from the norm, irresponsible, and require 
intervention from the government.  These households are considered unsuitable for 
citizen development, receive different levels of government assistance than those families 
viewed as deserving, and therefore are subject to intense government control. 
 
The Scope of the Problem 
Feminist political theorists and scholars of women and gender from numerous 
academic disciplines have encouraged scholars to explore the ways in which family has 
been naturalized in the modern state and society, and in political science alone, there are 
recent studies on family with respect to political theory (Holland 2001; Stevens 1999), 
social policy (Strach 2004), and American political development (Jensen 2003)2, as well 
as in other political science sub-fields.  A symposium sponsored by the Women’s Caucus 
of the American Political Science Association meeting in August 2005 discussed using 
the family as a new lens of inquiry in political science.   
                                                
2 This is an abbreviated list of contributions to the recent family literature in political science.  Other classic 
works by feminists in political science representing the spectrum of ideological persuasions include the 
following: Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), Marth 
Minow, “We, the Family: Constitutional Rights and American Families,” American Journal of History, 74, 
no. 3 (1987), Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), Bell Hooks, Ain’t I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism 
(Boston: South End Press, 1981), and Susan Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979).    
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Given the historical relationship between women and the private/domestic sphere 
and the concern among feminist and race scholars and activists about the growing 
regulation of poor women through public policies, it is appropriate to explore the centers 
of power in this regard—the nuclear family ideal and housing policy.3  At a one-day 
conference on housing rights in May 2005, sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson 
International Center for Scholars, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing warned that homelessness is increasing around the world due to due factors such 
as globalization, privatization of housing, family violence, and the criminalization of the 
homeless (Kathari 2005).  He pointed out, additionally, that United States is among a 
very small group of developed countries with especially egregious housing policies that 
disproportionately affect women.   Although the federal government supports numerous 
types of housing through a combination of state subsidies, tax expenditures, and 
mortgage financing, the single family home remains at the zenith of housing policy.  
According to the U.S. Census Bureau (2004), the overall homeownership rate in the 
Unites States was at a high of 66.2 percent in 2000, up from 55 percent in 1950 and 46.5 
                                                
3 Although I do not discuss this project in terms of w men’s agency and resistance, it should be noted that 
a number of important studies explore this topic.  Rhonda Y. Williams’s innovative research illustrates he 
process by which black women—“public housing tenants, welfare mothers, and nuns”—utilized the 
militant rhetoric of black power politics to mobilize grassroots efforts to fight poverty, slum living 
conditions, and poor social services. See Rhonda Y. Williams. The Politics of Public Housing: Black 
Women's Struggles Against Urban Inequality (New York, 2004); see also, Robert Feldman and Susan Stall, 
The Dignity of Resistance: Women Residents’ Activism in Chicago Public Housing (New York, 2004).  On 
women’s activism, see Deborah Gray White, Too Heavy a Load: Black Women in Defense of Themselves, 
1894–1994 (New York, 1999); Bettye Collier-Thomas and V. P. Franklin, eds., Sisters in the Struggle: 
African-American Women in the Civil Rights–Black Power Movement (New York, 2001); Premilla 
Nadasen, Welfare Warriors: The Welfare Rights Movement in the United States (New York, 2005); 
Christina Greene, Our Separate Ways: Women and the Black Freedom Movement in Durham, North 
Carolina (Chapel Hill, 2005); Felicia Kornbluh, The Battle for Welfare Rights: Politics and Poverty in 
Modern America (Philadelphia, 2007); Annelise Orleck, Storming Caesar’s Palace: How Black Mothers 
Fought Their Own War on Poverty (Boston, 2006); Kimberly Springer, ed., Still Lifting, Still Climbing: 
African American Women’s Contemporary Activism (New York, 1999); Kimberly Springer, Living for the 
Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 1968–1980 (Durham, 2005); and Winifred Breines, The Trouble 
between Us: An Uneasy History of White and Black Women in the Feminist Movement (New York, 2006). 
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at the start of the century.  Thus, over one-third of United States’ households fall outside 
of the primary federal single family housing agenda.  For women and minorities, 
however, the picture is even more sobering.  Whites continue to dominate the market 
with a 71.3 percent homeownership rate in 2000, while Blacks and Hispanics were at 
46.3 and 45.7 percents respectively.  Asians and AIAN’s (American Indian and Alaskan 
Natives) had the highest homeownership rates for minorities at 53.4 percent and 55.5 
percent, respectively.  Single mothers of all races had a homeownership rate of only 49 
percent, a sharp contrast to single fathers, who had a 69 homeownership rate.  Single 
women without children have a growing homeownership rate, presently at 51.9 percent 
(U.S. Census 2004).   
Research has consistently illustrated extensive levels of residential racial 
segregation, which many scholars attribute to discrimination in the housing market and 
lending industry (Ross and Turner 2005; Yinger 1995).  Both national- and local-level 
housing market audit studies reveal that most African Americans and Hispanics 
encounter discrimination related to housing availability and access to rental and sales 
markets (Ondrich, Sricker, and Yinger 1998).  Although the audit methodology is a 
useful tool for assessing discrimination faced by those seeking housing, scholar  have 
pointed to a number of disadvantages, including the fact that testing samples do not 
capture multiple forms of discrimination that become manifest in the housing market 
(Ross 2002).  In addition, far less research has been conducted on other forms of housing 
discrimination, such as household composition (for example, single woman or single 
mother with children), issues that are more likely to impact non-nuclear household 
composition (Tester 2007).  More problematic, “race is typically situated, with this 
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literature, as ‘the’ cause of housing discrimination while other inequalities, such as 
gender and familial status, are disregarded or hierarchically ordered below race” (Tester 
2007, 18).  In those studies that do focus on sex and household composition as the source 
of discrimination, findings show that males are favored over females with and without 
children (Galster and Constantine 1991) and African American women have the lowest 
probability of rental access (Massey and Lundy 2001).  Studies of sexual harassment in 
the housing context (Reed, Collingsworth, and Fitzgerald 2005; Welsh 1999) pale in 
comparison to those exploring employment-related sexual harassment.  Housing-related 
sexual harassment is particularly disturbing, as landlords have extensive access to 
residents’ private lives, including their homes, children, personal property, and credit.  A 
landlord may also impact residents’ reputation with neighbors and other community 
members.  For low-income women who participate in informal economies (for example, 
reduced rent or overlooking poor credit in exchange for child care or household 
cleaning), the potential for landlords to expect and obtain sexual favors is even greater.  
Gender discrimination in the context of housing is not uniquely about gender; race, class, 
marriage status, sexual identity, and household structure all operate simultaneousy in the 
creation and maintenance of gender discrimination.  These issues highlight an important 
characteristic of housing: the profound interaction between one’s overlapping identities 
and their relationship to a dwelling place.  While the studies noted above are crucial 
towards understanding the pervasiveness of discrimination in the housing arena, they 
paint an incomplete picture of the nature of inequality in housing.  Indeed, the focus on 
private market housing discrimination absolves the government from its role in 
perpetrating broader gendered and racialized housing practices through policymaking and 
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overlooks the role of society in general.  Inequality is embedded in the very structure of 
housing policy in the United States and is played out in a variety out feedback loops.   
One’s housing options are mitigated by a constellation of factors, including 
income, employment, household circumstances, race, and family composition.  In turn, 
housing location determines one’s access to public schools, hospitals and specialized 
health care, public transportation, banking, parks, child care, grocery stores, and political 
representation (or lack thereof, as is the case with residents of the District of Columbia 
and Congressional representation).  On a broader scale, housing policy and planning 
shapes patterns of work, community, and family life, as entire metropolitan regio s have 
been arranged to separate single-family houses from public urban spaces and industry.  
Despite the increase of women in the workforce, these spatial relations continue to shape 
gender roles.  Theoretically, United States housing policy has deemed the vulnerable to 
be eligible for subsidized and affordable housing, but demand outpaces supply.  In order
to develop a sound public policy that serves all groups in a fair and neutral manner, it is 
important to decouple conceptions of certain types of housing as virtuous from the more 
important shelter value of housing.          
Historian Gail Radford (2000) has pointed out that there is a two-tiered system of 
housing policy in which market incentives and tax breaks are used to promote the private 
development of single-family homes for the middle and upper class, while under-funded 
subsidies and at one time new public housing production are reserved for the lower class 
and indigent “deserving” poor.  Thus, white, middle-class and working-class citizens are 
given the “right to housing” through a combination of federal subsidies and tax breaks, 
while everyone else is subject to the unmanaged private rental market or public ho sing 
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and must endure intense government supervision as a condition to access low-income 
housing.  This also means an increased hardship for female-headed households, single 
parent families, and unmarried individuals who need to move to geographically isolated 
areas to obtain affordable housing (Hayden 1984).  Therefore, federal housing policy in 
the United States has been constructed to serve diverse groups with different types of
benefits, and notions of family have been implicated in this construction of those who are 
considered deserving--either because they maintain traditional nuclear families or can 
afford to buy into the market--and those who are not.   
Throughout the 1990s there has been a wave of literature on housing policy 
changes, welfare reform, and shifts towards prioritizing market based policyinit atives.  
Many scholars have sounded the alarm of what these policies mean for our national 
social and economic commitments and the future of social provisions in the United 
States.  Neil Smith (1999, 1996) argues that the 1990s marked a shift from the Keynesian 
and New Deal economics towards a revanchist urban regime in which urban policy 
represents a backlash against liberal and progressive policy making.  This movement 
includes intense policing by the state and neo-liberal market reforms.  Smith’s analysis is 
dramatic and insightful, and scholars certainly have reason to worry, but the revanchist 
ideology that he names has always been present for women and minorities attempting to 
obtain affordable housing.  The severe societal costs of this welfare state dimantl ng and 
privatization of housing policy should not be underestimated; however, focusing on 
recent neo-liberal reforms and devolution obscures the broader issue of housing policy’s
gendered nature, thus diverting attention from understanding the multiple ways in which 
housing policy has reproduced class, race, and gender bias since its inception.  Women’s 
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citizenship in relation to the right to housing has always been qualified by one’s ability 
to perform well in the market, withstand substandard housing conditions in public 
housing, or get by with little to no government assistance.   
 
Social Policy History 
While there is a great deal of research related to gender and social policy in the 
fields of history, sociology, and women’s studies, political scientists have lagg d behind 
in exploring gender biases embedded in twentieth century public policy and the 
development of U.S. social policy and the administrative state.  This is changing, thou h 
a gap remains in the literature so far as gender and the development of housing policy are 
concerned, as well as how ideological forces related to gender shape public policy.  The 
current view on institutionalized gendered social policy in the United States is incomplete 
without an understanding of the special role that housing policy plays in reinforcing sex 
inequality.   Nuclear family hegemony is one apparatus that supports other gend red 
processes and binds them together in an effective system.  While housing policy is unique 
in its disciplinary power and broad societal impact, it interacts with other policy areas, 
such as family law, child welfare, transportation planning, and drug policy.    
Feminist readings of U.S. social policy and welfare state regimes have sed new 
light on structural imbalances and bias--based on gender, race, and social class--present 
in the development of the administrative state in the United States (Boris 1995; Kerber
1995; Fraser and Gordon 1994; Orloff 1993).  These accounts either implicitly or 
explicitly draw from T.H. Marshall’s views of citizenship in which full membership in a 
national community extends from civic and political citizenship to social citizenship, 
which involves access to basic economic security as a requirement for access to political 
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and civic rights (Marshall 1983).  Scholars who examine national political regimes use a 
variation of social citizenship to include governance, which is an understanding of the 
relationships of citizens to political institutions and public policies (Mettler 1998; 
Skocpol 1992; Skowronek 1982).  State-centered theory views the formulation and 
enactment of social policy as contingent on previous policy precedents and the state 
structures that implement them (Skocpol 1992, 1980).  The determinants of state policy 
depend on the consequences of previous policy attempts, the capacities of state 
institutions, and the balance of power among economic and political elites (Skocpol 
1985).  State-centered theorists do not assume that state structures are neutral mediators 
of pluralist conflict among competing interest groups.  Rather, state structures provide 
differential access to state power for various agents and political groups.  State-centered 
theorists argue that the feedback effects of previously enacted policies on subsequent 
policies "reveal how changing political agendas and alternative possible alliances emerge 
not only in response to new socioeconomic conditions but also on the basis of-or in 
reaction to-previous policy accomplishments" (Weir, Orloff, and Skocpol 1988, 17).  
Once instituted, “social policies in turn reshape the organization of the state it elf and 
affect the goals and alliances of social groups involved in ongoing political struggle" 
(25).  According to state-centered theorists, state structures and policy feedback 
constitute the political processes through which social policies are forged.  Furthermore, 
the creation of public policy in democratic regimes is not neutral, rather, it is has been 
shaped historically through a web of interest groups, private actors, and the commitments 
of political institutions.  In addition, separate groups (women, blacks, men, immigrants) 
have been ascribed different civic rights based on the meaning and responsibilities that 
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have been attached to those groups and the roles to which the groups have been relegated 
in both private and public life.  Public policies have been shaped around different 
commitments of welfare state regimes.  Thus, it is possible to analyze gend r in social 
policy not only to bring new analysis related to women to the surface, but also to 
contribute to our understanding of political institutions and processes in American 
politics.  Therefore, understanding construction of the nuclear family takes on new 
meaning for scholars of gender and social policy in our contemporary context. 
  Most salient to this discussion are sociologist Gosta Esping-Andersen’s models 
of welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990) and feminist critiques thereof (Lewis 
2001; Lister 1997; Orloff 1993; Lewis 1992).  Esping-Anderson (1990) devised an 
influential three-pronged typology of Western, welfare state regimes--liberal (English-
speaking nations), corporatist (France and Germany), and social demographic regimes 
(Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands)--which was based on the level of social 
rights, social stratification, and state-market-family relations.  According to Esping-
Andersen, the ideal welfare state is one that contributes to decent standard of living for 
workers, absent of labor market employment.  Feminists criticized this notion of “de-
commodification,” maintaining that it did not appropriately consider the status of women, 
who were more likely to rely on spouses and parents than paid employment for support 
(Lister 1997; Orloff 1993).  Thus, an ideal welfare state cannot be one in which women 
are coerced to couple in order to maintain a modicum of stability.  In response to feminist 
criticism, Esping-Andersen adjusted his typology; however, some maintain he continues 
to fail to address earlier feminist concerns (Christopher 2002).  These new feminist 
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typologies do not, however, take into account social policy provisions outside of income 
maintenance, taxation, and employment.   
More specific to U.S. social policy, Nelson (1990), Mettler (1998), and Novkov 
(2001) have examined how social provisions have developed differently in the United 
State based on both the way in which the aid is perceived by policymakers and the public 
and the groups that receive the benefits.  Typically, social provisions developed for men 
and workers are administered at the federal level with standardized rules, whereas, 
policies for women and children have been relegated to state administration, permit mo e 
extensive evaluation and surveillance, and are assigned based on conceptions of who is
deserving and who is not—from ascriptive and social characteristics.  Lawmaking, 
economic conditions, and social institutions are often treated as mutually exclusive of one 
other; however, the practices work together to shape our social and political reality.  
Historian Daniel T. Rodgers (2000) summarizes the perspective of scholars studying this 
perspective from the view from recipients of government assistance: 
Up close, the agents of social policy may aid and enable, they may work 
modest additions of justice, but they also impose discipline.  The very act 
of separating citizens into distinctive social categories—the poor on 
welfare and the ‘working’ poor receiving merely earned income credits 
and food stamps, ‘minorities’ eligible for affirmative action programs and 
‘majorities’ who are not, persons with ‘families’ and persons who simply 
live together—serves to divide and survey the recipient’s of the state’s 
assistance.  So do the rules social politics winds around all it touches.  The 
disciplining of mind and body that modern welfare states undertake not 
only shores up the leading economic interests of the state, it is claimed.  It 
also enables the reproduction of the dominant social arrangements—be 
they the nuclear family, the prevailing sexual conventions, or the dominant 
structure of aspirations.  Politics as conventionally defined is beside the 
point; discipline is social politics’ driving motor. (23) 
 
Rogers warns, however, that these elements of the state are neither natural nor inevitable 
features of modernity, as some social scientists and other scholars would have us believe. 
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Historical determinism and liberal expectancy overlook the multiple casts of characters, 
resistance, and compromises that are involved in shaping social politics.          
Eileen McDonough (2009), in her uniquely argued The Motherless State: 
Women’s Political Leadership and American Democracy, contends that countries with 
extensive social welfare policies, gender quotas, or symbolic familial monarchies are 
more willing to accept women in public office because the state has taken up the maternal 
role typically associated with women.  This, she says, explains how women in the Ui ed
States have attained a great deal of professional success, but lack electoral gender parity.   
Virginia Sapiro (1991) argues that interdisciplinary scholarship that focuses on the 
relationship between women or gender and political institutions in a historical context is 
most helpful in bringing out insights about gender and politics more generally.  Ritter and 
Mellow (2000) observe that research combining the development of social policy and 
law, such as that of Skocpol (1992) and Mink (1985), offers the most promising venues 
for integrating gender to both critique and reinterpret American politics.  Instead of the 
‘add women and stir’ approach that is often present in studies of women in American 
politics, an analysis of gender provides an analytic concept for understanding the nature 
of political and economic relations and the relationship of women to government 
institutions and the bureaucracy.  Other feminist scholars have sought to give legit macy 
to topics historically considered outside the realm of politics and political theory: care 
(Tronto 1994), dependency (Kittay 1999), friendship (Raymond 1986), and capabilities 
(Nussbaum 2000).  In addition, scholars of American constitutional development have 
provided new insights into the interplay between gender, bureaucratic government 
institutions, and U.S. constitutional development (Ritter 2002, Novkov 2001, Siegel 
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1994).  These works are exciting for the ways they provide sophisticated analysis of the 
intersection of gender and political history, with existing models of constitutional 
development. 
 
House or Home? 
In 2004, the Center for Urban and Regional Studies and the Center for the Study 
of the American South at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill sponsored an 
exhibit on affordable home ownership at the National Building Museum in Washington, 
DC.  The exhibit, titled “Stories of Home”, showcased the images of Bill Bamberger, 
who photographed and collected stories from low-income families struggling to achieve 
affordable home ownership.4  One story was particularly telling of the psychological 
importance of house ownership, even in low-income communities.  House owner Pearlie 
Mae Seals’s comments were included in the exhibit:   
I picked this house because of a dream.  This house used to run me in my 
sleep.  I could be asleep, and this house looked like it had arms reaching at 
me, and I would be runnin’ and I would fall in a hole.  This house was 
flyin’ after me.  I told my mama about my dream, and she said, “Well, 
maybe that’s the house for you honey.”  I said to mama, “But the house is 
running after me!”  She said, “No baby, take your dream backwards.  The 
house is reaching out to say, ‘Come on, I’ll hold you.’”  The next night 
when I went to sleep, I said to Faye, “Wake me up.”  But Faye forgot, and 
I fell right asleep and had that dream again.  This time I told the house, 
“I’m not going to run no more.  We’re just going to fight it out.”  And I 
turned to ball up my fist, the house said, “peace.”  And I said, “What?”  
The house said, “Peace, come in.”  “Bull shit!” I said.  It said it again.  
“Peace, come in.”  And I walked in.5 
 
                                                
4 William Hamilton. “Four Walls that Changed the World,” The New York Times. November 27, 2003. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/27/garden/four-walls-that-change-the-world.html?pagewanted=1  
(Accessed May 15, 2005).  For more information on the exhibit, see http://www.nbm.org/exhibitions-
collections/exhibitions/stories-of-home.html  (Accessed August 1, 2010).   
5 Based on author’s notes from exhibit, 2004. 
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Seals’ impressions speak to the importance that dwelling places carry in our lives and 
imagination.  Different building forms produce different meaning.  The single family 
home has, in a sense, become a national monument.  Along with the structure of 
government, economic practices, and political ideology, monuments create and recreate 
meaning and traditions of identity.  According to William Sewell (2005), by exploring 
monument building and nationalism we can identify the national practices of a culture; 
they are captured in the buildings society constructs.  In the context of house building, 
this dynamic is even more powerful than the creation of ideology alone because building 
occupies physical space.  In addition, single family house building in the United States 
has historically been viewed as an inane practice.  Despite lobbying from the building 
industry, tax breaks for house owners, intervention by real estate industries, and raci l 
and gendered ideological forces propelling building, on the surface, the structure of a 
house appears to be absent of any significant political and social meaning.  The space that 
the house occupies and the meaning assigned to it by people is far different however.  
Shein, in her examination of nationalism and monument building, explores how meaning 
is constructed across different monuments.   
Yet beyond the questions of space, what is particularly interesting 
about national monuments producing a national meaning, or in  
Hobsbawm’s term, an invented tradition, is that not all national 
monuments produce the “same” meaning. Different monuments will 
produce different visions of what the nation is and how an individual  
relates to it. These differences will often play out in the diverse design  
choices of monuments. (2007, 41) 
  
According to Savage, monuments have “a curious power to erase their own political 
origins and become sacrosanct” (1997, 7).  Similarly, the single family house conceals 
the political practices behind it.   
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Houses in the United States represent status, power, and legitimacy--and in a 
sense, the single family home is a monument to these ideals.  Though for some 
demographic groups, the home, in all of its structural forms, involves intense government 
supervision.  According to Daphne Spain, “houses are shaped not just by materials and 
tools, but by ideas, values, and norms” (1992, 111).  The single family house is a symbol 
of a reproductive society, and what is considered legitimate and illegitimate n the 
production of this meaning, is dependent upon the group being represented and the 
familial ideology connected to it.  Family is connected to home in our social and political 
imagination and exposes an interesting dilemma in American ideology: the hom  remains 
a site of dependence and mutual support and yet ownership of a home reflects a 
prevailing individualist ethos in the United States.  This weaving of personal identity a d 
domestic place (Marcus 1976) is why, Lawrence Vale argues (2000), public and 
subsidized housing is meagerly funded.  The need to acquire housing is viewed as a 
“private responsibility” that trumps other liberal or communal meanings stamped onto 
assisted housing (2000, 7).  Therefore, Vale claims, to support this cultural pattern of 
individualism, the mortgage interest tax deduction (which far outpaces assisted housing 
in federal funding), for example, must remain a silent form of federal aid.  Gwendolyn 
Wright (1980) argues that homes act metaphorically, “suggesting and justifying social 
categories, values, and relations” (1).  Thus, “spatial and good social relations mutually 
reinforce one another, and if status differences are engendered within the home, they are 
likely to be expressed outside it also” (Spain 1992, 111).  Similarly, according to 
Mohatny and Martin (1986), home represents a mirror of the global patriarchal hierarchy: 
Nevertheless, women’s status as measured within patriarchal systems 
and other disciplining structures, must not be forgotten in attesting to  
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their creativity in crafting their identities through home.  This is not least 
because women’s different positionings with regard to homes’ discursive  
fictions do more than attest to the starkness of such differences; modernist  
versions of home are subtle truths by which individuals reveal to 
themselves their places in a global hierarchy. (3) 
 
The desire for an idealized home may even suppress crucial differences in the 
surrounding communities (Mohatny and Martin 1986).  People search out for ideal 
housing forms at the expense of others who may not access that housing.   
Architectural historian Gwendolyn Wright asks, “What does one learn by 
considering government housing programs as a form of cultural narrative, recounting 
assumptions about transformation and continuity in the home, along with political and 
economic realities?” (quoted in Mack 1993, 219).  Before images of public housing as 
blocks and in some cases miles of high-rise buildings and dirty hallways brought fear and 
disgust to those not living in those conditions, American urban slums consisted of 
dilapidated shacks and alley dwellers.  What remains consistent across the last century, 
however, are perceptions of the nuclear family sheltered in the legitimacy of the private 
and autonomous home.  Judith Baer (2002) points out that “a society that has shown itself 
willing to disadvantage, and even punish, people who live outside the conventional 
family has shown no comparable willingness to lighten the burdens of real families” 
(127).  This picture of legitimacy and order is juxtaposed with an image of both chaotic 
non-traditional families living in early twentieth century urban slums and thoseextended 
families residing in alleged drug filled public housing.     
In an attempt to dislodge the homogenous suburban image from our mind, better 
understand diverse suburbs, and try to build better suburbs in the future, in Buildi g 
Suburbia, Dolores Hayden (2004) explores the complexity of United States suburbs.  She 
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finds that young singles and elderly outnumber married couples with children, and as jobs
and affordable housing have moved beyond the city limits, the suburbs are increasingly 
the destination for immigrants and home to diverse ethnic communities (14).  While 
many contemporary suburbs do not reflect the homogeneity and the traditional nuclear
family ubiquitous of the 1950s and post-World War II culture and national identity, 
government legislation continues to produce this image of the good life for the American 
public and remains intent on punitive measures and disproportionate regulation for those 
households that refuse to conform.  While the suburbs might be gaining diversity, 
elements of Victorian Era home-creation, such as the emphasis on home repair, consumer 
consumption, design, and investment in a house as a primary method of savings, 
threatens to maintain the visions of the traditional suburban nuclear family as a reflection 
of the good citizen.   
Todd De Pastino (2003) lays out the other side of the story, tracing the 
consequences of homelessness for men and its meaning for our national identity.  In 
Citizen Hobo, De Pastino points out that, “Marches on Washington to revive and burnish 
this ideal [of home as a central place of being] have become more routine, as groups 
ranging from the Promise Keepers to the Million Man and Million Mom Marches 
dramatize local grievances as crises of home and nationhood” (2003, 271).  He suggests 
that one domestic vision has been replaced by a diversity of home ideals, yet this phase 
marks a different but continued inability to separate home from the “political economies 
of housing and the entitlement of citizenship” (271).  De Pastino contends, “the specter of 
white male homelessness so haunted the American body politic between the end of the 
Civil War and the onset of the Cold War that it prompted the creation of an entirely new 
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social order and political economy” (2003, xviii-xix).  Yet scholars need to be cautious to 
avoid casting alternative cultures of existence as unconstrained states of rebellion against 
the domestication of industrial and domestic life.  Indeed, representations of 
homelessness rely on conceptions of freedom/lack of freedom and sacred/profane in 
political and sociological discourse.  Political scientist Jeremy Waldron (1993) explores 
the nature of homelessness in the United States as rooflessness, and asserts th t property 
rules determine where one has the right to exist (309).  Avoiding casting homelessness in 
terms of socio-economic terms, Waldron observes that the right to be is as fundamental 
as property rights and therefore the right to housing should be the basis for other social 
rights.  Joanne Passero (1996) points out, “only homeless adults who will be housed are 
those who return to or recreate normative ‘homes’—and the gender roles they imply—in 
order to survive” (3).  “Men who are failed or unwilling breadwinners generally g in only 
limited access to bare temporary shelters unless they can somehow father a child and 
form a family,” argues De Pastino (2003, 261).  For homeless men, therefore, the nuclear 
family hegemony renders equally troubling results, “viewed on the one hand as 
dependent, and therefore emasculated, and on the other as hyper-masculinized, and 
therefore dangerous, homeless men are generally expected either to take care of 
themselves on the streets or face incarceration” (261).  The state’s coercive power 
reduces the homeless to subordinate civic status, or bare life.  Obtaining and maintaining 
housing, therefore, relies on the performance of gender, and more specifically, on the 
formation of nuclear or quasi-nuclear families.   
Dwelling is unique in that it is both a physical space and an ontological condition.  
Dwelling captures personal desire and acts as the household’s relation to society.  The 
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form of dwelling with which one is associated carries social, psychological, and 
economic messages.  An epistemological quality of dwelling places is thatthey can tend 
to lead one to take these spaces for granted.  Dwelling works in such a way as to become 
a part of our ordinary world.  However, this banality de-politicizes dwelling as it relates 
to housing policy.  It is often assumed that market-rate, single-family houses exi t 
without intervention from the government while affordable and subsidized housing 
receives significant federal outlays.  Housing policy exemplifies th  power of the state to 
define reality.  The single family house, like national monuments, produces different 
meanings and has served the United States’ class, race, empire, and domestic ambitions, 
yet there has been a lack of significant inquiry in political science with respect to the 
house or home.  There is also a tendency in social science to interrogate socil and 
political issues that exist at the forefront of our cultural and social worlds.  Dwelling 
places and the dynamics that created them, including the single family house, have 
become so naturalized that they are viewed as a less important site for political inquiry.  
By problematizing dwelling and placing it at the center of inquiry, other social and 
political relations, including the gendered and racial elements of housing policy that are 
taken for granted become more visible.  It is important to note that this inquiry into 
housing and gender is not one that focuses on a philosophical meaning of home or the 
contours of democratic theory.  Rather, the goal is to highlight the interconnections 
between conceptions of house, home, and family, and the policy implications of these 





Intersecting Issues of Gender, Race, and Class 
Although gender is an important factor in nuclear family-centered policymaking, 
the policy designs implemented from the Hoover administration to the HOPE VI program 
implicate race and class as well as gender.  Feminist geographers point out that
socioeconomic class serves as a “code for race in the national discourse” on public 
housing (Breitbart and Pader 1995, 1); however, it also acts as code for traditional family, 
with the consequence of making the gendered nature of the housing programs invisible.  
What is clear is that from stopping communist threats to fostering economic progress 
through consumption, the post-war family “rendered any deviation from its norms 
tantamount to treason” (Kunzel 1993, 163).  Kunzel argues the following:   
As with psychiatric discourse of white illegitimacy, new fears surrounding 
black illegitimacy took shape in the larger context of the familial ideology 
that crystallized during and after the war.  It was no accident that the black 
family should alarm policy-makers at a time when family values were 
being so rigidly prescribed and the normal family was portrayed as white,  
middle-class, male-headed, and suburban-dwelling.  This hegemonic  
post-war family both implicitly and explicitly excluded black Americans. 
 (162-163) 
 
This is not to say that non-traditional households are only headed by black women or that 
minority families are excluded from creating traditional nuclear families.  Rather, the fear 
of women without a man becomes further loaded with racially embedded stereotyp s for 
minority women.  In fact, Linda Gordon (1990) points out that highlighting poor, single 
women as the recipients of state aid distorts the reality of single mothers historically and 
targets poor women as representatives of social and moral breakdown.   
While studies have examined how the role of gender and domesticity shaped 
postwar politics, “representations of unmarried mothers suggest that race, as powerfully 
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and pervasively as gender, determined the form and shape of the ideology of the family 
that stood at the heart of the postwar political agenda” (Kunzel 1993, 165).  Ange-Marie 
Hancock (2004), in the Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen, 
examines how the public identity of contemporary welfare recipients is shaped by what 
she calls the ‘the politics of disgust.’  The result is that undemocratic legislative outcomes 
reflect the “misperception that they [welfare recipients] are all or m stly single mothers 
who are poor and African-Americans” (2004, 6).  According to Micaela Di Leonard  
(1999), underclass ideology and theories of model minorities work together with ideas of 
“moral motherhood” to “stigmatize poor minority mothers and to discipline those who 
are better off against making demands” for better social policy, such as federally 
subsidized child care and better wages (64).  By “psychologizing” and “narratig the 
American temperament,” she argues, these discourses draw the public’s attention away 
from the unequal distribution of resources in the United States (64).  Elizabeth Wilson 
(1992) argues that hostility towards the city by many feminist scholars and women, 
primarily related to welfare and safety, “re-creates the traditional paternalism of most 
town planning” (10).  This is the same kind of paternalism drummed up by lawmakers 
and developers to buttress support for urban renewal projects and recalls how nascent 
housing movements were shaped in part by activists who shared a maternalist agenda hat 
was in fact a paternalist ideology. 
 
Chapter Outline 
To explore the research question using a critical interpretive approach, this project 
will examine important housing legislation and housing-related court cases, most of 
which have not been viewed using a lens of gender and family status in the political 
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science literature.  Housing legislation established policy and set the terms for the 
political debate; Supreme Court decisions further legitimized proper family nd housing 
structures.  To put it another way, how has the federal government responded to 
contingent gendered ideological messages of the nuclear family through housing policy 
and how has it relied on that ideology to both frame and legitimize their policy formulas?  
Here, the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985) requires some acknowledgement.  Their 
work emphasizes the significance of political conflict in shaping discursive practices.  It 
has been influential for researchers interested in charting the impact of political 
ideologies.  Laclau and Mouffe do not seek to interrogate specific texts in deta l; instead 
their focus is on the interconnections between different ideological discourses arising
from multiple sources of power.     
Gender analysis of political history can highlight women-related concerns, as well 
as illuminate trends and problems in wider political institutions that would otherwise 
remain invisible.  Gender analysis goes beyond the biological determinism of sex 
differences (the category of ‘woman’) to an understanding of how social roles, 
institutions, and “perceived differences between the sexes” shape experiences for women 
and men (Scott 1988, 42).  Therefore, reading for gender involves paying attention to the 
possibility that women and gendered language may have been used to legitimize political 
institutions and societal norms.  Women may be implicated as objects and subjects in the 
process; the participants, as well as, the meaning assigned to the actors and the process 
warrants attention.  According to Scott (1998), the goal of gender analysis in historyis as 
follows: 
Our goal is to understand the significance of the sexes, of gender 
groups in the historical past.  Our goal is to discover the range in  
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sex roles and in sexual symbolism in different societies and periods,  
to find out what meaning they had and how they functioned to  
maintain the social order or to promote its change. (29) 
 
Thus, gender analysis of political history may require normative, genealogic l and 
methodological considerations.  Examining perceptions of the nuclear family and family 
status may move us closer to understanding under what types of ideological conditions 
states model housing policy, and contribute to the dialogue between whether welfare
states model social policy based on institutional designs, economic forces, or cultural 
values.   
In the following chapter I will provide a short history of the family in political 
theory, with the goal of explaining how family remains relevant to present political 
inquiries and impacts present social policy development.  Jacqueline Stevens (1999), in 
Reproducing the State, asserts that “the modern notion that political authority and 
familial authority might be separate” started with social contract theory (51).  That, along 
with the continued public/private heuristic, argues Stevens, is a fiction promoted by 
political scientists which results in further reducing the visibility of familial features of 
the state (51).  It is not possible or necessary towards the overall aim of this project to 
explore the entire history of political thought.  The discussion will focus on both the 
naturalization of family in political theory and the ways in which theorists havefailed to 
deal adequately with family status.  I will examine how this trend has influenced modern 
political theory and hegemonic familial thought, and the criticisms of it promoted by 
feminist political theorists.  Ambivalence surrounding liberalism and classi l 
republicanism can be seen in the development of United States social policy, in general, 
and housing policy, specifically.   
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The three subsequent chapters trace hegemonic nuclear family ideology as it 
relates to housing policy.  These three chapters are not intended to be exhaustive of 
federal housing policy history in the twentieth century.  Rather, each chapter offers 
unique insights into the way in which the nuclear family has been established and 
implicated in federal housing policy.  Drawing on the published work of contemporaries 
and historical scholars, Chapter 3 has two parts: The first part will introduce how the  
maternalism of the Progressive era coalesced around a nuclear family ideal as the federal 
government became more involved in housing policy.  Maternalist ideology acted 
alongside other white, nuclear family-centered movements, including the Better Homes 
in America campaign, to create an atmosphere in which sex differentiated housing policy 
would be nurtured and endorsed.  Although many political scientists studying social 
policy often see the roots of public policy in the New Deal period, the interwar period in 
the United States, as many historians acknowledge, is important as well.  With respect to 
housing, Hoover promoted the dissemination of single family house ownership and the 
nuclear family ideal through government sponsored housing organizations (Hutchison 
2000).  The New Deal period saw intense subsidization of nuclear families in the United
States.  Part two of this chapter will examine one important piece of New Deal 
legislation, the Housing Act of 1934, which created the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA), much later known for its infamous racially discriminatory “redlining” mortgage 
lending practices.  FHA worked alongside the Serviceman’s Readjustment Act, known as 
the GI Bill, passed in 1944, to consolidate the system of long-term mortgages for the 
construction and sale of private houses.  However, the FHA did nothing for low-income 
families, single women who could not qualify for FHA loans (unless they were war 
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widows), the non-wage earning elderly or minorities who were officially excluded from 
obtaining loans through FHA redlining practices.   
From the 1950s through the 1970s there was a normalization of nuclear family in 
housing policy.  Nuclear family hegemony became increasingly punitive during the 
Reagan and Clinton administrations.  A system of separate benefits for nuclear families 
and non-traditional households that was created decades earlier made public and 
subsidized housing ripe for attack.  During the 1980s there were severe cuts in funding
for public housing, and funding for low-income housing remained low through the Bush 
administration.  A corruption crisis at the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development brought more attention to homelessness but also the need for public 
housing reform.  Unfortunately, the political consensus between liberals and 
conservatives that was required to heal the wounds from the earlier scandal, along with 
changing attitudes aimed at addressing drugs and crime in and around public housing, 
resulted in the Housing Act of 1990.  The major elements of the legislation included 
increased use of vouchers and certificates, increased local and private control over 
housing, encouraged more home ownership for low and middle-income families, and 
integrated social services into low-income housing planning.  One major program that 
resulted from the new direction in policy, the HOPE program (Housing Opportunities for 
People Everywhere) and now known as HOPE VI, was a throwback to the early urban 
renewal projects.  Housing legislation passed during the 1990s paralleled the reform of 
cash assistance programs with an emphasis on nuclear- and conjugal-family for ation, 
family self-sufficiency, and market-based solutions to poverty.  
28 
 
In Chapter 4, I examine the HOPE VI program, along with new urbanism, an 
architectural and urban planning movement, to illustrate how nuclear family hegemony, 
which crystallized prior to the Clinton administration, coincided with political 
maneuvering and resulted in a housing program that shut out most previously eligible 
public housing residents from housing.  Neo-traditionalism rose to prominence in 
residential architecture.  This architectural concept generated a movement in urban 
planning that was adopted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development.  
Congress and the Department of Housing and Urban Development created the HOPE VI 
program in 1992 with grants first administered in 1993.  The HOPE VI program was 
designed with a number of stated goals: revitalizing severely distressed public housing; 
increasing home ownership for low-income and moderate income families; reducing the 
housing authorities’ maintenance costs; deconcentrating poverty by creating mixed 
income and lower density housing; and making public housing and public entitlements a 
step towards less reliance on government assistance.  From 1993 to 2000, the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development awarded nearly $4 billion to local housing 
authorities to fund demolition, planning, and revitalization through HOPE VI.  Since 
1996, although the local housing authorities were required to increase funding through 
private investment, which necessitates setting aside a large portion of the new or 
renovated housing for middle income families, many low-income families, and especially 
single women, are locked out of the new program.  These attempts to integrate market 
rate housing with public housing limits the number of available space for low-income 
households and the emphasis on home-ownership means that fewer women will be able 
to access the new properties. 
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In the 2002 Supreme Court case the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development v. Rucker the Court ruled that public housing authorities are permitted to 
evict tenants when they, their household members, or their guests are involved in illegal 
drug activity; the Court agreed that such evictions are permissible even if th tenant has 
no knowledge of, or control over, the criminal activity, and even if the activity takes 
place away from the housing unit.  Chapter 5 explores this decision and how the Supreme 
Court affirmed the racial and gendered nature of HUD’s housing policy, whereby 
extended family is linked to the housing unit and property interests.  Traditional legal 
scholarship on the topic has overlooked the racial and gendered ideological nature of the 
decision as well as the way in which family structure was utilized as a method through 
which to sanction public housing residents related to those who had committed crimes on 
or near the public housing unit.  
In the final chapter I will summarize my findings and discuss their academic and 
political implications.  This study will contribute to the existing literatu e on welfare state 
development and bring housing, in general, and low-income women and the built 
environment, specifically, into the discussion of gender and federal social policy 
development.  Although tracing the development of nuclear family hegemony cannot 
explain the entire story, it will help create a more complex and nuanced rendering of 
American political development and gender politics.  The narrative I lay out is aimed at 
understanding the prominent role of nuclear family ideology in the development of 
federal housing policy.  These cases cannot explain all aspects of gender, policy, law, and 
urban planning; however, they can bring to light previously unexplored issues and 
suggest an important direction of inquiry.  With the current state of the housing market, 
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the struggling United States and global economy, and the changing face of racialized 
policy programming, it is particularly important to explore the meanings that surround 









































Chapter 2:  The Nuclear Family Reframed  
 
The meaning and importance of heterosexual marriage and family remains a 
highly contested social and political issue.  Although the family may no longer be 
considered a site of extensive oppression and subordination in the United States, it 
remains a hierarchical structure that defines both women’s and men’s political, so i l, 
and spiritual selves.  Family is neither a pan-human universal nor a stable entity.  Family 
and family relations are fluid and contingent.  Despite the contemporary diversity of 
family structures and household composition in the United States, the heterosexual, 
nuclear, two-parent family is viewed as an essential building block of American society 
and social policies continue to favor the traditional nuclear family.  Feminists concerned 
with eliminating gender-based inequalities have long been concerned with the role of the 
family in establishing, perpetrating, and legitimating women’s secondary st tus.  This 
dominance of nuclear family ideology and nuclear family-centered social pol cy in the 
United States limits and marginalizes many citizens, including singles, b ended families, 
extended families, single-parents, foster parents, kinship caregiver-headed families, and 
gay and lesbian families who may or may not seek or be permitted to legally marry.  
Many non-traditional families support policy changes, such as civic marriage for same 
sex couples or cash payments for non-adoptive kinship caregivers, which would 
legitimize their household arrangements in the eyes of the state.  However, not all non-
traditional families attempt performing as traditional, nuclear families nor seek benefits 
from the state.   Some non-traditional families openly resist homogenizing conceptions of 
family life, while others may be unable or uninterested in further politicizing their 
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intimate lives.  Narrow definitions of family, such as the traditional nuclear family, are 
not only exclusionary.  The celebration and defense of the nuclear family contributes to 
patterns of structured inequality: racism, classism, and patriarchal power relations.  This 
raises serious questions about the democratic nature of political and social institutio  n 
the United States.        
In this chapter I seek to illuminate the connection between ideologies of family
and individuals within the state.  The relationship between the liberal autonomous self 
and the nation/state is mediated by the institution of the family; however, modern 
political theory, and thus our present institutions, has not settled the place of family in the 
political.  There are two central ideas: 1) Ambivalence surrounding liberalism nd 
classical republicanism as it relates to the structure and ideology of the nuclear family is 
critical towards an understanding of the functioning of state construction, and 2) 
American political ideology carries with it elements of nuclear family hegemonic 
thought, which impacts our political and social institutions, including contemporary 
housing policy.  The modern nuclear family and state are mutually constitutive.  Related 
to these two central elements is the notion of the house as a metaphor for the city, 
republic, and polis and family as a symbol of reproductive society.   
For the purposes of its Current Population Survey (CPS), the U.S. Census Bureau 
defines family in the following manner: 
A family is a group of two people or more (one of whom is the 
householder) related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together; 
all such people (including related subfamily members) are considered as 
members of one family. Beginning with the 1980 Current Population 
Survey, unrelated subfamilies (referred to in the past as secondary 
families) are no longer included in the count of families, nor are the 
members of unrelated subfamilies included in the count of family 
members. The number of families is equal to the number of family 
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households, however, the count of family members differs from the count 
of family household members because family household members include 
any non-relatives living in the household.6          
 
As demographers hasten to admit, this official definition of family does not easily reflect 
attitudes about marriage, the roles of men and women, nor family functioning7 (See Table 
2.1).  While scholars attempt to find new ways to capture different family forms, the 
family/non-family dichotomy still exists.  Some sociologists have used th term Standard 
North American Family (SNAF) to describe the “ideological code” that influeces how 
we think about family and relationships (Smith 1993).  The media, government, books, 
and advertising related to the SNAF—all discursive sites--order the categories that are 
utilized to study families.  According to Smith (1993), the implications of Standard North 
American Family are as follows:   
It is a conception of the family as a legally married couple sharing a 
household. The adult male is in paid employment; his earnings provide the 
economic basis of the family-household. The adult female may also earn 
an income, but her primary responsibility is to the care of husband, 
household, and children. Adult male and female may be parents (in 
whatever legal sense) of children also resident in the household. (52)  
 
The SNAF presents itself as universal and a-temporal.  Family forms outside of the 
SNAF model are viewed as deviant and scholars who employ alternative theories and 
methods related to family research remain on the margins.   
Beyond demography, sociology, and survey methodology, applying a gender 
perspective to the institution of family challenges mainstream notions about the nature of 
family functioning in our political structure and imagination.  Myra Marx Ferree (1990) 
                                                
6 U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division, Fertility & Family Statistics 
Branch,  http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (Accessed, September 3, 2010).  See 
Appendix for additional definitions. 
7 Suzanne M. Bianchi and Lynne M. Casper, "American F milies," Population Bulletin 55, no. 4: 2000, p. 
3-6 and 14. 
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observes that “attention to both the structural and ideological levels of analysis requires 
distinguishing between ‘households,’ which are the co-residential units in which people 
empirically can be found, and ‘family,’ the ideology of relatedness that explains who 
should live together, share income, and perform certain common tasks” (870).  Ferree 
continues, 
The new gender perspective has shifted emphasis away from socialization 
and toward processes of categorization and stratification.  Gender models 
also explicitly theorize the connection between structural and ideological 
levels of analysis.  The family, as a cultural system of obligation, a ‘tangle 
of love and obligation,’ is distinguished from the household, a locus of 
labor and economic struggle.  Neither families nor households can be 
conceptualized as separate or soli[t]ary spheres of distinctive relationships; 
both family and household are ever more firmly situated in their specific 
historical context, in which they take on diverse forms and significance. 
(879) 
 
Using the term nuclear family or the family presents some overstatement of the meaning 
attached to it and misstates the universality of the term’s ideological meaning.  I hope to 
avoid recreating a homogenization of the term.  However, it is important to consider the 
hegemonic nuclear family as both an ideology and conceptual principle.  The ambiguity 
and multiple meanings of the family is part of what this project seeks to engage and 
illuminate.  When I describe family composition in its most neutral sense, I tend to refer 
to households.8  I use family or nuclear family in reference to the symbolic, idealized 
form of two-parent, heteronormative, family relations and the ideology that it repres nts.  
The term nuclear family may be invoked by certain political parties more frequently than 
others; however, as both an institution and ideology, the nuclear family go beyond left 
                                                
8 Similarly, in discussing the structure of a built space where households reside, I will use the term house.  
The term home is reserved to describe all of the ideas, myths, and aspirations contained in the dwelling 
place.      
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and right political orientations, as both sides of the political spectrum either explicitly or 
implicitly rely on its structure and representation.         
 
Nuclear Family Hegemony 
Hegemony refers to “the ability of a particular social class to make everyone 
consider the group’s interests the universal concern and thus create acceptance of a 
particular way of organizing society” (Ferber and Nelson 2003, 177).  Although used by 
both Marx and Lenin, Gramsci’s writings on hegemony have been used to explain the 
production of unequal power relationships in the modern state.  Hegemony is established 
by raising “the great mass of the population to a particular cultural and moral level” 
(Gramsci 1971, 259).  Cultural norms act as an educative force by promoting ways of 
thinking, acting, and speaking.  This hegemonic process is not always self-conscious, but 
it is coercive (263).  Hegemony thrives due to its ability to organize around shifting 
meanings so that mass subordination is constantly defended, renewed, and modified 
(263).  The common use of the term refers to the processes by which the class intere ts of 
the elite are universalized through institutions such as schools, churches, and the family, 
and thus, internalized by the rest of the population.  The values which come to be 
universalized in the emergent state are not simply those of the ruling class, but are also 
those of subaltern groups with whom the ruling class has developed alliances.  
Despite the usefulness of the concept of hegemony as a tool of analysis for 
feminists towards understanding how relations of domination permeate various aspect  of 
both public and private lives, in using the term hegemony I am in no way suggesting that 
Gramsci was a feminist nor that his economic theory is useful for feminism.  Gramsci 
recognized how women’s sexuality plays a key role in subordination; however, his 
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support of sexual discipline in service of the economy, his deterministic view of progress, 
and the liberatory potential of industrialization rightly raise red flags for feminist theorists 
(Holub 1992, 198).  Although Gramscian economic theory easily becomes tangled with 
Marxism and Fordism, his grappling with modernity and the time-specific nature of his 
thought is wholly relevant to an analysis of the modern, nuclear family.   
Sociologist Raewyn Connell’s (née Robert Connell and also known as R.W. 
Connell) influential Masculinities (1995) developed a view of the social construction of 
masculinity and the concept of hegemonic masculinity.  Connell sought to understand the 
reproduction of unequal gender orders, including how dominance and subordination 
among men and women came to be accepted at different periods in history.  According to 
Connell (2000), hegemonic masculinity is defined as “the configuration of gender 
practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of 
patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position f men and 
the subordination of women” (2).  Heterosexuality and homophobia are part of the 
foundation of the hegemonic masculinity: women exist as potential sex objects for men, 
while men are off limits as sex objects to other men.  Although some scholars conflate 
psychological or biological characteristics traditionally associated with men and social 
and cultural characteristics, Connell is careful to focus on the relational nature of 
masculinity.  Hegemonic masculinity is not simply about domination and power.  
Summarizing the views of a number of scholars in sociology and men’s studies,9 
                                                
9 See R. Connell, "A Whole New World: Remaking Masculinity n the Context of the Environmental 
Movement," Gender and Society 4 (1990): 352-378: R. Connell. "An Iron Man: The Body and Some 
Contradictions of Hegemonic Masculinity," in M. Messner and D. Sabo, editors, Sport, Men and the 
Gender Order (Champaign. Ill.: Human Kinetics Books, 1990); Connell, "The State, Gender and Sexual 
Politics"; Carrigan, Connell and Lee, 86; R. Chapman. "The Great Pretender: Variations in the New Man 
Theme." in R. Chapman and J. Rutherford. editors. Male Order: Unwrapping Masculinity (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart. 1988) 9-18; C. Cockburn. "Masculinity, the Left and Feminism." in Male 
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Donaldson (1993), in a less than flattering yet insightful interpretation, notes the 
following: 
In their view, hegemonic masculinity concerns the dread of and the flight 
from women. A culturally idealized form, it is both a personal and a 
collective project, and is the common sense about breadwinning and 
manhood.  It is exclusive, anxiety-provoking, internally and hierarchically 
differentiated, brutal, and violent. It is pseudo-natural, tough, 
contradictory, crisis-prone, rich, and socially sustained. While centrally 
connected with the institutions of male dominance, not all men practice it. 
though most benefit from it. Although cross-class, it often excludes 
working class and black men. It is a lived experience, and an economic 
and cultural force, and dependent on social arrangements. It is constructed 
through difficult negotiation over a life-time. Fragile it may be, but it 
constructs the most dangerous things we live with. Resilient, it 
incorporates its own critiques, but it is, nonetheless, ‘unraveling.’ (645) 
 
Some critiques of Connell’s formulation of hegemonic masculinity focus on concerns 
over lack of agency (Whitehead 2002, 1999), complicity and resistance (Wetherell & 
Edley 1999), and embodiment (Jefferson 2002); however, few successfully refute the 
fundamental elements of Connell’s theory.  Others argue that the entire concept f 
hegemonic masculinity is a concept that cannot be measured (Speer 2001).  If no man 
embodies these characteristics, can it describe gender dynamics?  In respo se, Lusher and 
Robins (2010) suggest that Connell’s theory holds up, as hegemony is comprised of 
social structures, cultural factors, and individual which act interdependently to one 
another (5-9).  The dynamic may not be easy to demonstrate, but it is the task of scholars 
to identify examples and describe the interplay of hegemonic features with empirical 
exposition.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Order:103--329; P. Lichterman. "Making a Politics of Masculinity," Comparative Social Research 11
(1989): 185-208; M. Messner "The Meaning of Success: The Athletic Experience and the Development of 




  The hegemonic dynamic described by Lusher and Robins (2010)--local, regional, 
and global evels acting with structural, individual, and cultural f ctors—can be utilized 
towards understanding the American privileging of the nuclear family.  The hegemonic 
nuclear family presents itself as natural to justify present economic and social positions.  
Individuals who benefit from this household construction seek justifications for the 
institution, while economic, political, and cultural institutions reproduce the ideology.  
An important feature of hegemony is that relationships of power are constantly shaped 
and reshaped; as a hegemonic formulation, the nuclear family requires constant 
reinforcement.  There are subtle ways in which ideology related to familial relationships 
transcend the public and private through civil society and government institutions.  
Planners, policymakers, and courts helped to organize political, cultural, social, and 
economic relations in such a way as to make the nuclear family appear to be the universal 
and natural organizer of society.  Realtors, religious organizations, civil society 
organizations, and news outlets buttress these elements with their own supporting 
ideology.  Lusher and Robins (2010) note that ideology is central to Gramsci’s concept f 
hegemony, and therefore, “At the most basic level, for any group to be dominated there 
must be a devaluation of that group by the other, and this devaluation, usually on the 
basis of some observed or inferred characteristic (eg. gender, ethnicity, religion, etc…), 
must be systematic” (8-9).  With respect to this project, those households which fall 
outside of the hegemonic nuclear family are viewed as unnatural, illegitimate, working 
against civic priorities, and require government intervention. In terms of space, the 




Women and Modern Political Theory 
It is not possible to explore the entire history of women and gender from the 
ancients to the moderns, nor is it helpful towards the overall goals of this project.  It is 
important, however, to review some broader themes that run throughout the tradition of 
modern political philosophy which impact our understanding of the familial.  Women are 
inextricably linked to the political and social family, and in ways far different than men.  
There have been many assumptions in the tradition of mainstream political thought that 
pose problems for feminist scholars, ranging from denials of sexual difference in the 
development of political theory to outright embedded misogyny and gynophobia.  When 
feminist scholars first began to address the Western tradition of political philosophy from 
a women-centered or feminist perspective, there were simultaneous attempts o either 
“find” women in texts or categorically denounce a thinker who in another time and place 
made numerous assumptions about women’s rationality and ability to obtain full 
citizenship.  These critiques remain incredibly valuable towards a more comprehensive 
understanding of the political theory canon, particularly since there is a great deal left 
unexplored.      
As Ann Phillips (1991) notes, the orthodox political theory canon, with only a few 
exceptions, appears to agree on one thing—from moral psychology to democratic theory: 
“whatever else is at stake, gender is irrelevant to the issues and will not affect the 
arguments on anyone’s sides” (2).  In the classical and modern tradition of thought,  
women were not worthy of mention and if they were it was not in the name of equality, 
freedom, or the right to contract, but to illustrate their proper place in the political 
hierarchy.  While women are consistently at the center of social, economic, and 
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reproductive demands, they are either formally excluded from theory or subsumed under 
men (3).  Furthermore, theory that was once viewed as having an absence of women is 
now seen by contemporary feminist theorists as thoroughly saturated by sex.  Gender
neutrality and abstractions tend to be a guise for masculinist political theory (5).  These 
assumptions of non-gendered, abstract citizenship reinforce the historically dominant 
(male) hierarchy.  Phillips states that the scale of this mythology remains one of the 
largest tasks for feminists today (6).  
 
Not Founder nor Citizen: Feminists Challenging Tradition 
In orthodox modern political theory we see a shift away from concerns with the 
perfection of the soul towards a justification and preservation of the state and a 
conception of individual rights.  Modern political theorists use the state of nature as a 
conceptual tool to enable one to develop notions of human nature, social and political 
authority, purposes of political action, legitimate governance, the relationship between 
the individual and the community, the relationship between the private and the public, 
and the moral characteristics of individuals.  The state of nature describes how people 
would have reacted in pre-civil society, and according to some is a window into our 
present condition.  The boundaries of contemporary politics are viewed as having been 
defined by an earlier, symbolic place.  The state of nature is a warning agaist what is 
possible without civil society and also determines the shape of political legitimacy.  In 
the modern period, human nature is the basis of civic freedom.  Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, and a renewed Machiavelli are frequently used to buttress our understanding 
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of liberal institutions and values.10  Through birth-right or natural capacities, individual 
freedom and equality is described as universal in the story of modern political theory.  
However, even according to standard interpretations of modern theorists, human nature is 
sexually differentiated.  The bifurcated notions of womanhood/manhood, 
femininity/masculinity, and exposed/intimate denote varying political conceptions.  
Moreover, the nature of women’s incorporation into citizenship remains contested.  If his 
is the case and civic rights rest on human nature, how might women become incorporated 
into the civic order?  Is women’s citizenship different than men’s?  The ‘add women and 
stir’ notion remains a peculiar approach to political equality.   
In contrast to property rights theorizing, there is no intellectual tradition in the 
United States of dealing with housing issues from the perspective of social and political 
theory.  While markets and politics (including race and political party maneuvering) are 
at the center of most discussions of housing policy, the historic institutional structures of 
housing policy and the gendered political and ideological discourses that are attach d o it 
are largely overlooked in the political science literature.  The deep-seated beli f in 
property rights and inviolability of the private housing market in the United States 
promoted specific cultural perceptions of the purposes of housing policy.  Open and 
available land, the absence of feudalism, and a modest egalitarianism for white males 
nurtured a conception of equal access to landownership and housing.  Even as property 
was considered a basic right in the early American republic, symbolically from the 
                                                
10 For Hobbes, see Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan. Ed. by Michael Oakshott (New York: Collier Books, 1966); 
for Locke, see John Locke. Two Treatise of Government ed. by Peter Laslett. (New York: New American 
Library, 1965); for Rousseau, see Jean Jacques Roussea . On the Social Contract. ed. by Roger D. Masters 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1978) and Emile or On Education. ed. and translated by Allan Bloom (New 
York: Basic Books, 1979); and for Machiavelli, see Niccolo Machiavelli. The Prince and the Discourses 
(New York: Modern Library, 1950). 
42 
 
mixture of labor and land, for racial minorities and women the lack of ownership in 
relation to personhood and labor meant an uneasy path into the tradition of liberal 
property rights.  The contours of property rights—and ultimately land and housing 
policy--was further mitigated, first with the Land Ordinance of 1785 and the related land 
surveys in which visions of the ideal colonial city was substituted with the dream of the 
single-family house (Hayden 2002) and again in the early twentieth-century wi h the 
development of the administrative bureaucratic state.   
Moreover, in mainstream liberal political theory the concept of the house or home 
is conspicuously absent, and possibly subsumed with the concept of the family.  As 
Jacqueline Stevens (1999) observes, whereas the ancient Greeks and Romans crafted 
explicit connections between legitimate childbirth and citizenship, most orthodox modern 
theorists relegated family, reproduction, and marriage to the private or pre-political (with 
the exception of Hegel), all while assuming that the traditional, heterosexual family is the 
foundation of society and the related blood-ties offer a neutral and rational basis for civic 
membership.  Sex difference is constituted through kinship-based policies, though by 
ignoring the familial role and concealing kinship.                    
  Significant for this project are the ways in which the institution of family is 
utilized in modern political theory, particularly liberalism and classical republicanism.  
While family has been so thoroughly identified as compatible with liberal republicanism, 
it remains an important consideration for gender politics.  Globalization, profound social 
and familial changes in developing countries, population centers shifting from rural to 
urban areas, and rights increasingly centered on the individual make this issue salient 
beyond the United States and other global north nations.  The institution of family and the 
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ontology of the private and intimate realm, however, do not sit easily with liberal political 
theory.  As Jean Bethke Elshtain (1981) notes, 
As these thinkers recast distinctions between public and private in order to 
take the family out of the politics and the politics out of the family, they 
found that the remnants of patriarchalism were not so easily expunged.  
The image of the human being which emerged triumphant in 
postpatriarchal political thought was in tension with, yet parasitic upon, 
the person as family man or woman. (1981, 106) 
 
As an immediate precursor to social contract theorists, some feminists look to Filmer to 
provide insight into modern policy theory.  Elshtain sees Filmer’s politicization of the 
family and familialization of the commonwealth as providing no room for individuals, 
whether male or female, to conceive of themselves as political (103).  She observes that 
the excesses of Filmer’s unreflective familial naturalism are replac d with contractualism 
and absolute obedience to authority in Hobbes and an excessive rationalism in Locke 
(106-117).  However, Elshtain maintains, neither Hobbes nor Locke adequately 
countered Filmer’s patriarchalism, so much so that as they sought to depoliticize the 
relationships in the family, they integrated a set of assumptions regarding birth, 
childhood, and women’s roles in society.  Hobbes’ conception of family, like the 
commonwealth, is dominated by fear, subjection, and obedience (110-111).  Hobbes 
states, 
The right of dominion by generation, is that, which the parent hath over 
his children; and it is called PATERNAL.  And is not so derived from the 
generation, as if therefore the parent had dominion over his child because 
he begat him; but from the child’s consent, either express, or by other 
sufficient arguments declared.  For as to the generation, God hath ordained 
man a helper; and there be always two that are equally parents: the 
dominion therefore over the child, should belong equally to both; and he 
be equally subject to both, which is impossible; for no man can obey two 
masters.  And whereas some have attributed the dominion to the man only, 
as being of the more excellent sex; they misreckon in it.  For there is not 
44 
 
always that difference of strength, or prudence between man and the 
woman, as that right can be determined without civil war.  In 
commonwealths, this controversy is decided by the civil law; and for the 
most part, but not always, the sentence is in favor of the father; because 
for the most part commonwealths have been erected by the fathers, not by 
the mothers of families. (quoted in Elshtain 1981, 155) 
 
Elshtain, a pro-family feminist, or as some describer her, a family communitaria , is also 
concerned with Hobbes’ lack of morality in his conception of the family and 
commonwealth and his rejection of the social view of human nature.  Locke, on the other 
hand, creates a public world of rationality, contrasted to the private realm of passion nd 
desire.  In the public sphere, this reason served to both break from the authority of the 
past and create a separation from irrational desire.  The private realm, the one occupied 
by women, however, was further separated from public discourse and action (1981, 116).  
Furthermore, in terms of family, Elshtain argues, Locke tries to reject patriarchy as 
having any basis in nature; however, he asserts that dominion over women and children 
derives from the laws and traditions of man (124-125).  Although Locke did insist upon 
an equal education for girls and boys in the use of reason and asserted that women had 
the right to earn and make contracts, according to Elshtain: 
Public grants of parity to women have gone hand in glove within 
liberalism from Locke’s time to our own, with extraordinary disparity in 
the distribution of goods and services and in the concrete allocation of 
economic and social power.  Locke’s abstract grant of property rights is in 
some important ways tendentious in a social situation in which in which 
the female portion of the population is propertyless.  If past history is 
patriarchal—in this Locke agrees—and the chief motive for the formation 
of civil society is the preservation of property (understood as a variety of 
‘goods,’ not simply economic), it is difficult to see how women can 
emerge, simply by a grant of formal rights, from a condition of 




Elshtain’s comments, while an important contribution to feminist and liberal political 
theory, have been put forth in the context of her own political agenda.  Elshtain believes 
it is possible to articulate a particular vision of the family that does not recreat  the 
oppression or exploitation of earlier theorists, but can coexist with a public life n which 
virtue, freedom, and law is central.  She believes that the family and childrearing are 
central to the establishment of basic, human existence and an ethical polity, and as such
must be nurtured (347-352).  For her, a woman’s sex should not dictate what she does in 
public realms, such as education or employment, but principles of self-interest and liberty 
should also not become dominant in the family.    
In addition to Susan Moller Okin’s observations of liberal political theory 
(discussed later) and Jean Bethke Elshtain’s critiques of liberalism, two of the most far 
reaching criticisms worth considering come from Hanna Pitkin and Carole Pateman.  In 
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (1975), Pocock describes the circumstances and the Florentine identity under 
which Machiavelli’s thought arose--the “moment”.  Machiavelli attempted to provide 
stability in uncertain and violent times.  Pocock seeks to illustrate that Machiavelli was a 
republican theorist (in the tradition of Aristotle) and his thought was consistent with his 
contemporaries, and thus, it might be possible to ward off some highly critical 
interpretations.  According to Pocock, Machiavelli’s virtù in the Discourses is similar to 
that in Aristotle’s arête, but Pocock has been criticized from a number of theoris s on that 
point.  For Skinner (1998), while Machiavelli might advocate republican institutions, it is 
not because he is concerned for the liberty of citizens but security from outside invasion 
and internal corruption.  In Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of 
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Niccolò Machiavelli (1984), Hanna Pitkin turns away from the focus on virtu and turns 
the lens towards Machiavelli’s ambivalence surrounding masculinity, dependence, and 
self-sufficiency, all of which, she maintains, provides a deeper understanding of his 
vision of a republic.  Pitkin contends that autonomy, eked out from Machiavelli’s 
discussions of self-sufficiency and the danger inherent in needing others, is the unifying 
thread in Machiavelli’s thought.  Machiavelli holds a number of truths in tension: what is  
means to be human, political, and autonomous.  She argues that this understanding of 
autonomy is not the atomistic sort posited by social contract theorists.  Machiavelli’s 
insights are dissolved by his metaphorical use of masculinity and femininity i virtu and 
fortuna, respectively, so that all three incompatible elements are related to manhood.  
According to Pitkin, Machiavelli is explicitly misogynistic in his rendering of women: 
they are dependent, weak, indecisive, easily manipulated, and fearful (1984, 110).  Young
women weaken men’s self-control and older women are manipulative and control men’s 
access to desirable women (132).  Far worse, however, is his retelling of the Lucretia 
story as the prototypical dangerous and seductive woman, despite having been the victim 
of a rape (112).  Although Machiavelli does not directly address the issue of autonomy as 
manhood, Pitkin’s reading finds it as a recurring theme.  Pitkin points to two models of 
manhood used by Machiavelli: the mythical, superhuman Founder and the relational, 
participating Citizen.  Both are utilized as devices to illuminate Machiavelli’s vision of 
political liberty and action, and Pitkin maintains that the only conception of public life, 
for Machiavelli, is one built on domination, machismo, and misogyny (305).  For Pitkin, 
“Machiavelli’s sexual and familial imagery, meant to challenge men out of their concern 
with private, household matters of wealth and family into the more ‘manly’ realm of 
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political life, has the opposite effect, arousing images of domination and submission and 
undermining that capacity for mutuality which citizenship requires” (306).  Thus, “by 
denying the humanity of women, men are bound to misunderstand their own” (306).  
Although the personification of “fortuna” as a female is not new, Machiavelli’s version 
“appears to be the first to use that metaphor as a way of suggesting the sexual conq est of 
fortune, introducing into the realm of politics and history concerns about manliness, 
effeminacy, and sexual prowess” (144).  Images of fertility and reproductin are 
frequently set alongside barrenness and entropy.  Pitkin points out, according to 
Machiavelli, “authority is a prerequisite to freedom, in politics as in family life” (247).  
Therefore, mothers being pushed into the background are necessary for the establishment 
of republican liberty. 
In The Sexual Contract (1988), Carole Pateman attempts to explain how 
traditional birthright is sub-planted by political right through contract.  She argues that 
the story of the social contract establishes not only political right, but also patriarchal 
right–the power men exercise over women--thus establishing a modern form or 
patriarchy.  With the exception of Hobbes, modern theorists claim that women lack the 
natural “attributes and capacities as individuals.”  Only individuals participa e in the 
original contract.  Therefore, sexual difference means political differenc.  Women are 
subjects in the original contract, but not parties to the contract.  The sexual contrct is 
associated with both the public and the civic realm.  Pateman makes a number of claims 
about the original social contract.  Although social contract theory is typically presented 
as gaining civil freedom protected by the state, Pateman says civil freedom is not 
universal; the social contract established civil freedom for men, but subjection over 
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women.  Therefore, she says, “contract is the means through which modern patriarchy is 
constituted” (2).  Although contract theorists claim that social contract established a 
public sphere of civil freedom, Pateman says an entire sexually differentiated society was 
created with patriarchy expressed in both the public and private sphere (11-12).  The 
private sphere, which includes marriage, was not considered relevant.  Patriarchy also 
spills over into the public sphere affecting issues such as employment and prostitution.  
Since contract is a primary element of contemporary social association (just like the 
relationship between husband and wife, and capitalist and worker), Pateman uses the 
sexual contract to shed light on why problems will occur for women as they engage i 
contracts (1988, 10-13). 
  Pateman names three different types of historical patriarchy as she develops her 
typology of modern sexual contract.  Traditional patriarchal thought includes the family, 
headed by the father, as the model for all power relations (23).  Classical patrirch l 
thought expressed paternal power and political power as identical (24).  The fiction in 
this model, she maintains, is that the family is a natural institution and the father’s power 
arose from his natural capacities and care.  Sons were born into subjection to their fathers 
and thus into political subjection.  Modern patriarchal thought, however, is “fraternal, 
contractual, and structures capitalist civil society” (25).  Pateman argues that “the story of 
the sexual contract begins with the construction of the individual” (38).  Contract theory
justifies subjection by presenting it as freedom.  Contract theorists claim th t individuals 
are born naturally free and equal.  With classic contract theory, previous arguments about 
rulers acting through God’s will and appeals to custom and tradition, were rejected.  A 
free and equal individual had to agree to be ruled by another and the method to do this 
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was the contract.  Only men have the attributes of free and equal individuals and so 
relations of subordination between men must originate in contract if they are legitimate.   
 Pateman offers a novel explanation for how women are left out of the original 
social contract (47-49).  According to Pateman, in classical contract theory t  family 
was no longer the model of political authority.   The father or king wielding absolute 
power was not longer consistent with the modern principles of equality and freedom.  A 
father’s natural right over his sons was not political power.  Contract is necessary bec use 
fathers have been stripped of their political power and need some way to create and 
exercise political right.  Men do not, then, contract as husbands or fathers, they contract 
as brothers.  Civil society might be fatherless, but it is still a brotherhood of men (1988, 
78-95).  Once they are in civil society, the subjection of women is secured through the 
marriage contract.  If women were in fact as free and equal as the original story purports, 
they would not agree to a pact that subordinated women to men in civil society.  She says 
that in Hobbes’ state of nature, no person would willfully give up one’s life, so the 
defeated man makes a contract to obey the victor.  Male individuals will also conquer 
females who will become servants and are excluded from the original pact.  With respect 
to Locke, Pateman observes that in the natural condition women are excluded from the 
status of the individual, as only men are free and equal beings.  Women are naturally 
subjugated to men, but they still must enter the marriage contract (52).   
These insights from feminist theory help illuminate the potentially problematic 
nature of both classical republicanism and liberalism.  It also raises concerns surrounding 
rights and responsibilities in the state that are differentiated by sex.  The intimate spaces 
of the household as well as the public do not guarantee the same privacy, autonomy, and 
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freedom to deliberate for women as they are for men.  And yet, these same featur s 
remain embedded in American political theory. 
 
Civic Myths and Archaisms  
 In 1873, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Bradwell v. Illinois (1873) that Illinois 
had the power to control and regulate the administration of legal licensing for thepractice 
of law in state court, denying Bradwell’s Fourteenth Amendment claim and preventing 
her from practicing law.  Myra Bradwell’s application to practice law hd been denied by 
the Supreme Court of Illinois because she was married.  In his concurring opinion, Justice
Bradley noted the following: 
It certainly cannot be affirmed, as an historical fact, that this has ever been 
established [the right of females to pursue any legal employment] as one 
of the fundamental privileges as one of the fundamental privileges and 
immunities of the sex.  On the contrary, the civil law, as well as nature 
herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres 
and destinies of man and woman.  Man is, or should be, woman’s 
protector and defender.  The natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the 
occupations of civil life.  The constitution of the family organization, 
which is founded on the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of 
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the 
domain and functions of womanhood.  The harmony, not to say identity, 
of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the family 
institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and 
independent career from that of her husband.  So firmly fixed was this 
sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of 
that system of jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate 
from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the 
social state; and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil 
status, many of the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon 
this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most States.11 
 
The Supreme Court decision went beyond agreeing with the state of Illinois’s position in 
this case, it subsumed women’s personhood under her spouse.  If we are to follow legal 
                                                
11 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) 
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theorists in asserting that reality and the contours of rights in the United States are 
represented in legal decisions, we see how women’s relationship to family and the 
domestic sphere was enshrined in early American law.  American political theory as 
been described by some at the red-headed step child of political theory.  Despite 
interesting debates over gender, manhood, and sexuality that took place at the star of the 
American republic, most traditional theoretical discussions of the founding period focus 
on the balance between republicanism and liberalism.  From Gunnar Myrdal’s American 
Dilemma (1944) to Louis Hartz’s Liberal Tradition in America (1955), early major 
interpretations of American political thought focus on various aspects of Tocqueville’s 
account of the American republic.  Regardless of racial concerns (in Myrdal) o  the 
boundaries between the remnants of feudalism, democracy, and property rights (in 
Hartz), the egalitarian and democratic notions advanced by Tocqueville remain central to 
these interpretations.  Through the 1970s and 1980s, accounts by Pocock (1975) and 
others offered a challenge to the dominance of liberalism with an emphasis on “classical 
republicanism” or “republican revisionism.”  Emphasizing virtue, the public good, and 
positive liberty, advocates of the republican tradition sought to unseat Hartzian 
Lockeanism as the dominant interpretation of the founding period.  American political 
theory and public law has also seen a refashioning of republican arguments based on the 
privileging of “the public.”  Most of these accounts, however, categorically disregard 
gender as salient to a republican revival of the liberal project, while others merely 
mention gender critiques in passing and offer no way to account for or integrate these 
concerns.12 
                                                
12 The term “republican revival” originates in S. D. Gerber, "The Republican Revival in American 
Constitutional Theory," Political Research Quarterly 47, no. 4 (1994). Gerber coins the term in a review of 
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When the lens is pulled back and refocused to include more groups in the inquiry, 
how then might scholars understand United States ideology?  Most notably, in Civic 
Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (1997), Rogers M. Smith has 
recast the debate in American political thought through the notion of “multiple 
traditions.”  According to Smith, 
Many analysts have since advanced similar interpretations out of the same 
range of motivations, thereby reinforcing beliefs that American values 
have always been have always been as these great writers described.  Yet 
all three wrote during periods when the nation was denying most persons 
access to full citizenship on racial, ethnic, or gender grounds.  Their ability 
to stress the democratic nature of American values despite these facts is
vivid testimony to how their comparative baseline of European class 
politics led them to minimize other types of ascriptive inequality.  But 
each of them did take notice of America’s exclusionary practices, again in 
influential ways. (20) 
 
Smith’s notion of ascriptive inegalitarian traditions challenges the ubiquity of the liberal 
tradition (3).  Smith maintains that inegalitarianism and illiberal notions such as nativism, 
sexism, racism, and Anglo superiority are as much a part of the American founding 
identity as liberalism and democratic republicanism.  Awareness of these doctrines can 
help us identify and address ongoing illiberal impulses in our political lives.  Morethan 
his “multiple traditions” theory, Smith’s notion of “civic myth” is relevant to this project.  
Civic myths are used to describe how people form a nation, who is included in 
membership, and the values attached to the community (33).  Smith explains, “Civic 
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Freedom and Government (Clarendon, 1999); Philip Pettit, "Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a 
Difference with Quentin Skinner," Political Theory 30, no. 3 (2002); J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian 
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Princeton University Press, 1975); and Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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myths inspiring faith that memberships are preordained and blessed can especially foster 
prejudices that may do more than ‘enlightened reason’ to instill ‘reverence’ for the laws 
constituting their society” (33).  More importantly, “even the liberal and republican 
traditions stressed in standard accounts of American political culture are themselv s not 
simply rationalistic political doctrines but also civic myths, much more than tose 
accounts generally acknowledge” (36).  However, by recasting the multiple traditions he 
describes as part myth, Smith downplays the extent to which the illiberal traditions gain 
and carry out power and coercion. 
Smith’s critics argue that the “multiple traditions” approach artificially separates 
discourses that were fundamentally intertwined, holding that ‘liberalism’ and ‘ascriptive 
Americanisms’ were clearly distinct and inherently incompatible species.  Others, such as 
Nackenoff (2007), assert that the entire notion of the “liberal tradition” may have long 
since outgrown its usefulness towards understanding American political ideology and 
development.  Catherine A. Holland (2001), while acknowledging the nuance in Smith’s 
argument and contribution to American political development, maintains that he too 
easily exonerates American liberalism; he grasps the political tradition but oversimplifies 
the liberal tradition (xvi).  What Smith misses, according to Holland, and reminiscent of 
Sheldon Wolin and Wendy Brown, is that “precisely those elements that are assumed to 
have been overcome by the emergence of the late modern state turn out to have been 
incorporated within it, and held [in] reserve by it, to be deployed in moments of crisis”
(2001, xix).  Holland asserts, 
That the body erupts on the scene of politics in moments of public crisis 
suggests that it never fully eliminated from liberal democratic order, but is 
instead reconfigured by and incorporated within it.  The body may be 
made invisible to or transparent within the modern public realm, but it is 
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nonetheless held in reserve as a political force that becomes visible (or is 
made visible) in the very moments when order itself is at its most 
vulnerable. (xiv) 
 
Therefore, the body is more complicated as a political symbol than Smith’s version can 
capture.  Holland continues, 
To put it another way, it could be said that modern political thought does 
not fully overcome or abandon its premodern past, but instead 
recharacterizes elements of the past as archaisms that inhibit and work in 
new ways within the modern.  One way of illuminating modernity’s 
production of archaisms—and more specifically, modernity’s production 
of the body as an archaic figure—is to retell with new emphases and a 
slightly shifted focus on the foundational modern tales of the origins of 
political society, namely, that of man’s passage from the prepolitical state 
of nature to an established political order. (xx) 
 
The human body is used as a figure of freedom and sovereignty, but nonetheless, remain  
a site of subjection and coercion.  The language of the body is also represented in 
constitutions, the law, and through social policy in the modern administrative state.  The 
founding of the American republic carried with it metaphors from liberal political theory.  
While the founders sought perpetual newness, theories contained and incorporated 
elements of the past (2).  Holland incisively argues that a mythology of pastlessness that 
was characteristic of the American founders is also present in the writings of late modern 
political theorists, including Arendt’s privileging of natality as the source of beginnings 
and political action and Rawls’ veil of ignorance which artificially obscures social 
hierarchy and identity (3).  Both nation and citizen are seen as being self made.           
According to Marc E. Kann (1998), the American founders shared a vision of 
reigning in democratic disorder through hegemonic gender norms (26).  The rhetoric of 
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republican ideology alongside liberal self-interest served to both eliminate women from 
political discourse and depoliticize male familial authority.  Furthermore, Kann notes,      
They promoted hegemonic masculinity as part of their effort to restrain 
disorderly male passions, temper men’s democratic desires, restore 
fraternal order, and reconstitute political authority.  They advanced a 
coherent conception and language of manhood based on the consensual 
norms that enjoined males to establish independence, start families, and 
govern dependents to achieve manhood and procreate new generations.  
They stigmatized, sanctioned, and reformed disorderly men, whose 
marginal masculinity associated them with dependency, effeminacy, 
immaturity, and sterility.  They rewarded the complicit masculinity of men 
who conformed to consensual norms by recognizing their social merit and 
citizenship.  And they promised immortal fame along with social status 
and political authority to extraordinary men who, like themselves, 
procreated a new nation and glorious future for humankind. (28-29). 
 
Similarly, historian Linder Kerber notes in Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology 
in Revolutionary America (1980) that “republican motherhood” was endorsed by the 
founders as a way for virtuous women raise rational male citizens.  While women may 
become educated, their primary role in relation to the state was domestic and maternal.  
Ann Norton (1986) has highlighted gendered metaphors used to describe U.S. antebellum 
sectionalism, with a patriarchal North and feminized and maternal South.  Historian Nina 
Silber (1993) observes that after the American Civil War rhetoric of reconciliation 
depicted the nation as a household and family whose parts were being joined by 
Reconstruction initiatives.  In the policy arena, most notably the Freedman’s Bureau, the 
black male was viewed as the head of household and was permitted to contract for labor 
for the entire household.  The Freedman’s Bureau Act of 1865 (formally known as An 
Act to establish a Bureau for Relief of Freedman and Refugees) allotted land grants to 
black males and to unmarried black females a year later through the Southern Homestead 
Act (Foner 1988, 87).  According to Holland, “The family, long suppressed by liberal 
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modernism as a principle of political organization (if not as an economic unit), returned 
in precisely that capacity in, during, and as Reconstruction” (2001, 140).       
 
Family beyond Modern Political Theory 
The economic theory canon is no more forgiving in terms of nuclear family 
hegemony.  On the one hand, there existed the valorization of individualism in 
neoclassical, market-based theories and on the other, a romanticization of family 
benevolence and cooperation in socialist economic thought.   For some early socialist 
scholars, such as Robert Owen, natural sentiment would be enough to maintain a 
cohesive family unit (Folbre 2003, 98).  Owen’s vision for industrial society was based 
on a sense of cooperation and egalitarianism that he attributed to the family.  It is evident 
in this example how Enlightenment ideals incorporated problematic and idealized 
versions of the family.  However, when the lens is turned onto Enlightenment and social 
contract theory writ large, the paternalistic and familial aspects become largely hidden.  
Political theorists disregard the family with little explanation.  Utilitarian James Mill also 
advanced a paternalistic theory of family: women’s political rights would be repr sented 
by their fathers and husbands (2003, 99).  William Thompson, an advocate of social 
reform, contraception, and women’s suffrage, in conjunction with journalist Anna 
Wheeler, pointed out contradictions in economic theories which claimed that men could 
be self-interested in their interactions with each other and at the same time altruistic with 
regard to their wives and children (2003, 100).   
 Women fared no better under Marx and Engels’ early scientific socialism, which 
prioritized class interests over women’s interests.  According to Nicholson (1986), 
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“Liberalism at its base is founded on a reification of the categories of family nd state, 
and Marxism is equally founded on a reification of the category of the economic” (131).  
Both Marx and Engels half-heartedly condemned women’s oppression, but argued that 
the source of oppression was private property and the capitalist system; attempting to 
resolve women’s issues was counterproductive to broader class interests (Folbre 2003, 
102).  In The Condition of the Working Class in England (1958), Engels was primarily 
concerned with the status of men in the family, arguing that male unemployment in some 
industrial cities created a system of dependency in which the wife was the breadwinner 
and the husband relegated to domestic duties.  Engels added that if the factory system, 
which created a system of dependency was unnatural, so too “the former rule of the 
husband over the wife must also have been unnatural” (1958, 194).  However, this nod to 
women’s equality was super-ceded by the class interests of working class men.  Since 
childbearing and child rearing was unrelated to surplus value or creative labor, domestic 
tasks were relegated to the realm of nature.  It was not until 1880s that Engelsaddr sed 
women’s issues specifically.  Engels used historical materialism to locate gender 
inequality in social evolution and not biological determinism; however, the proletarian 
family was absolved from gender conflict.  
Courses such as Liberalism and its Critic and the Liberal/Communitarian Debate 
are ubiquitous in political science departments.  Most critiques of liberalism, however, 
rarely include discussions of gender, race, or sexuality.  In Justice, Gender, and the 
Family (1989), Susan Moller Okin offers one of the most comprehensive critiques of 
liberal political theory and its relationship to the family.  In the political sphere, liberals 
evoke a notion of the political conception of persons such that citizens are understood as 
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free and equal individuals engaged in the process of public reason in order to develop 
inclusive principles of justice. These principles are to provide a political framework for 
questions of basic justice and constitutional essentials which would be applicable to the 
basic structure of society.  The personal sphere, in contrast, is the domain where citizens 
pursue their own specific conceptions of the good or views of human excellence within 
the general strictures of the principles of justice.  Okin’s (1989) criticism falls into two 
major categories.  She maintains that theorists of justice continuation of the “separate 
spheres” tradition renders the family as nonpolitical (9) and superficial gender neutrality 
permits theorists to disguise their failure to adequately address socially and biologically 
relevant features that impact men and women differently (10), both of which result in 
women’s exclusion from the promotion of justice, undermines equal opportunity, and 
renders a just society impossible without a just family (14).  Okin points out, if the 
internal organization of the family is outside the scope of the principles of justice, and a 
particular family is based on illiberal and sexist principles, then this must raise serious 
doubts about whether the female members of that family form can achieve the requisite 
political conception of self. Contemporary political theorists of justice “assume, though 
do not discuss, the traditional gender-structured family” and “they often employ gender-
neutral language in a false, hollow way” (1989, 8).   
At the heart of Okin’s criticisms of the liberal public/private distinction is the 
ambiguity liberal political theory shows towards the family as part of the basic structure 
of society.  The family is both part of the basic structure but also exempt from the 
principles of justice.  According to Okin, most contemporary libertarians’, 
communitarians’, and democratic liberals’ failure to address the family rende s their 
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conceptions of justice problematic (21).  Although moral and social development takes 
place first in the family (in all of its different forms), theorists of justice rarely 
acknowledge its importance.  Okin notes many contemporary theorists either fail to 
consider the family altogether or downplay the family as an important political institution 
(9).13  Rawls, an exception to this, assumes family is just. 
In A Theory of Justice (1971), John Rawls asserts that the family is a basic 
element of society and assumes that the heads of households will decide in ways that will 
be beneficial to the family unit.  Along with liberty, the market, and private property, 
Rawls includes the monogamous family as one of the major social institutions which 
distribute rights and duties and through which a persons’ ability to thrive is mitigated (7).  
Rawls acknowledges that these factors impact one’s life chances.  However, as Rawls 
develops his theory of justice—justice as fairness—through the difference principle, the 
family is given scant attention.  His assumption of the fairness of the family means that it 
plays no role in his allocation of resources which are intended to serve the least 
advantaged and moderate the arbitrariness of nature (101-102).  Rawls continues that th  
difference principle enables fraternity.  It is through fraternity, described as both “civic 
friendship and social solidarity,” that liberty and equality are conveyed in democracy 
(105).  While many scholars criticize Rawls for ignoring family as he construct  his 
theory of justice, it is evident that family is crucial towards his understanding of the 
development of his difference principle.  However, we see Rawls presenting a 
                                                
13 For other feminist critiques of liberal political theory see, V. Bryson, Feminist Political Theory - An 
Introduction (London: Macmillan, 1992); A. Echols, Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 
1967-1975 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989); E. Frazer and N. Lacey, The Politics of 
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1993); R. Lister, Citizenship - Feminist Perspectives (London: Macmillan, 1997); and T. Tong, Feminist 
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dramatically naïve conception of families and familial decision-making and he has no 
sense of the economic role that family plays in society.  With respect to the family, Rawls 
notes,  
The difference principle, however, does seem to correspond to a natural 
meaning of fraternity: namely, the idea of not wanting to have greater 
advantages unless this is to the benefit of others who are less well off.  The 
family, in its ideal conception and often in practice, is one place where the 
principle of maximizing the sum advantages is rejected.  Members of a 
family commonly do not wish to gain unless they can do so in ways that 
further the interests of the rest.  Now wanting to act on the difference 
principle has precisely this consequence.  Those better circumstanced are 
willing to have their greater advantages only under a scheme in which this 
works out for the benefit of the less fortunate. (105) 
 
As Rawls shifts from his explanation of the difference principle to how parties behave in 
the original position to articulate his notion of justice, he continues using the institut on 
of family as an example of the foundation of justice: “[W]e may think of the parties as 
heads of families, and therefore having a desire to further the welfare of their nearest 
descendents” (128).   
According to Carole Pateman (1988), Rawls’s task is “to find a picture of an 
original position that will confirm our intuitions about existing institutions, which include 
patriarchal relations of subordination” (42).  In Women and Human Development: A 
Capabilities Approach (2000), Martha Nussbaum addresses Rawls’s claims about the 
family being one of the institutions of the basic structure of society to which his two 
theories of justice apply (271).  She observes that in response to his feminist critics,14 
Rawls amends his previous formulation, adding that the two principles of justice do not 
apply to the internal functioning of families.  Therefore, the difference principle no 
longer applies to the distribution of resources within the family; however, princi les of 
                                                
14 Largely a response to Susan Moller Okin’s criticism.  
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justice will provide some basic constraints on behavior (271).  Rawls compares families 
to institutions such as churches, universities, and other civic associations that are
governed by rules though may not privilege liberty as part of its internal governanc .  
Nussbaum notes that Rawls remains conflicted on how to address family.  She says, 
“Rawls is clearly torn between the idea that the family is so fundamental to the
reproduction of society and to citizens’ life chances that it must be rendered just, and the 
equally powerful idea that we cannot tolerate so much interference with the internal 
workings of this particular institution” (273).  In some ways this dilemma represnts the 
same concerns many feminists articulate about the family and yet even Rawls’s most 
understanding response to feminists is based on a traditional conception of family.  
Nussbaum continues, 
He gives this unit, vaguely specified, a high degree of centrality and 
support, and he never asks what other affiliative groupings of individuals 
might, for related reasons, deserve state protection and support.  Thus, 
despite his attack on the private-public distinction, he retains the picture of 
a society of people divided into nuclear home units that has frequently 
been used to underwrite that distinction.  He strongly suggests that the 
family has a prepolitical form and that politics can regulate it on the 
outside rather than constitute it from the ground up – although at the same 
time he insists that a sphere of life is not a ‘place or space’ exempt from 
justice.  Rawls may also retain, in a related way, a distinction between 
state action and inaction that suggests that the state is not acting when it 
does not interfere with the traditional shape of the family, where it would 
be acting were it to attempt to change modes of family governance. (276) 
 
Unfortunately, as Nussbaum readily admits, her capabilities approach and Rawls’s two 
theories of justice render similar answers on how to address gender justice.  Even as 
Nussbaum introduces the idea of women’s collectives as a potential social foundatin 
62 
 
protected by the state, she seeks to attach special privileges to some family types over 
others in accordance with the promotion of human capabilities (279).15         
     In a similar though different vein to Rawls, Gary Becker in A Treatise on the 
Family (1981) argues that the family unit’s goal is the maximization of utility.  However, 
he maintains that families are held together by altruism, and only later add d that other 
motives such as anger and guilt should be added to the model.  He assumes that the head 
of household will distribute resources and opportunities in a manner that benefits the 
entire household.  Since the family is a collection of preferences and desires, it may be 
considered as one unit; it is unnecessary to consider each individual in the household.  
Internal inconsistencies aside, Becker need not attempt to attribute agency to ea h
member of the household.  Unlike many political theorists, neoclassical economists are 
brutally honest about what matters in the market (such as efficiency and self-inter st) and 
what does not (this includes child care, equal pay for equal work, reproductive labor, and 
the household).  To his credit, Becker acknowledges that production occurs in the 
household.  Michele Pujol (2003) observes that the neoclassical economics paradigm 
excludes women from the public realm of the market; it also silences feminist economists 
as a legitimate voice of dissent and (22).  Other feminist economists assess their goals in 
the following manner: 
Feminist analysis shows that economics relies on highly gendered and 
raced metaphors, the most famous of which is ‘homo economics,’ or the 
rational economic agent, a conception of human agency that reflects a 
privileged, masculine world-view.  Rational agents have no necessary 
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obligations or responsibilities and interact contractually with others only 
when it is in their best interests to do so.  Moreover, since neoclassical or 
mainstream economics is defined by its method of analysis rather than 
domain of study—conventional economics generally admits only 
explanations based on self-interested exchange between rational economic 
agents—it fails adequately to account for a variety of factors germane to 
women’s (and men’s) lives. (Barker and Kuiper 2003, 2-3) 
 
These criticisms are similar to those expressed by feminist scholars in political science 
and urban politics.  Other scholars, including Anthony Giddens, have theorized the 
private realm but these interpretations still come up short in speaking to the material 
circumstances of women’s lives.  Giddens (1992) argues that transformations in private 
life, intimacy, and gender relations represent a democratization of the emotions.  
“Chosen” relationships are superior to kinship structures because they operate through
negotiation and personal values, offering a “pure” relationship rather than one embedded 
in patriarchal familialism or in the social expectations of modernity.  However, it is 
important to note that this claim seems to uncritically endorse (rather than in errogate) 
emergent western relationship models that may seem rather less pure to other observers. 
Legal scholar Judith Resnick (2003) points to the multiple ways in which the 
federal government defines family, through federal bankruptcy law, child support 
provisions related to cash assistance recipients, immigration law, and retirement and 
pension provisions (132-133): “within the category of the family can be found federal 
regulation, and within the category of the federal can be found rules of family life” (135).  
And yet, despite this constellation of federal laws that create and define the family, 
attempts to utilize the power of federalism to address concerns specific to women’s 
equality has been met with resistance (Siegel 2002).  For example, the Supreme Court 
held in United States v. Morrison (2000) that the civil rights remedy related to gender 
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motivated violence in the 1994 Violence against Women Act was unconstitutional.  In 
terms of privacy and the law, the contours of family are further complicated.  The modern 
private family is typically characterized as distinct from the state; however, Fineman 
(2002) argues that the family and state are interactive and define one another (237).  The 
family as an institution is dynamic in its relationship to the state and, therefor , can be 
reconfigured to reflect specific aspirations.   
In Queer Family Values: Debunking the Myth of the Nuclear Family (1999), 
Valerie Lehr warns readers of the dangers inherent in the unqualified embrace of 
liberalism and rights-based politics. Providing a convincing argument for a radicl 
democratic approach, Lehr encourages readers to question the values and assumptions 
underlying conventional gay politics. In doing so, she challenges us to widen our visin 
of "family" in ways that address the complex concerns of not only gay and lesbian 
families, but all forms of intimate relationships.  Lehr critiques liberal, rights-based 
reform attempts to assimilate gay and lesbian families into the existing judicial system. 
Focusing on the debate over same-sex marriage, she argues that current attempts a  
reform are an inadequate means for reconstituting the power structures that silence and 
subordinate gay and lesbian individuals and the intimate relationships they forge. She 
then broadens her discussion to explore how the emphasis on rights-based reform has 
emerged historically within a social and political context that privileges certain 
hegemonic family constructions over others.  She argues that a radical democratic politics 
would ultimately transform these ideologies so as to provide for both personal security 
and greater freedom in private life.  Lehr’s insights are instructive for this project as well.  
Although same-sex marriage might allow lesbians and gay men to share a host of state-
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mediated rights and benefits, such as access to employer-sponsored medical benefits,
social security insurance, pension benefits, family estate property transfers, powers of 
attorney, and custody, it would do very little for lesbians and gay males who are less 
closely tied to the labor market and its benefits.  Same-sex marriage campaigns also 
bypass more progressive sexual liberation approaches that have been harmed by 
traditional nuclear family-centered policies.  By seeking to extend the privileges of 
marriage to sexual minorities, liberal democratic rights-based same-ex marriage 
campaigns reproduce the political and social structure of heterosexual marrige and the 
traditional nuclear family.  Seeking refuge in the private and family highlights how the 
insidiousness of the hegemonic nuclear family has been extended to mainstream lesbi n 
and gay activism.  Efforts to legalize same-sex marriage, although frequently viewed as a 
threat to the heterosexual nuclear family by traditional family values advoc tes, may 
actually buttress the sexual, family-centered state.  Following Pateman, the coercive 
conditions of dependency and subordination that is inherent in contract--in this case, the 
same-sex marriage contract--would be reinforced.           
 
Sexual Difference and the Public/Private Distinction 
For feminists, the failure to explore the nature of the private sphere is a failure of 
democratic debate.  Since women and men are not equally autonomous and free, 
inequality in the household and family make it difficult to accept that women have equal 
political rights.  Women’s perceived nature and sexual difference has largely been the 
avenue through which canonical thinkers have connected women to the family.  What is 
viewed as political is that which is public: the economy and the state.  In much ancient 
political theory, the city, or polis, is used both as a metaphor for the political realm and a 
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description of the material space in which the activities of the political are performed.   
The private, or the realm of the domestic, familial, and intimate, is considered 
nonpolitical.  Sexual difference, sexuality, and the capacities of women—both perceived 
and assigned--such as motherhood, is seen as existing outside the realm of the political 
and is usually invoked to buttress the role of women in the social realm in service of the 
political, the polis, or the state.  Moreover, without recognition of the historically reated 
spheres of family, state, economy, or the intimate, it is difficult to understand their 
interaction with gender relations.   
Classical republican accounts of the public/private split draw heavily on the 
political ideals of ancient Athens.  The public sphere was the domain where free and 
equal citizens, typically a group of men, with a capacity for deliberation and a capacity to 
engage in war met to decide matters of state.  Strong men ruled the state while women, 
children and slaves were necessarily excluded for the good of the polis. The classical 
republican notion of public and private follows a distinction between political association 
and household, between two different institutional contexts each with their own 
appropriate set of rules. The family is of little concern to the state (and vice versa) which 
is properly the concern of the head of the family. The family is an inner sanctum, a place 
where the head of the household reigns supreme beyond the reach of the state.  By 
comparison, for comprehensive liberal doctrines, the public/private distinction is of 
fundamental importance because of the role it plays in safeguarding an individual's right 
to privacy.  The individual that is established under liberal doctrines is not gender-
neutral, rather, it is based on male standards and masculine tendancies.   
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According to Pateman and Shanely (1991), “long before the separation of the 
world of women and the household from the masculine realm of politics and citizenship 
took its peculiarly modern form, political theorists had set the ‘political’ in opposition to 
‘private’ concerns” (4).  Feminist theorists have widely divergent views on the contours 
of sexual difference, capability, and the relationship of the political to the intimate, 
although all agree that patriarchy might not be so easily expunged.  Susan Moller Okin 
(1979) points out that many ancient and modern political theorists considered women 
simply in relation to their role in the family and their usefulness in sexual and 
reproductive roles (9).  Thus, this has lead to the prescription of a code of morality and 
conception of rights for women distinctly different from those that have been prescribed 
for men (9).  She notes how theorists have traditionally regarded women’s nature as 
instrumental--What are women for?--as opposed to men who are assigned innate 
potential and a host of life possibilities (10).  Jacqueline Stevens, in Reproducing the 
State (1999), asserts that “the modern notion that political authority and familial authority 
might be separate” started with social contract theory (51).  That, along with the 
continued public/private heuristic, argues Stevens, is a fiction promoted by political 
scientists which results in further reducing the visibility of familial features of the state 
(51).   
It is not possible to recount the entire scope of Jurgen Habermas’ political 
philosophy in this limited space.  I will sketch one of his central themes--his analysis of 
the public and private spheres--which is relevant for gender theory and theorizing about 
the family.  Habermas (1989; 1984) observes that modernity brings with it the increased 
rationalization of social life, or what he calls lifeworld, which is distinguished from 
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systems, or those which function according to an internal logic of end means rationality.  
The traditional public and private spheres are similar though not an exact parallel to his 
systems/lifeworld dichotomy.  Markets and government institutions operate as system  
and structure choices and social interaction.  The public form of communicative action 
occurs and is made possible by the public spheres of participatory democracy, which 
Habermas describes as public space.  In the moment of modernity the emancipatory 
potential of communicative interaction allows for socialization without repression.  
Habermas’ theoretical formulation has generated a large body of work from feminists 
critical of what they argue is a tolerance of repressive gender relations.  One influential 
response, in particular, is Nancy Fraser’s “What is Critical about Critical Theory? The 
Case of Habermas and Gender” (2001) in which she charges Habermas’ The Theory of 
Communicative Action with gender-blindness.  Joan Landes (1992) observes that 
Habermas’ The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) is a recreation of 
the bourgeois public sphere and uncritically accepts the gender ideologies that nourish
it.16  Marie Flemming (1995) presents a similar criticism.  She argues that Habermas’ 
assertion that the juridification of the previously informally managed lifeworld (including 
the family) has failed to recognize how domesticity is centered on relations of 
subordination.  Flemming (1995) also points out that it is not merely the private, but 
intimacy—gendered intimacy--that Habermas failed to understand.  According to 
Habermas, the structure of modernity is wrapped up in the distinctions between the public 
                                                
16 For other critiques of the public/private dichotomy see Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self- Gender, 
Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992), 108-109; 
Nancy Fraser, "Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribu ion to the Critique of Actually Existing 
Democracy," in Francis Barker, Peter Hulme and Margaret Iversen, editors, Postmodernism and the Re-
Reading of Modernity, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); Nancy Fraser, Justice 
Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition (New York: Routledge, 1997). 
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and private.  Chantal Mouffe (2000; 1999) and Jodi Dean (1996), proponents of agonistic 
theories of democracy, offer solutions based on replacing Habermas’ model of 
deliberative public sphere, which they see as rationalistic and hostile to cultural and value 
pluralism, with conceptions of public politics based on political conflict and contestation.  
These critics maintain that Habermas’ theory is unable to speak to sexual, cult ral, and 
ethnic difference, and on a normative level, they argue that it is not possible to draw 
emancipatory potential from otherness.17   
Habermas’ failure to attach spatiality to the public sphere has also drawn criticism 
from some scholars (Low and Smith 2006).  They maintain that “the weakness of the 
public sphere literature may lie in the distance that it maintains from the plac s and 
spaces of publicness” and therefore “an understanding of public space is an imperative 
for understanding the public sphere” (Low and Smith 2006, 6).  Theories of the public 
that are unattached to groups, places, bodies, or institutions—local and global--recreate 
assumptions of neutral spaces and locations of political power.  Furthermore, “abstracting 
from the location of real events and social relations removes and entire dimension of 
political relationality” (7).  The public sphere is socially produced and the result of 
political struggle and historical change (7).  Returning to the main topic of this project, 
we see that the theme of the relationship between space and political spheres enables us 
to better understand the materiality and spatiality of gender dynamics.  In this case, it is 
                                                
17 For other agonistic theories of democracy, see Patchen Markell. ‘Contesting Consensus: Rereading 
Habermas on the Public Sphere’, Constellations 3: 2000, 377–400 and Dana Villa. ‘Postmodernism and the 
Public Sphere’, American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992): 712–21.  On difference and 
deliberative democracy see Seyla Benhabib, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy," in 
Selya Benhabib, ed., Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1996); Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2002); James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1996); John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford 




the relationship between the house and the nuclear family that we are trying to better 
understand.  Home building involves spatial, as well as social restructuring, and rests on 
models of family. 
 
Traditional Nuclear Family Advocates 
The post-World War II period is often viewed as “the golden age of families” n 
the United States.18  Higher birth rates, larger families, and a stable divorce rate were 
characteristic of the decade following World War II.  Nuclear family advocates suggest 
that it is the era to which all other decades should compare.  According to traditional 
nuclear family advocates, the period of the 1960s and 1970s began a shift in the cultural 
and social values in the United States, creating family instability.  Women’s s xual 
liberation, sex and cohabitation outside of marriage, and increased personal liberty in 
personal life are viewed as negatively impacting families and intimate relationships.  The 
result of which has been, on the one hand, the government providing greater financial 
support through social programs such as cash assistance where the family wage has fail d 
due to family dissolution, and on the other, individuals are less likely to view the family 
as a place for citizen’s moral and civic development.  For minimal government 
advocates, it is the role of the family and not the government, to provide economic 
support.  Some family communitarians, on the other hand, maintain that the state support 
of families will strengthen both nation and civil society.  It is not surprising that 
advocates of traditional family values and the “revival” of the nuclear family focus their 
lens on a specific period in United States history as the basis of familial normalcy.   
                                                
18 See also Stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New 
York: Basic, 1992); Judith Stacey, In the Name of the Family: Rethinking Family Values in the Postmodern 
Age (Boston: Beacon, 1992). 
71 
 
A number of scholars, including democratic political theorists, have taken 
traditional family-centered values and extended them to new theories of revitalizing 
democracy.  William Galston, in A Call to Civil Society: Why Democracy Needs Moral 
Truths (1998), states that American democracy should prioritize “the likelihood that more 
children will grow up with their two married parents” (18).  His subsequent Liberal 
Pluralism: the Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (2002) 
and The Practice of Liberal Pluralism (2005) do not explicitly elaborate on those earlier 
themes, but both books provide a sense of his guiding philosophy.  Galston’s vision of 
liberal pluralism focuses on the ability for “individuals and groups leading their liv s as 
they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in accordance with their own 
understanding of what gives life meaning and value” (2002, 3).  While Galston’s Liberal 
Pluralism and The Practice of Liberal Pluralism are elegantly argued, his typology 
remains problematic for women and families.  Galston endorses a liberalism that 
prioritizes diversity by affording maximum “space for the enactment of individual and 
group differences” (2002, 23).  He argues that liberal pluralism “does not warrant the 
conclusion that the state must (or may) structure public education to foster in children 
skeptical reflection on ways of life inherited from parents or local communities” (253).  
That is, a public education grounded in liberal pluralism (and a corresponding focus on 
expressive liberty) may account for the religiously motivated parental desire to pass on 
beliefs to one’s children without consideration of conflicting beliefs or values.  The 
liberal priority on diversity and religious pluralism, then, might require accomm dation 
of distinctive and thus potentially illiberal traditions.  In addition, if political liberals can 
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endorse established religion it seems plausible that they can also endorse establish d 
heterosexual marriage. 
Unlike many other family-centered advocates, Galston deserves credit for 
attempting to construct a theory that takes the rights of all seriously, groups and 
individuals, and advances these notions in a highly respectful and non-polemic manner.  
However, although he has departed from Rawls in many ways, Galston similarly seems
guided by the idea that families are an important foundation of civil society and has been 
unable to adequately resolve this impulse in his political philosophy.  In this I see two 
types of problems.  First, Galston’s political advocacy in both the Clinton administration 
and on the Council for Families is decidedly pro-family centered,19 as is his writing on 
marriage and public policy (1996).  Galston’s political writing and advocacy make his 
philosophical positions, which emphasize liberal pluralism and are largely silent on 
family and marriage, seem disingenuous.  His emphasis on parental rights in his liberal 
pluralism typology could be viewed as a coded theoretical play for family in general.  If 
this is the case, then Galston is no different from other pro-family communitaria s and 
with respect to family, his philosophy collapses under his political positions.  Even
without his political writing to raise red flags, Galston’s focus on parental rights as the 
basis for civic education appears to be an endorsement of a particular form of life and 
structure of society: marriage, an institution which gains much of its supposed strength 
and importance from its long history and its traditional centrality, both of which are 
profoundly patriarchal.  As marriage is a legal institution, the law already intrudes on 
individuals’ liberty by defining the conditions under which people may marry and 
                                                
19 See also, William Galston, "Beyond the Murphy Brown Debate: Ideas for Family Policy," Paper 




determining the legal consequences of marriage.  Furthermore, for most fe inists, it does 
not make sense to say that the personal sphere of marriage (or even parenting) should, a  
a matter of liberty, be immune from political interference, because the personal sphere is 
already defined and regulated by politics.  While it might be possible to reformulate a 
version of Galston’s argument that resonates better with egalitarian liberal concerns by 
making the pursuit of gender equality a legitimate part of justice, thus far, such a revision 
seems outside of Galston’s intentions and could only occur with major alterations of his 
overall typology.  It is also possible that children may not be best served by marriage and 
parenthood as it is presently conceived in dominant American culture.  This criticism 
echoes Okin’s observation in Justice, Gender, and the Family (1989) that families must 
be schools of justice such that unjust parental relationships, including traditional 
marriage, are harmful to children.      
Critics of traditional nuclear family–centered policymaking maintain hat in 
addition to the problematic normative nuclear family that is the basis for civil society, 
this articulation specifically excludes same-sex couples and the non-married from this 
family-centered vision of a democratic society (Snyder 2002, 167).  Taking a broader 
view of family history in the United States, one sees that the post-World War II economic 
boom and its related social and political manifestations were neither normal nor a-
political.  Many scholars consider the post-war period in the history of the family “the 
great exception” (Mintz and Kellogg 1988).  Mintz and Kellogg note that in the United 
States “the pattern of family life characteristic of the fifties differed dramatically from 
any that has been observed earlier in our history or since” (178).   
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The "decline of the family" in American society is a theme that has become the 
focus of increasingly heated debates by politicians, pundits, and family scholars during 
the last decade.  Supporters of the family decline hypothesis have focused on the nega iv  
consequences of changing family structure and they suggest that social norms 
legitimating the pursuit of individual over collective goals and the availability of alternate 
social groups for the satisfaction of basic human needs have substantially weakened the 
social institution of the family as an agent of socialization and as a source of nurtura ce 
for family members.  According to Popenoe (2002), in the last two decades “families 
have lost functions, social power, and authority over their members…they have grown 
smaller in size, less stable, and shorter in life span” (19).  Some scholars, politicians, and 
commentators who support what are viewed as traditional nuclear family valuesfear that 
the weakened heterosexual, nuclear family is contributing to a range of social,
psychological, and economic ills: parental absence, increased divorce, childhood poverty, 
over-individualism, and lack of community values (Blankenhorn 1995).  The traditional 
nuclear family is viewed as the “natural” form of social organization.  This "family 
decline" hypothesis is limited, however, by its preoccupation with the family as a co-
resident household and the nuclear family as its primary representation. Popenoe defines 
the family as "a relatively small domestic group of kin (or people in a kin-like 
relationship) consisting of at least one adult and one dependent person" (1993, 529).  
Although this might be sufficient as a demographic definition of a "family household," it 
does not include important aspects of family functions that extend beyond boundaries of 
co-residence.  There is nothing in Popenoe's hypothesis to reflect the function of 
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multigenerational influences on children, the role of grandparents in socializing, or 
supporting grandchildren, particularly after the divorce of middle-generation pare ts. 
In response to Popenoe, Judith Stacey (1996) argues that the family is indeed in 
decline, if what we mean by "family" is the nuclear form of dad, mom, and their 
biological or adopted kids.  Families are changing in both forms and meanings, 
expanding beyond the nuclear family structure to involve a variety of kin and non-kin 
relationships.  In the last few decades, with the shift to a postindustrial domestic economy 
within a globalized capitalist system and with the advent of new reproductive 
technologies, the modem family system has been replaced by what Stacey has alled "the 
postmodern family condition," a pluralistic, fluid, and contested domain in which diverse 
family patterns, values, and practices contend for legitimacy and resourc . Stacey 
suggests that family diversity and fluidity are now "normal," and the postmodern family 
condition opens the possibility of egalitarian, democratic forms of intimacy, as well as 
potentially threatening levels of insecurity.  In addition, intense federal subsidization of 
the nuclear family occurred during the post-World War II era.  Transportation policy bu lt 
highways from central cities to suburban developments and low energy costs saw a ri e in 
car culture.  War veterans received low-interest mortgages.  Families had few multi-
generational responsibilities as seniors became more income stable through elder social 
policies.  Proponents’ of traditional family values and the nuclear family response is that 
recent family decline [in the 1980s and 1990s] is unique and more serious than other 
historical family changes (Popenoe 2002).   
Jacques Donzelot’s The Policing of Families (1979) argues that the family is the 
product of modern history, stemming largely from multiple government programs.  The 
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family, according to Donzelot, is a mechanism of social harmony and national 
productivity.   Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the family emerged as a 
link between the public and the private realms, with the private family constituted as 
separate from the gaze of the state and appearing natural, while the public family is 
managed by government social programs that address the failure of the family. The 
family, therefore, became both an end and a means of government.  Similarly, McIntosh 
and Barrett (1982) maintain that the family is as much a collective fantasy as it is an 
institution, albeit a privileged fantasy that dictates household relations.  It is also helpful 
to distinguish, as Barrett and McIntosh (1991) do, between family as a social and 
economic institution and the broader ideology of family.  These two elements act 
alongside the actual make-up of family and household composition.  It is important to 
note that these three features of family are not autonomous, as each is marked by 
characteristics of the other.  Together, these nodes act as a “moving resultant, an 
uncertain form whose intelligibility can only come from studying the system of relations 
it maintains with the socio-political level” (Donzelot 1980, xxv).  As much as family as 
an institution and often in practice is a site of political inequality, for many it remains an 
important source of love, security, identity, and community.  Recognition of the 
exclusionary effects of family and its implications is not intended to downplay the very 
real, comforting role that family plays in many lives.   
While a range of viewpoints exist from traditional family-centered advocates,  
primary concern is that changes to the nuclear family and their perceived negative social 
consequences, are cause for concern.  Wright and Jagger (1999) note contemporary 
debates surrounding family are imbued with a sense of crisis and parallel the mythical 
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panic of the late nineteenth century fin-de-siècle era invoking the health of the family and 
nation.  Nuclear family-centered assumptions work its way into various social and 
political arenas, and sometimes unlikely places.  Cynthia Burack (2003) observes that 
recent social conservative thought, what she calls New Right discourse on families, have 
attempted more sophisticated articulations of family-centered ideology by replacing “the 
natural” with a misreading of psychoanalytical theory.  Contemporary theories of 
childhood development and rearing, such as attachment theory (also known as attachmen  
parenting or AP), are rarely criticized for the ways in which they are fully-formed from 
western, nuclear family norms, assume a heterosexual parental unit, and rely on male 
breadwinner models of household economic arrangement; however, Burack maintains, 
New Right social conservatives are using theories of child development to buttress their 
visions of gender hierarchy and traditional family values (86).   
While a number of “pro-family feminists” remain committed to defending 
women’s roles in the family (McClain 2006; Elshtain 1981), other feminist scholars are 
less optimistic about maternalist and family-centered politics, and argue that women’s 
democratic citizenship cannot find its foundation in institutions of inequality, regardl ss 
of how loving (Okin 1979).  In a related vein, with this project, I argue that federal 
housing policy—whether explicitly or implicitly relying on the hegemonic nuclear 
family--has serious negative consequences for many who do not fall within the confines 
of traditional family formulations and should be a cause for concern for theorists of 
democracy and social policy formation.  Taking gender into consideration does and 
should change the way we think about democracy.  Liberal democracy wants to ignore 
and civic republicanism wants to transcend local identity and difference.  Formal 
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equalities conceded through universal suffrage have not led to substantial material 
changes in the lives of many citizens.  The deceptive abstractions and masculinity of 
orthodox modern political theory not only overlooks reproduction, housework, child 
rearing, mothering, and other features of gender-stratified family life, it integrates sex 
difference into its various forms and assumes the presence of a nuclear family to soak up 
latent anxiety and other features of the state that liberal democracy and civic 
republicanism is not designed to accommodate.   
               

























Chapter 3:  Foundations of Nuclear Family Hegemony 
 
Part I – Nascent Nuclear Family-Centered Movements 
At the back and beginning of [patriotism] is the home.  Pride of home, reverence 
for home, affection for home, [and] loyalty for home lie at the very foundation of 
true patriotism.  The home-making propaganda is the best training in national 
pride that the child or adult can have.  Homeless people make poor citizens.  
Nomads are seldom patriots.  Give us a nation of homes, with each family loving 
and beautifying and developing its own, and there will be small need for teaching 
patriotism.20   
 
The government’s role in housing matters dates primarily from two major turning 
points.  First, during the Progressive era, tenement reform laws set the precedent that 
local government would establish standards and regulate housing safety.  Second, during 
the 1930s, the public housing program, banking reforms, and the Federal Housing 
Administration (which is the focus of the second part of this chapter) determined the 
federal role in expanding homeownership and stabilizing the housing and banking 
industries.  Until the Depression, most politicians and social commentators believed that 
the private market, with a helping hand from private philanthropy, could meet the 
nation’s housing needs.21  During the Progressive-era, reformers sought to address the 
problem of dilapidated slums and tenement housing in a variety of ways, but housing 
advocates who wanted the federal government to play a major role in housing remained 
in the minority.  The economic collapse surrounding the Depression, however, provided 
                                                
20 American Home 3 (July 1929):463, Editorial, Quoted in Marsh, 1990, p. 147. 
21 The federal government’s role in housing appeared earlier through the Land Ordinance of 1785, the Old 
Soldiers Act of 1855, the Homestead Act of 1862, all land grant programs, and starting in 1917 through the 
newly established U.S. Housing Corporation (USHC), by building and subsidizing housing for defense 




“housers” with a political opening to advocate for federal government subsidization of 
social housing and helping to create a noncommercial sector free from profit and 
speculation (Radford 1996; Wright 1981).  Progressive-era social housing movements, 
however, were largely built around the gendered ideologies of the time.22  Notions of 
women’s proper roles in society, the economy, and the household contributed to the rise 
of the settlement housing movement and municipal housekeeping.  During the 
Progressive era, maternalist ideology supported the extension of women's concerns from 
the household to the larger community.23   These women-centered movements and their 
related ideologies, along with developments in city planning, zoning, and protective labor 
legislation for women, acted together to create the conditions in which early twentieth 
century American ambivalence towards municipal housing would result in federal policy 
that centered on owner-occupied, single family houses.  In this chapter I trace these 
                                                
22 Discourses surrounding republican motherhood and the cult of true womanhood in the early nineteenth 
century are widely recognized by scholars as having reified perceptions of gender roles, idealized family 
life, and promoted a specific form of motherhood as central to women’s lives in the United States. The 
concept of Republican Motherhood held that the highest duty of women was to raise virtuous citizens for 
the well-being of the new republic. Although they were restricted legally and politically from the public 
domain, post-revolutionary American women brought their acknowledged domestic role into the public 
realm through the image of Republican Motherhood. In this way, women participated in the public sphere 
but were consigned to the role of keeper of virtue. Virtue in this sense was based on the Enlightenment 
belief that man had the ability to perfect himself. It was women, as care giving mothers, who were 
necessary to rear virtuous male citizens. Thus, through Republican Motherhood, nineteenth-century 
American women were able to accomplish what the Enlightenment had not: to incorporate themselves into 
the civic culture within the confines of a separate- spheres ideology.  See Linda K. Kerber,  Women of the 
Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1980).  For more on the cult of true womanhood, also known as the cult of domesticity, see Barbara 
Welter’s influential “The Cult of True Womanhood: 1820-1860,” American Quarterly 18 (summer 1966): 
151-74, as well as the following: Barbara Epstein, The Politics of Domesticity: Women, Evangelism, and 
Temperance in Nineteenth- Century America (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1981); Glenna 
Matthews, “Just a Housewife”: The Rise of Domesticity in America (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
1987); Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-
1800 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980); and, Mary Ryan, The Empire of the Mother (New York: Haworth, 
1982).  For male domesticity, see E. Anthony Rotundo, "Body and Soul: Changing Ideals of Middle-Class 
Manhood, 1770-1920," Journal of Social History 16 (Summer 1983): 32 and Peter Gabriel Filene, 
Him/Her/Self: Sex Roles in Modern America (New York, 1974). 
23 Maternalism is discussed in detail later in this chapter.   
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developments to illustrate the foundations of nuclear family hegemony as it relates to the 
American housing agenda.        
A narrative of protecting home and the nuclear family--whether from dissolution 
of the Union, industrialization, trade unionism, communism, and urban life--has been a 
common theme throughout United States history.  Expectations for national unity were 
predicated on the assumption that the American home was inherently a site of harm ny 
rather than of discord and differences, as the house can only provide stability and security
if it remains symbolically untainted from the problems of the nation, city, and market.  
Widespread changes at the turn of the twentieth century provoked unprecedented debates 
over the meanings of home.  During this period, Karen Sánchez-Eppler (1992) observes, 
American literature illustrates how “the metaphor of a national household treats hese 
terms as mutually constitutive: anxieties about the nation produce the idealized image of 
the home, and visions of home promise to ameliorate national discord” (346).  
Policymakers, social commentators, and activists addressed the anxieties they felt about 
change by insisting on protecting the continuity of gendered stereotypes relat d to family, 
home, and motherhood.   
For middle-class households, the late Victorian period after the Civil War brought 
more attention to the individualized style of a house.  Household interiors were 
commonly considered as expressions of the woman who inhabited the house.  Suburban 
houses and those on the edge of cities, notes Margaret Marsh (1990, 147), appeared as 
safe heavens from immigrants swelling the inner cities.  Houses served to keep out 
negative influences and keep women inside.  Domestic functions, such as sewing, 
cooking, or reading, were built into the design of houses.  The sitting room, parlor, and 
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pantry spoke to women’s roles in the house.  Housing guides published by female 
decorators, Wright says, “represented particular people and also the particular cultural 
form of the very privatized nuclear family, which many American’s at the tim
considered God’s chosen universal living arrangement” (quoted in Birch 1984, 130).  In 
City of American Dreams: A History of Homeownership and Housing Reform in 
Chicago, 1871-1919 (2005), Marjorie Garber observes,  
The American conception of homeownership was profoundly transformed 
in the fifty years after the Civil War.  As the nation moved from an 
agrarian to an industrialized urban society, as immigrants from abroad and 
migrants from rural regions flowed into American cities, and as reformers 
sought to improve living conditions in impoverished urban neighborhoods, 
the ownership of a single-family house emerged as a symbol of what many 
call ‘the American dream’.  The American celebration of a particular form 
of property—the single-family house set on a tidy yard—was neither 
natural nor inevitable.  Rather, it was grounded in changing material 
conditions of housing and social relations of work in industrializing 
northern cities, and in struggles over the meaning, form, and function of 
the family home that divided wage laborers and salaried workers, 
immigrants and their native-born neighbors, tenants and municipal 
officials, and African-American and white home owners.  The result, no 
less damaging for its having been unintended, was the emergence of cities 
sharply divided along class and racial lines, and the expansion of an urban 
poor who were increasingly shut out of the nation’s housing markets. (1)   
 
The middle class house was intended to provide a refuge for men and protection for 
women.   
Amy Kaplan (1998) seeks to shift the lens away from the notion of separate 
public and private spheres in examining American domesticity towards one that 
recognizes the ways in which American foreign policy is represented in the geographic 
and cognitive boundaries of home.  In a fascinating article, Kaplan observes that the 
relationship of nationalism and imperialism to domesticity is one marked by racial
otherness:   
83 
 
When we contrast the domestic sphere with the market or political realm, 
men and women inhabit a divided social terrain, but when we oppose the 
domestic to the foreign, men and women become national allies against 
the alien, and the determining division is not gender but racial 
demarcations of otherness. Thus another part of the cultural work of 
domesticity might be to unite men and women in a national domain and to 
generate notions of the foreign against which the nation can be imagined 
as home. The border between the domestic and foreign, however, also 
deconstructs when we think of domesticity not as a static condition but as 
the process of domestication, which entails conquering and taming the 
wild, the natural, and the alien. Domestic in this sense is related to the 
imperial project of civilizing, and the conditions of domesticity often 
become markers that distinguish civilization from savagery. Through the 
process of domestication, the home contains within itself those wild or 
foreign elements that must be tamed; domesticity not only monitors the 
borders between the civilized and the savage but also regulates traces of 
the savage within itself. (582) 
 
More recent cultural history builds on these themes and illustrates how the middle class 
house in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century served as a site for cosm politan 
domesticity (Hoganson 2002, 57).  At the same time that the home was viewed as a place 
of refuge away from immigrants, the market, and other features of urban life, it captures 
some global influences of the nation that the home had intended to keep out.  Narratives 
of foreignness and empire are linked not only to production and capital, but to 
consumption.  Mirroring the concept of separate spheres for men and women, though 
highlighting the permeability of these borders, is the juxtaposition of the domstic and 
foreign, which in the context of the middle class house, played out through the 
consumption of international goods (57-58).  Elevating the place and role of women and 
motherhood in the United States acted as a compensatory effort to glorify women’s 
reduced agency.  Thus, symbolic sovereignty in the home takes the place of withdrawal 





Much has been written about the introduction of women into public life through 
voluntary associational and community service work at the turn of the century and during 
the Progressive era.  Maternalism broadly refers to the ideologies, practices, and state-
building strategies employed by groups of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
white, middle class, female social reformers (Mink 1995; Ladd-Taylor 1994; Gordon 
1994; Boris 1994; Koven and Michel 1993; Muncy 1991).  More specifically, according 
to Koven and Michel (1990), maternalism encompasses a variety of "ideologies that 
exalted women's capacity to mother and extended to society as a whole the values of car , 
nurturance, and morality" (1079). A number of scholars (Sklar 1995; Skocpol 1992) 
describe how existing social and political institutions shaped, constrained, and produced 
maternalism.  In the realm of public policy, maternalist activists contributed to a variety 
of initiatives that targeted low-income women and children.  
In Protecting Mothers and Soldiers: The Political Origins of Social Welfare 
Policy in the United States (1992), Theda Skocpol argues that that from 1900 through the 
early 1920s, the United States appeared to be developing an “internationally distinctive” 
maternalist social welfare state that included social provisions specifically for mothers 
and children and which did not rely on the connection to male wage earners or soldiers 
for receipt of public social insurance.  Maternalists, defined by Skocpol as women 
activists who sought to extend “the moral values and social caring of the home int the 
larger community" (51), were so successful in their efforts to promote specific social 
policies that they helped produce a nascent maternalist welfare state.  Skocpol develops 
an analysis of how, while male, social science-oriented advocacy groups failed to get 
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social welfare legislation passed in the early 1900s, women’s voluntary organizations 
facilitated successful legislation to benefit poor women and children.  Skocpol points out 
that analysis of U.S. welfare state creation typically adopts one of three models: social 
welfare expectancy from industrialization (adapted from the European model), emphasis 
on national values and American liberal exceptionalism (from Hartz), and the gendered 
nature of the state (social policy as a reproducer of patriarchal relations nd domination).  
None of these models, she explains, takes into account specific U.S. institutional factors,
in connection with economic, cultural, and gender structures (1992, 41-53).  This 
burgeoning maternalist welfare state was advocated and administered primarily by female 
professionals and included minimum wage laws for women and the Sheppard-Towner 
child and maternal health program.  However, Skocpol contends, opposition in the courts 
and in Congress cut short these programs in the 1920s and the maternalist potential of the 
American welfare state was never fully realized.   
Some gender scholars (Ladd-Taylor 1994, 1993; Koven 1993; Koven and Michel 
1993) argue that maternalist activism was more varied and complex than Skocpol’s 
account identifies.  Historian Molly Ladd-Taylor (1994) claims that matern lism 
embodied four elements:   
1. that there is a uniquely feminine value system base on care and 
nurturance; 2. that mothers perform a service to the state by raising 
citizen-workers; 3. that women are united across class, race, and nation by 
their common capacity for motherhood and therefore share a responsibility 
for all the world's children; and 4. that ideally men should earn a family 
wage to support their "dependent" wives and children at home. (3) 
 
This definition, Ladd-Taylor argues, would exclude those feminist and African American 
women's groups which advocated women's economic independence from men and 
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rejected the family wage system altogether.  Linda Gordon (1994) points out, however, 
that maternalism was a hegemonic approach that encompassed multiple interprtations; 
many different advocates and women’s groups relied on maternalist rhetoric, but within 
varying contexts and emphases.24  Skocpol claims to be attentive ‘gender structures,’ 
which, no doubt, contributed to the development of the welfare state; however, her 
analysis rests on the exclusion of white middle and upper class women from traditional 
politics.  Nackenoff (1999) contends, “while maternalism opened up some opportunities 
to radically revision the state, relations of dependence and asymmetry that were so 
prevalent in much of its rhetoric were not liberal relations of equality” (165).  Skocpol’s 
view does not sufficiently account for the degree to which maternalism may have been a 
mask for paternalistic activity on the part of the state.  For the purposes of thi project, it 
is important to re-examine maternalism in light of the housing policy literature, in which 
discussions of gender are surprisingly absent.  
In Dividing Citizens (1998), Suzanne Mettler points out that “while historical 
institutionalists have done much to explain the origins or determinants of public policies, 
less attention has been given to the civic and social consequences of polices” (4).  Mettler 
contends that structural arrangements, such as civic status, social status, political rules, 
and governing arrangements contribute to patterns of governance for citizensh p a d 
                                                
24 Linda Gordon (1994) points out that highlighting poor, single women as the recipients of state aid 
distorts the reality of single mothers historically and targets poor women as representatives of social and 
moral breakdown.  Reformers relied on these negative perceptions to gain popularity for their programs 
from politicians.  Single mothers were more often employed outside of the home; therefore, the rhetoric 
from reformers regarding women’s position as caretakers in the home was unrealistic moralizing.  In 
addition, the charity-oriented model of maternalist social welfare proposed by many reformers defeated 
more radical notions of women’s economic independence from men.  The implications of these reform 
policies are dramatic given the weight to which Skocpol gives these policies as potential models; however, 
they ignore a host of actual social and economic conditions or an analysis of gender structures which is 




provides the best explanation of how governing arrangements affect citizenship.  She 
explains that most pre-New Deal social provisions for women typically arose t the 
municipal or state level and did not involve the federal government; white men obtained 
national citizenship with benefits incorporated into federal institutions, while women and 
minority men were subject to labor and social policy generally administered by states or 
through grants-in-aid programs.  Thus, early government social provisions for women 
remained local and traditional.  According to Mettler (1998), “beginning with the New 
Deal, most women remained beyond the purview of the new liberal realm of citizenship” 
(24).  Mettler describes how states had the tendency of incorporating women based on 
non-liberal criteria which viewed women as “role-oriented” or “relational” instead of as 
abstract liberal individuals.  In addition to the ideological distinctions that qualified 
women for social provisions, state programs were administered differently than federal 
programs.  For state-administered programs, women were not complete rights bearing
individuals, as the benefits came with supervision and were based upon dependency and 
protection.  Mettler identifies state social provisions as “semifeudal” because of the 
ascriptive characteristics that qualified persons for benefits and because of the parochial 
ways in which the states administered the programs.  Consequently, Mettler argues, “the 
major route through which women did gain access to the national realm of citizenship in 
the New Deal was through incorporation on a distinctively non-liberal basis” (25).  
Although the local/federal distinction that Mettler highlights is applicable in terms of 
social insurance policy, it is arguable whether the same model applies to housing 
policy.25  Mettler’s instincts, however, about women’s incorporation on a non-liberal 
basis are consistent with analyses with this project.  In sum, maternalist movements did 
                                                
25 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
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not open up citizenship to women on the same terms as men.  These movements reified 
women’s sex differentiated position in the realms of the social and political. 
 
Protecting Women or Male Wage Earners? 
From teaching women the best way to clean or manage grocery shopping, 
Progressive-era-styled scientific home management invoked a strong sexual division of 
labor inside the house.  The home economics movement became even more influential 
during the interwar period, and in 1917 the Smith-Hughes Act provided federal funding 
for the establishment of home economics programs in schools (Apple 2006).  This home 
economics and professional household administration also reduced popular participation, 
as experts assured households that liberation would come through following their advice 
and not by challenging household roles and conventions (Birch 1984, 135). 
Starting in the mid-nineteenth century in the United States, the agrarian two-
parent farm model was gradually being replaced by the two-parent male breadwinner 
model; however, at the turn of the century this model only accounted for just over 50 
percent of all families (Hernandez 1993).  By 1920, married women wage earners 
increased dramatically, making dual-earning families the dominant household model 
(Scharf 1980).  During the same period, the Census Bureau reported that more Americans 
lived in urban than rural areas.  With the onset of the depression, increased 
unemployment and job competition created public animosity against married women’s 
wage earning.  Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, public school systems, the federal 
government, and private corporations began restricting married women’s employment 
(Goldin 1990; Foner 1980).  During the depression, male unemployment and women’s 
increased earnings to keep households afloat threatened the erosion of male identity, 
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undermining the breadwinner model of family/state economics (May 2008).  However, 
despite the hardships of the Depression, “some observers even saw a silver lining in
economic hardship, since it revived the economic functions and social importance of kin 
and family ties” (Coontz 1992, 13).   
Efforts to enact protective labor laws for women began in the late nineteenth 
century and crystallized in the early decade of the twentieth century.  In 1908, the 
Supreme Court reversed its 1905 decision in Lochner and decided in Muller v. Oregon 
(1908) that Oregon’s law that limited the workdays of women in laundries and other 
specific occupations was constitutional.  Eileen Boris (1994, 119) notes that Louis 
Brandeis’ brief for the National Consumers’ League (NCL) relied on the idea that 
protective labor legislation contributed to women’s overall health, as well a notion of 
women’s place in the domestic sphere.  The Court determined that the state’s interest 
were to be prioritized over women’s liberty of contract because “as healthy mothers are 
essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of 
public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race”.26  Fewer 
than ten years later, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital (1923), the Supreme Court held that 
the District of Columbia could not enforce its minimum wage laws in which employers 
were required to pay men and women at the same rate set by the District.27  Suzanne 
Mettler (1998) observes that protective labor laws “reinforced the separateness of woman 
and men in the workplace, institutionalizing occupational segregation by gender” (36) 
and led women into an unfortunate paradox: women were “protected” by states through 
                                                
26 Justice David Brewer, Opinion, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) 
27 For an excellent discussion of women’s protective labor legislation from 1897 to 1923, see Julie 
Novkov,, “Liberty, Protection, and Women's Work: Investigating the Boundaries between Public and 
Private,” Law & Social Inquiry, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Autumn, 1996), pp. 857-899.  Novk discusses how both 
state and federal courts developed understandings of liberty for women that differed from those for men. 
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labor law legislation and denied freedom of contract, while simultaneously not afforded 
the same protection as men of minimum wage laws.  Mettler also notes that New Deal 
programs that sought to address joblessness did so based on the family wage ideal: 
government officials assumed that programs for men would indirectly benefit women and 
children (1998, 45).  Along with maternalist movements for mothers’ pensions, protective 
labor law advocacy and court decisions adhered to ascribed roles for women and men 
based on their sex.          
 
Race Betterment and Housing Promotion  
In the 1920s and 1930s, American popular marital and sexual advice literature 
argued that the foundation of white civilization was the normal, heterosexual couple 
(Carter 2007).  These features of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century acted 
alongside scientific racism to connect whiteness and heterosexuality with nuclear family 
normalcy.  American eugenics was developed within a series of organizations in the early 
twentieth century, including the American Breeders Association and American Eugenics 
Society.  Eugenic thinking underscored the Progressive Era discourse of psychopathology 
and social problems.  In Building a Better Race: Gender, Sexuality, and Eugenics from 
the Turn of the Century to the Baby Boom (2005), Wendy Kline argues that a shift 
occurred in the eugenics movement, from negative eugenics in the 1920s which was 
characterized by forced sterilization, immigration and marriage restriction, and 
euthanasia, towards what is labeled positive eugenics in the 1930s which sought to 
promote pronatalist, family-centered measures.  Central to this image of positive eugenics 
is the image of the good mother, what Kline calls the “The Mother of Tomorrow.”  This
prototypical good mother provided a gendered and racial representation of American 
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progress.  Robert Rydell (1984) argues that eugenics theories and ideas about race and
heredity were spread and popularized through “the nation’s exhibition culture”: fairs, 
contests, museums, and expositions.  Fairs were one way that (racist) pseudo-sci ntific 
theories about race and ethnicity were filtered to the wider public.  “Fitter amilies for 
Future Fireside Contests,” also known as “Fitter Family” contests sponsored by the 
American Eugenics Society, were held at state agricultural fairs acro s the United States 
in the 1920s and the Children’s Bureau held “Better Baby Contests.”  Contests were 
typically held in the livestock area of the fairgrounds.  Applicant families were judged 
based on their eugenic worth, including healthy family history and talents such as musical 
ability.  Applicants completed paperwork in advance and underwent medical 
examinations and psychiatric evaluations at the fairs.  Family members with a score of 
B+ or higher received a bronze medal.28  Despite increased public pressure over the 
contests and exhibits, eugenicists were active into the 1940s, including a prominent race-
betterment contest of “Typical American Families” held in conjunction with the 1939-
1940 World’s Fair in New York City (Wolf 2009).  The contest, sponsored in part by the 
Ford Motor Company, sought applicants from each state in the country.  Winning 
families, all white with two parents and two children, were given an automobile and a
one-week “vacation” to New York City in which they resided in a Federal Housing 
Administration-built house on the fair grounds.  The families could be observed using 
appliances produced by corporations exhibiting at the fair through first-floor windo s of 
the houses.  The “Typical American Families” contest brought together both racial and 
gendered elements of American family life, while connecting the image of ood families 
with domesticity, consumer culture, and the built environment.                
                                                
28 See Image 1. 
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In 1935 the American Eugenics Society established a housing conference to 
influence community planners to design and build family-oriented suburban communities 
(Lovett 2007).  While evidence of the direct impact of the eugenics housing conference 
on U.S. housing is nevertheless limited, a number of influential housing policy and 
planning experts were either supportive of the conference goals or noted their parallel 
interests.  Edith Elmer Wood, housing activist and anti-tenement crusader, advocated f r 
housing reform that emphasized health and nuclear families, and openly supported the 
goals of the American Eugenics Society as they related to housing (Lovett 2007).  
Historian Laura L. Lovett (2007) maintains, 
 
What is important to note is the way in which a faith in positive modeling 
around the family was taken for granted.  Promoting an ideal of the 
suburban family as one with three or more children coincided with 
promotion of homes of a certain size and communities with family-
friendly features.  Eugenics and housing ideals were understood as 
mutually reinforcing, but the means to their implementation was 
understood in terms of promoting an ideal as much as actual legislation of 
support for housing. (160-161) 
 
Suburban developments were viewed as the appropriate environment in which to raise “a 
normal sized” and “well-reared family” (Lovett 2007, 104).  These arguments were 
extensions of the nativism popular at the turn of the century, as fears of race suicid
became popularized alongside anti-immigrant rhetoric, as well as maternalism that 
focused on women’s proper duty in service of the state. 
Marital sexuality was expressed as a microcosm of political and social values 
inherent to American democratic ideology (Carter 2007, 14). Marital sexual self-
discipline and “normal” family life--monogamy and heterosexuality--was identified with 
white civilization and the common good.  Sex education was one method of teaching 
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whiteness and self-control (15).  Indeed, Carter maintains, “normality gathered much of 
its meaning from its indirect reference to modern whiteness as a set of universal values 
(15).  Similar to some views of anti-miscegenation laws, regulating sex was less 
important than regulating the boundaries of race-pure wedlock and reproduction.  While 
there has been much scholarly discussion of the policing of interracial relationships 
during this period and explicitly racist literature, looking to white-on-white, heterosexual 
marriage is also instructive towards understanding how familial, sexual normalcy was 
established and promoted. 
 
From Restrictive Legislation to Housing for the Nuclear Family  
Prior to the emergence of federal health and sanitation standards, cities and state 
governments passed legislation and local ordinances to address municipal problems.  
During the Progressive era, city officials and state legislators sought ways to curb 
substandard housing and related health and sanitation problems (Henderson 2000, 45).  
The resulting restrictive legislation, which grew largely from the work of health and 
housing reformers, represented a significant extension of the government’s police 
powers.  In order to address the problems faced by the urban poor, many of whom were 
new Americans, progressive reformers organized schools and settlement houses and 
established procedures and model codes that would be administered through municipal 
agencies, which in some cities were directed by those in political patronage positions.  
Restrictive legislation was promoted on the one side by male Progressive housing 
reformers and on the other by female settlement house workers and community workers 
in the new field of social work, both of which advocated for urban reforms in a way that 
promoted nuclear family hegemony.    
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The settlement housing movement was based on the idea that social reform had to 
begin with individuals who needed help overcoming conditions created by circumstances 
that were beyond their control.29  The major purpose of settlement houses was to help 
assimilate and ease the transition of immigrants into the labor force by teaching them 
middle-class American values; however, wage laborers and native-born household 
members living in tenements were also the foci of settlement house worker interventions.  
The settlement house movement in the United States channeled the energy and talent of 
white, middle class, educated Progressive women who were largely locked out of 
traditionally male-dominated professions and leadership positions (O’Connor 2001).  
Scholars suggest that these reformers, paradoxically, based much of their advocacy w rk 
for women and children on the assumption that working-class women fared better in the 
domestic sphere than in the harsh modern industrial workplace (Gordon 1994; Ladd- 
Taylor 1994; Muncy 1991).  Central to this movement was the idea of the extraordinary 
power of domestic environments to bring about social change.  As such, settlement house 
planners and workers were concerned with more than architecture: 
These concerns encompassed the role of the government to provide certain 
social services or to direct the economy; the definition of a good family 
                                                
29 There is significant literature surrounding the settlement house movement and the development and 
professionalization of social work as a profession.  The debates and contested ideologies that were a part of 
these developments are beyond the scope of this project.  For more detailed studies, see Laura S. Abrams, 
"Guardians of Virtue: The Social Reformers and the 'Girl Problem,' 1890-1920." Social Service Review 74 
(3): 2000, 436-52; Joanne L. Goodwin, "'Employable Mothers' and 'Suitable Work': A Re-evaluation of 
Welfare and Wage-Earning for Women in the Twentieth-Century United States." Journal of Social History 
29 (2): 1995, 253-74; Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History of Welfare in 
America (New York: Basic Books, 1986); and Robyn Muncy, Creating a Female Dominion in American 
Reform, 1890-1935 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).  For a particularly fascinating reading of 
the settlement house movement and the motivations of social reformers, see Jackson Lears, No Place of 
Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1981).  Lears uses Twenty Years at Hull-House and Addams' work to discuss his concept of anti-
modernism in relation to what he calls the "Arts and Crafts ideology" of late-nineteenth-century America.  
Lears argues that, because Addams and the other Arts and Crafts ideologues sought personal fulfillment 
through pre-modern work rather than new ways to improve the degrading and alienated forms that 
modernized labor was taking, they capitulated to "capitalist cultural hegemony" p. 8o. 
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life; the possibilities for upward mobility; the benefits or dangers of 
mixing different classes, races, or ethnic groups; and the complex 
relationships of women and their homes, encompassing paying for the 
dwelling, cleaning and beautifying it, making a pleasant place for family 
life, and being able to leave it for work or other activities outside of the 
home. (quoted in Birch 1984, 128) 
 
Similar to health reformers from the previous decade, who contrasted month-to-month 
tenancy in tenement buildings to the healthy living of house owners, turn of the century 
housing reformers were concerned with the impact of poverty on urban life.  Settlemen  
house workers hoped to improve living conditions among the poor, but also carried 
forward a broader agenda which included advocating for kindergartens, playgrounds, and 
municipal regulations, and against child labor and for women’s protective labor 
legislation (Garb 2005, 148).  Settlement workers had a vision of an American way of life 
in which the family home buttressed the health, morality, and proper raising of child-
citizens.  Settlement workers feared that overcrowded units and unrelated lodgers whose 
wages helped with household expenses threatened sexual purity and the privacy of the 
family (168).  This new rhetoric of nuclear family privacy targeted both middle class and 
wage laborers.  Although these reformers did not view home ownership as the main 
solution to urban poverty, Garb observes that the language used by settlement house 
workers overlapped with that of businessmen promoting house ownership: “by defining 
the home as the source of social order and promoting family privacy, urban reformers 
contributed to a remaking of the homeownership ideal” (149).  These home-centered 
articulations of proper family life, Garb says, would have far reaching consequencs for 
the ways in which the United States would develop housing reform in the twentieth 
century (2005, 149).   
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In addition to settlement house workers, housing reform was carried out in 
tandem with local municipal health and sanitation experts.  Living in rental dwel ings was 
portrayed as unhealthy, unstable, and dependant on the whims of landlords (Garb 2005, 
65-66).  Tenement house laws were enacted in large cities across the United States from 
1867-1901; however, it is arguable whether these regulations lead to even a modicum of 
improved living standards.  Restrictive legislation might make some buildings safer, but 
it did not increase the supply of affordable housing (47).  In order to address the lack of 
affordable housing, some housing reformers, including Charles Abrams, supported model 
tenements (47).  This compromise was intended to be a way for private business to build 
housing within the guidelines of restrictive health and safety codes, without involving 
public funds.  Abrams concluded, however, that “legislation could prescribe what was not 
to be built in the future, but it could not eradicate what had already been built in the past” 
(quoted in Henderson 2000, 47).  Even more problematic was the fact that restrictive 
legislation could not produce more housing.  Another housing reformer, Lawrence 
Veiller, helped form the New York City Tenement House Department, but he opposed 
model tenements housing laws as well as publicly funded housing strategies (48-49).  He 
believed that the laws of supply and demand would be disrupted through municipal 
housing, exacerbating housing problems.  Thus, state regulation, not large-scale 
municipal housing, became the path forward.    
Although restrictive legislation did not get new housing built, it profoundly 
affected the nature of how the rights of renters versus homeowners would be viewed in 
society, and in turn, how the relationship between the government and the intimate would 
be managed in the future.  In Chicago, for example, since multi-unit buildings were 
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considered industry, tenements and other structures that housed multiple households 
(whether they were multi-family buildings or single-family houses that were known to 
have been subdivided to accommodate more than one household) became subject to 
health and code inspections by the city’s Department of Health.  With the exception of 
building regulations and fire codes during the construction phase, single-family houses 
incurred no similar public health interventions from the city (Henderson 2000, 68-69).  
This distinction between the property rights of house owners, landlords, and rental 
tenants assisted in grounding the government’s legal claims to intervention in he l ves of 
the poor and wage laborers, based solely on their differential residence.  Rental unit and 
tenement inspections also permitted government intrusion into the intimate space of the 
household, thwarting the traditional concept of the head of household supervision.  
Owner-occupied, single family houses, however, remained free from overt govenment 
intrusion.  Paradoxically, the advocacy of settlement house workers and other 
maternalism-focused movements established a space within which educated, 
professional, middle-class women could work outside of the household themselves.  They 
may have been barred from other male-dominated professions, but in addition to nursing 
and teaching, their contributions to social work, home economics, settlement work, and 
advocating for social provisions for low-income women and widows provided paid 
employment.  However, their charges may not have had the same opportunities, and the 
caring- and domestic-centered movements in which they were engaged further embedded 




American City Planning and Zoning: Tools of Nuclear Family-Centered Housing Policy    
In Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Era, D niel T. Rodgers 
(1998) notes that in the first decade of the twentieth century, municipal progressives in 
the United States were influenced by European models of municipal collectivism, 
housekeeping, and ownership (133).  Planners and city officials traveled to European 
cities to study city administration and urban planning.  There was a sense that cities could 
provide utilities, police services, transit (at the time streetcars), public parks, and allow 
for productive industry--all in an effort to direct their own urban fate and foster civic life 
(143-144).  Advocates of urban good government during the Progressive-era in the 
United States, Rodgers points out, were working under very different institutional 
circumstances than in Germany, England, and Scotland (154-155).  In American cities, he 
maintains, “the early rise of a white, male, democracy created a system more porous to 
those who saw city office as a field for private profits and more inclined to treat public 
positions as a short-term investment, whose profits were to be taken as quickly as 
possible” (155).  Compromises between municipal progressives, old school 
entrepreneurs, and urban party machines resulted in half-hearted municipal ownership of 
government services, such as a city owning street car tracks but not the trains that 
operated on them and private utility enterprise with regulatory commission oversight 
(156).  Rodgers also raises an interesting question: Were the broad range of services that 
were provided in European cities at the time possible because of “European elites’ 
success in staving off formal democracy for so long?” (158).   Regardless, this vision of 
American municipal ownership as the realization of democracy contained significant 
non-liberal elements.  At the same time, concerns over city space, planning, and desig as 
99 
 
it related to housing and social welfare were dominating industrial cities on both sides of 
the North Atlantic.  Even before World War I, European cities were addressing these 
issues with forums on model housing design, zoning, and street layouts.  With respect to 
zoning, Rodgers (1998, 186-187, 197) argues that the European model which sought to 
prevent property’s speculative element and decongest inner cities, was remadein the 
United States into a system dominated by real estate interests, absent the municipal 
housing element characteristic of zoning and planning in many European cities.   
“That the core values of a society should be written in its street designs and public 
buildings, its shelters and cityscapes, was a conviction deep in progressive culture on 
both side of the Atlantic,” observes Rodgers (2000, 106).  Lawrence Veiller, one of the 
founders of the National Housing Association, promoted anti-tenement legislation and 
model housing buildings codes, nevertheless objected to municipal ownership (194).  
Florence Kelley, former settlement house leader and head of the National Consumers’ 
League which sought better working conditions for women, organized one of the first city 
planning exhibits in the United States (163).  Kelley and other settlement house workers 
also resisted municipal house building in inner cities, purportedly based on health and 
sanitation grounds (195).  Even as many social reformers became more involved in 
housing issues, the American model of housing provision and shelter remained 
ambivalent towards publicly planned and built housing.  Examples of cooperative living, 
semi-philanthropic housing models, and other European-styled housing communities 
which never fully took hold in the United States, can be found scattered across the states, 
driven by local labor leaders and cities to house workers (197); however, these local 
housing experiments gained little traction in the Progressive era.  Furthermore, city 
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planning and housing provision were separated in the American context so that city and 
town planning was viewed as a public concern, while housing was considered an issue to 
be addressed by private industry (196).  Thus, Rodgers concludes, “monumental street 
planning and zoning made it through to prewar America; public assistance for cheap, 
decent housing did not” (198).   
Not all scholars agree with this assessment of early city planning.  Historian 
Robert B. Fairbanks (1998) agrees that in the early part of the twentieth century the 
emphasis on housing as healthy dwelling gradually shifted toward a broader community- 
building endeavor (36).  Although housing reformers had historically understood the 
connection between the social and shelter value of housing, there was a change in the 
way in which housing reform was viewed.  A preoccupation with the poor was replaced 
by standards and planning that would benefit metropolitan regions (59).  Overcrowding 
and lack of sanitation in poor immigrant-occupied tenements were still viewed as an 
unhealthy environment in which to raise good citizens, but housing reformers began to 
extend policies beyond model tenements and tenement regulation to comprehensive 
neighborhood and city planning, which included zoning ordinances, support for 
community amenities, and continued efforts to shape residents’ moral, health, and socil 
well being (37).  Fairbanks examines the dynamics of the city of Cincinnati and 
generalizes his findings across other major cities in the United States.  Th  emphasis on 
homogenous neighborhoods, Fairbanks notes, did not necessarily mean parochial 
attitudes dominated planning, as is the consensus with many housing scholars (1998, 53).  
Reformers who supported homogenous neighborhoods sought to encourage civic pride 
and citizenship through shared values (53).  However, this shift also meant that housing 
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reform would no longer focus on the poorest and most precariously housed and even 
Fairbanks admits that severe housing shortages remained (60). 
For most housing scholars, however, the introduction of municipal zoning 
intertwined moral character and house form, elevating the status of the owner-occupied, 
single-family house while decrying the dependency associated with rental mul i-family 
units and tenement buildings (Vale 2000, 116).  Zoning legislation provides evidence of 
changing social dynamics in relation to gender and housing.  Housing was no longer 
simply a commodity; it was considered a social good and essential towards proper state 
functioning.  Urban planner Constance Perin (1977) views the cultural meaning of zoning 
as one in which the technical concerns of land are value-laden: defining and classifying 
American land with specific tasks are akin to making moral judgments about social and 
cultural categories and the proper relationships among them.  Zoning ordinances and 
comprehensive municipal planning became a crucial part of the housing reform agenda in 
the early twentieth century.  Starting in the late 1600s, cities passed nuisance ordinances 
as part of early efforts to make sense of land use and to separate certain undesirable 
industries from residential neighborhoods (Vale 2000, 116).  The first large-scale zoning
regulations were passed in California and New York after the turn of the twentieth 
century, both largely efforts to contain immigrant-owned and operated businesses from 
residential neighborhoods (116).  This impulse to restrict specific racial and eth ic groups 
would subsequently become codified in federal housing, in part through red lining and 
other racial segregation policies within the Federal Housing Administration.   
In California, according to Seymour Tool (1996) in Zoned American, zoning 
ordinances were directed towards Chinese immigrants and laundry businesses and in 
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New York against Jewish garment factories.  In some states cities could limit the amount 
of multi-family housing built within city limits.  In addition to excluding all non-whites 
and immigrants—with the exception of domestic servants—zoning restrictions amplified 
the nation’s perception of the normal home, with the mortgage paid by the male 
breadwinner who had desirable employment, and established a concrete distinction 
between those who could afford a single-family home and everyone else.  A number of 
states had been seeking to address zoning issues in the courts when in 1926 the Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of municipal zoning.30  Zoning’s purpose was “no 
longer to disperse overcrowded, over[-]factoried lower Manhattan so that its working 
population could breathe” but to “keep lower Manhattan in its place” (Tool 1996, 186).  
Marc Weiss notes in The Rise of the Community Builders (1987), in the 1920s and 1930s: 
  Where residential areas were planned and built up with expensive 
  single-family houses, protection to facilitate or to preserve this 
  particular form of high property values was considered to be a 
  worthwhile objective; in middle-income residential areas, promotion 
  of higher-density, higher-value multifamily apartment buildings, 
  hotels, stores, office, and other residential and commercial uses 
  was combined with the necessary protection of those uses from  
  industrial “nuisance” encroachment; in low-income residential areas, 
  promotion of industrial uses was the primary objective, with  
  absolutely no protection of the local working-class population. (11-12) 
 
In time, zoning would become the best asset for realtors and businesses.  In the privae 
market, restrictive zoning practices sought to reify the connection between house design 
and moral character through codes that excluded rental and commercial housing from 
planned areas, while promoting the single-family home and the nuclear family (Vale 
2000, 116).  The Supreme Court played a significant role in reproducing this white 
heteronormativity and nuclear family hegemony in its 1926 decision in Village of Euclid 
                                                
30 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926) 
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v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926).  The Supreme Court decided that the realty company’s 
property interest and ability to develop land was trumped by the government’s police 
power.  Therefore, the community could prevent the realty company from developing 
apartment buildings and any other properties for business purposes, maintaining the value 
of their houses and keeping out those perceived as undesirable.  Surprisingly, it was the
realty company which argued that the zone for single family houses in Cleveland 
prevented low-income families from accessing Lake Erie (Vale 2000, 117).  In response, 
the Court maintained that apartment buildings should be viewed as a form of businesses 
or trade that could be excluded from areas considered residential, i.e. single-family house 
neighborhoods.  Michael Wolf (1989) asserts that Euclid planted four seeds in the 
American zoning soil: exclusion, anti-competitiveness, aestheticism, and parochialism.  
The effect of the decision meant that high-income families would be protected by 
municipalities by the designation of being “residential areas” while low r-income 
neighborhoods had no similar protection (Vale 2000, 117).  The culturally and morally 
preferred single family house received the greatest protection of the law.   
There is an assumption built into the exclusive single-family residential district 
that a parent, almost always the mother, will be at home all day and available to tak care 
of her children while a wage earner will commute daily to work in a central business 
district or office park (Warner 1962).  Despite changes in the meaning and structure of 
family life--the increase of double wage earning households, suburbs that have become
more ethnically diverse (and thus diverse in terms of household structure, i.e., more likely 
to contain extended families, same-sex couples, and non-conjugal family members), and 
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commuting patterns that rely less on transportation to central business districts31--zoning 
laws remain basically unyielding in their nostalgic interpretation of corre t community 
land use patterns.  This preoccupation with segregating nuclear families is a dominant 
social norm that is central to the disciplinary power of municipal planning.  In her 
seminal work on the discriminatory elements and gendered assumptions of zoning 
practices, Marsha Ritzdorf (1988; 1987; 1986; 1984) concluded that there is an almost 
universal acceptance among men and women, both planning professionals and 
community residents, that the nuclear family unit, living in a single family detached 
dwelling, is the only acceptable lifestyle to which one should aspire.  Current residential 
land policies in many communities, Ritzdorf notes, prohibit the combining of home and 
work, prohibit the location of childcare, shopping, or services in residential 
neighborhoods, forbid the remodeling of large single family homes into more than one 
unit, and exclude other forms of affordable housing such as modular or manufactured 
units.  Nuclear family hegemony, as it relates to municipal planning and land use, 
therefore, recreates notions of proper family composition and residential location.   
Subsequent federal affordable housing policies would see public housing built in 
geographically isolated sections of cities.  As the federal government committed funding 
to transportation arteries outside of urban areas and subsidized suburban development 
through house mortgage insurance and down payment assistance for war veterans, there 
was a parallel disinvestment in urban centers.  Urban renewal (or displacement) of the 
1960s and 1970s took shape differently than urban planning of the last decades of the 
twentieth century that saw public housing developments demolished and rebuilt as mixed 
                                                
31 There is an important growing literature in the field of feminist transportation planning which is 
interrelated with zoning and municipal planning issue , but beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
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income communities; however, the drive to segregate households that do not conform to 
specific standards of family remain consistent.  Municipal zoning ordinances spatially 
direct our lives by assigning and passing judgment on the very composition of our 
intimate household arrangements and our support systems.  In time, federal interest  
housing tenure would firmly set the national housing policy trajectory toward 
homeownership.     
 
 
Part II – Nuclear Family Hegemony and the American Housing Agenda 
Private property is not a fetich [sic] in America. [ . . . ] Our development of 
individualism shows an increasing tendency to regard right of property not as an 
object in itself, but in the light of a useful and necessary instrument in stimulation 
of initiative to the individual, not only stimulation to him that he may gain 
personal comfort, security in life, protection to his family, but also because 
individual accumulation and ownership is a basis of selection to leadership in 
administration of the tools of industry and commerce.32 
 
The first part of this chapter focused on turn of the century and early twentieth 
century family-centered ideologies and how these gendered assumptions were central to 
the work of social reformers and non-government actors.  The hegemonic nuclear family 
provided an ideological backdrop for federal policy as it began to take shape during the 
interwar period in the United States: on a social level it nurtured specific notions of 
household arrangements, on a spatial level it provided legitimacy for municipal land use 
policies, and on an economic level it supported a male breadwinner model of family 
economy.  As middle-class American consumption increased, nuclear family hegemony 
would also connect house building and purchase to consumer citizenship.  
                                                
32 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism. (New York, 1922), pp. 36–37. 
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The second part of this chapter shifts towards an examination of nuclear family-
centered assumptions embedded in early federal housing policy.  A number of single 
family house purchase-promoting professional groups and business organizations were 
embraced by the Department of Commerce and Department of Labor during the interwar 
period.  The Better Homes movement, an outgrowth of the Better Homes in America 
organization, highlights the connection between nuclear family promotion, federal 
government-sponsored programs, patriotism, and a consumer-based citizenship.  The 
Better Homes movement and similar campaigns provide an important link between the 
interwar period and New Deal housing policy, more specifically, the promotion of si gle 
family house financing and ownership through Federal Housing Administration policies.  
After 1934, the Federal Housing Administration and other federal housing agencies 
would promote a Fordist regime of mass production and consumption all centered on an 
idealized version of the nuclear family and single family house.   
 
Better Homes and Consumer Citizenship  
Like other hegemonic formulations, the nuclear family requires constant 
reinforcement.  Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, a number of government-sponsored 
programs and advocacy from professional business associations contributed to consumer-
oriented citizenship based on the nuclear family and the single family house purchase.  In 
1918, the U.S. Department of Labor launched the Own Your Own Home campaign, a real 
estate marketing campaign. The Own Your Own Home campaign, originally promoted 
by the National Association of Real Estate Boards in the aftermath of World ar I, was 
taken over by the U.S. Department of Labor.  The program was largely promotional; 
there were no financial incentives offered to prospective home buyers or builders. Th  
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Department of Labor handed out "We Own Our Own Home" buttons to schoolchildren, 
sponsored lectures on the topic at universities, and distributed posters and banners 
extolling the virtues of home ownership and pamphlets on how to get a house loan.  
Using masculine and patriotic appeals, campaign materials asserted that a man must 
provide for his family by “building a home” or risk losing “his patriotism of 
practicability” (Hutchinson 1997, 189).  Masculinity and the protection of one’s family 
through homeownership became equated with patriotism, the protection of the republic, 
and thriftiness. At the federal level, leaders produced how-to manuals to promote 
ownership and supported local initiatives that served similar purposes. Pamphlets and 
other materials that appealed to women’s traditional responsibilities to the family and 
home, though in a new form as a household technocrat, were distributed to women’s and 
service organizations (189).  At the same time the federal government was promoting 
market-driven home ownership, modest government financing to address critical housing 
shortages during World War I was raising anxiety levels in the business ad 
manufacturing community.  The threat of socialism and widespread opposition from 
professional business organizations and manufacturing interests ended federal funding for 
residential construction in 1919 (Hutchinson 2000, 85).  The Department of Labor ended 
its official relationship with the Own Your Own Home campaign; however, realtors and 
manufacturers continued to promote the campaign through model homes, advertising, and 
other commercial displays.   
During the same period, the Department of Commerce conducted research on 
home construction, produced educational materials, and sponsored expositions on house 
building.  Herbert Hoover was appointed Secretary of Commerce in 1921, much to the 
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pleasure of the business community.  Encouraged by Progressive era housing reformers 
(noted previously) as well as the Department of Commerce under Secretary Herbert 
Hoover, municipalities continued adopting zoning regulations and standardized building 
codes.  In 1921 only 60 cities had zoning regulations; by 1930 the number had risen to 
three hundred (Taylor 1931, 764).  By 1928, building codes had been adopted by 200 
cities and six states (762).  Under Hoover, there was also a significant expansion of the 
federal government’s role in promoting material goods and consumption.  In 1922, the 
U.S. Department of Commerce joined forces with the house promoting non-profit 
organization, Better Homes in America, Inc., to launch the Better Homes in America 
campaign (Vale 2000, 126).  The idea for the Better Homes in America campaign came 
from Marie Meloney, editor of the mass-circulation women’s magazine The Delineator. 
Meloney proposed to Herbert Hoover that The Delineator, as well as other media outlets 
and professional organizations could be utilized to disseminate information on home life 
(Hornstein 2005, 128).  Hoover recognized the potential for using advertising directed at 
women to mobilize his vision of homeownership.  Responding to debates among housing 
reformers and Congressional leaders, federal policy was delivered through the Better 
Homes movement.  (See Image 2.)  Hoover believed that cooperation between 
businesses, voluntary associations, and the federal government, not direct government 
funding, should aid Americans in obtaining houses.  His “cooperative 
associationalism”—linking non-profits with state interests—remains one of the primary 
features of American housing policy (Hutchinson 2000, 87).  Drawing on notions of 
individualism, civic republicanism, and Christian domestic morality, along with 
Progressive era ideology, Hoover brought the suburban house national attention (83).  
109 
 
The organization’s goals were to encourage “better living conditions… by holding up 
high standards in home building, home furnishing, and home life and urging ‘old-
fashioned thrift’ for homeownership, the improvement of home lots, the promotions of 
home gardens, and the dissemination of information for home makers of moderate 
means” (quoted in Vale 2000, 126). The Better Homes campaign sought to publicize the 
need for better houses, improve housing standards, and allow more public participation in 
the process.  Building single-family houses would support the construction industry and 
manufacturing interests, and help promote professional groups, such as architects, real 
estate agents, and home economists (Hutchinson 2000, 84).  Constructing single-family 
dwellings also assumed land use patterns and transportation to employment that required 
use of an automobile (84).    
In terms of women and the nuclear family, the Better Homes campaign promoted 
the making of the modern housewife who would be trained as an expert and armed with 
the latest laborsaving technologies, creating a “discriminating consumer and moral 
arbitrator within a defined architectural setting” (Hutchinson 1986, 168).  The campaign 
built a model home on the Mall in Washington, DC in 1922 and sponsored annual 
contests for model demonstration houses throughout the 1920s.  Local Better Homes 
committees across the country built demonstration houses to “to show the best that ach 
community is doing to promote and strengthen the wholesome, normal family life” 
(quoted in Hornstein 2005, 129).  Hornstein concludes that the model houses, by 
combining technology with thrift, were monuments to the new American middle class 
family (129).  Middle-class women were drawn to the vision of the home as women’s 
workplace: “if only the home could be standardized both as a commodity and as a site of 
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production and consumption, Hoover envisioned savings enough to drive housing costs to 
levels in reach for nearly every family” (2005, 129).  The Better Homes movement 
illustrates Hoover’s conflation of efficiency with morality and responsibility to the nation 
through consumption.  His vision of the economy was one in which a breadwinner was 
employed outside the house and an unpaid housewife/mother labored within.  American 
manhood, which had taken a hit during the Depression, needed to be asserted in new 
ways.  Hornstein and others contend that homeownership was in “some respects a 
compensatory project for the damage wrought to American manhood by the Great 
Depression, a goal heavily fortified in national policy despite vigorously pursued 
alternatives” (118).  Men’s symbolic citizenship derived from partnering with a woman, 
procreating, and working in waged employment.  Advertisements for the Better Homes 
campaign promoted the domestic roles of middle class women and intensified the image 
of the male breadwinner, elevating the nuclear family living in a single-family house to a 
place of national prominence, all of which would gain more importance in the post-World 
War II period in the United States.   
The broad constituency and public/private alliances of the Better Homes 
movement made it extremely successful.  After residential construction dropped during 
the Depression, as president, Herbert Hoover would draw on strategies from the Better 
Homes campaign to promote consumption and American housing.  In 1931, President 
Hoover organized the Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership.  The goals of 
the conference, Vale states, “represented a platform for Hoover’s own views about the 
connection between the single-family home and good citizenship, ideas he had publicly 
expounded for many years” (2000, 126).  While homeownership was promoted, tenancy 
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and multi-family housing were simultaneously disparaged in the federally supported 
campaigns.  Prominent land economist Richard Ely favored homeownership in his policy 
promotions (Weiss 1987, 117).  Like Hoover and other leaders, Ely maintained that 
homeowners made good citizens.  Ely and his staff’s research was some of the most 
widely used in the nation in the early years of land studies.  Besides being disseminated 
in the institute’s own Journal of Land and Public Utility Economies, Ely edited textbooks 
on land economics, and he and his staff provided expertise at the 1931 presidential 
conference and advised organizations from NAREB to the U.S. Department of 
Commerce—thereby embedding their arguments into most of the housing networks 
around the country.  Ely’s former students and staff members went on to participate in the 
founding of the Federal Housing Administration and Federal Home Loan Bank Board in 
the 1930s (Weiss 1987, 117-119). 
Historian Richard Harris (2009) observes that between 1920 and 1950 in the 
United States there was a significant rise in anonymous house purchases.  Until World 
War I, the purchasers of speculatively built housing were often investor-landlords, rather 
than owner-occupied house buyers.  In 1923 Richard T. Ely described the standard 
method of financing owner-occupied house purchases: “The family would first buy the 
site, gradually pay for it, then . . . mortgage it through a building and loan association or 
otherwise . . . construct the home with the aid of the mortgage and gradually . . . 
extinguish the mortgage” (quoted in Harris 2009, 526).  During the 1920s, a rise in 
speculative building meant that builders began to undertake building as well as land 
subdivision and with anonymous homeowners in mind they developed the model home as 
a sales tool.  Buyers now purchased and financed both the land and buildings as a 
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package.  These new types of land speculation, however, required financing.  This need 
would be satisfied with passage of the Housing Act of 1934.   
The single-family house also bridged the gap between personal responsibilities to 
the family and national duty during wartime.  Advertising played off of personal 
obligations, usually to the family, to sell people on the duties of war.  Wartime 
advertising also gave a particular cast to the idea of the citizen-consumer (Cohen 2003, 
62-109).  The strict conservation of national resources began in the home with victory 
gardens and the salvaging of scrap.  The ordinary citizen came to understand perso al 
consumption in national and patriotic terms.  Moreover, the planned consumption of 
postwar products guarded against a return to depression, something that ads relentle sly 
reminded people on the home front (Fox 1975).  By engaging the obligation of the 
citizen-consumer to stave off postwar depression, wartime advertisements elaborated a 
message that was already deeply inculcated in advertising culture and brought out by war 
production, namely, that business and politics in American democracy were inseparabl .  
The war made the relationship explicit by calling on the citizen to carry out a patriotic 
duty as a consumer.  This form of advertising, in which a product became associated with 
a state of being, a sensual pleasure, or an anticipated standard of living, featured 
prominently in campaigns of the period.  Historian Roland Marchand (1985) has 
analyzed the business strategy, showing how advertisements used allegories of uplift and 
parables to preach a kind of salvation through consumption (164-167).  The political 
underpinning of the citizen-consumer was explicit: “Drawing by analogy upon the 
political concept of citizenship, [advertisers] constructed an image of a market 
democracy, in which advertisers appealed to constituencies of consumer citizens and won 
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election of their brands as popular products” (1985, 63-64).  That this would be done in 
the name of the post-war house is not surprising, given the importance of the building 
industry to the economy and the symbolic importance of the house to American ideals of 
citizenship, independence, and individuality.   
 
The National Housing Act of 1934 and the Federal Housing Administration 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was established by the National 
Housing Act on June 27, 1934.  The FHA followed a string of legislation as part of 
Roosevelt’s New Deal that was directed at addressing the housing industry which had 
been dramatically impacted by the Depression (Henderson 2000, 101).  FHA greatly 
expanded 1933 legislation establishing the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), 
which had set up low-interest loans to help mortgage-holders refinance their house 
mortgage in an attempt to prevent foreclosure.  The HOLC assisted house owners 
threatened with foreclosure by transforming short-term loans into long-term mortgages. 
The agency was designed to purchase the mortgages of house owners at risk of 
defaulting, and then refinance the loans with more advantageous terms made possiblby 
its government backing (Henderson 2000, 101).  The 1934 legislation, however, was 
centered on home-ownership ideology and effectively restructured the private housing 
market, both of which contributed to a gendered and racialized division of housing 
accommodation.  Nuclear family hegemony became inextricably linked with federal 
housing policy; it was codified in legislation and sanctioned through the writing of 
administrative rules.  The stated goals of the FHA legislation were to facilitate house 
financing, help stabilize the house mortgage system, and improve housing standards.  
Depression-era job loss and income reduction had led to high foreclosure rates and a 
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reduction in private housing and nearly collapsed the housing industry.  The FHA created 
federal mortgage insurance (for creditors) and created new loan polices based on low 
down payments to be paid over long periods of time, rather than earlier balloon 
payments.  This program expanded the number of working and middle-class families who 
could afford a house, accentuating the push towards federally subsidized house 
ownership for working families.  The FHA legislation also established a loan insurance 
program to rehabilitate properties, created federal charters for private mor gage 
associations that would purchase government-insured mortgage loans, and establish d  
federal savings corporation to insure deposits of qualified savings and loan associations 
(Hays 1995, 81).  The program was designed to stimulate house building and to alleviate 
unemployment that was especially high in the construction industry following the 
depression.  
Federal Housing Administration programs fundamentally restructured the house 
mortgage market in the United States.  The Federal Housing Administration did not build 
houses or loan money.  FHA programs insure mortgage loans made by banks and other 
lenders.  This federal insurance against loss would induce banks to lend money for home 
mortgages.  This policy design guaranteed broad political support from interest groups, 
such as the real estate and banking industry, which were historically opposed to federal 
government intervention in the housing arena.  Prior to the Federal Housing 
Administration, balloon mortgages were the norm and required prospective home-owners 
to have a down payment of 30 to 50 percent of the cost of a home in order to secure a 
loan; however, FHA-secured loans introduced the low down payment home mortgage 
which reduced the amount of money needed up front to as low as 10 percent.  The agency 
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also extended the repayment period of home mortgages from 5 to 10 years up to 20 and 
30 years (Hays 1995, 85).  This reduction in monthly mortgage payments helped to 
prevent foreclosure, often made buying a house cheaper than renting, and allowed 
families with stable but modest incomes to qualify for a mortgage.  Under the FHA, 
government-backed loans also resulted in lower risks for the lender, so interest rats on 
mortgages went down.  In 1938 Congress established the Federal National Mortgage 
Administration (FHMA), also called Fannie Mae, which fostered the creation a secondary 
mortgage market and increased capital flow for mortgages.  FHA worked alongside the 
Serviceman’s Readjustment Act, commonly known as the GI Bill, passed in 1944, to 
consolidate the system of long-term mortgages for the construction and sale of private 
houses.33  After World War II, neighborhood developers built to FHA standards with two 
primary reasons in mind: With FHA approval, the developer could qualify for FHA- or 
VA-approved construction loans of up to 90 percent of the build cost and the house 
buyers could qualify for home loans from 90 to 100 percent of the home‘s appraised 
value.  Building to FHA standards required less up-front capital from the develop r, and 
it insured the homes were financially attractive to the new homebuyer.  All of these 
changes contributed to a significant increase in American homeownership.  Between 
1934 and 1972 households living in owner-occupied dwellings rose from 44 percent to 63 
percent (Hays 1995, 85).  Compared to other western, industrialized nations this house 
                                                
33 For the exclusions and limitations of the G.I. Bill, see David H. Onkst, "'First a Negro ... Incidentally a 
Veteran': Black World War Two Veterans and the G.I. Bill in the Deep South, 1944-1948," Journal of 
Social History 31 (Spring, 1998): pp. 517-544; for an excellent discussion of sexuality and the GI Bill, see 
Margot Canaday, "Building a Straight State: Sexuality and Social Citizenship under the 1944 G.I. Bill," 
Journal of American History 90 (December 2003): pp. 935-957; and Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers' 
Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: Knopf, 2003). 
116 
 
ownership rate is high; however, given the level of federal government subsidization, it is 
arguable whether this rate is a positive return on government investment.       
Although Federal Housing Administration programs dramatically expanded house 
ownership opportunities, not all segments of the population benefited from the program. 
FHA did nothing for low-income families, single women who could not qualify for FHA 
loans, the non-wage earning elderly or minorities who were officially excluded from 
obtaining loans through FHA redlining practice (Hayden 1984, 55).  Nuclear-family 
households in the suburbs benefited, in a one sense, from federal housing policy, but the 
policies also reinforced stereotypes of women’s domestic roles and the dichotomy of the 
home and work spheres based on division of labor between men and women (Freeman 
1980, 26).  Suburban living also impacted white, middle class, American manhood: men 
had lost autonomy in corporate and industrial employment and this alienation and 
subordination was further embedded through the homogeneity and order of the suburbs.  
House ownership, consumerism, and acting as the head of the traditional, nuclear family 
offered males a modicum of compensation for their reduced role in the post-World War II 
economy.  Suburban housing was based on the male-breadwinner model with “the home 
as retreat s for male workers and as workplaces for their wives” (Hayden 1984, 7).  FHA-
insured mortgages favored new single-family house building over the construction of 
multi-family units, and in time the nuclear family residing in a single-family home would 
become synonymous with the American dream.  Along with low-density development 
outside of urban areas was the need for massive federal highway projects and increased 
reliance on the automobile.  Furthermore, the FHA legislation initially did not benefit 
low-income families, single women unless they were war widows, the non-wage-earning 
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elderly, or racial minorities who were for decades officially excluded from obtaining 
loans through FHA lending practices (Hayden 2002, see Table 2).  The FHA fostered the 
vision of the self-reliant nuclear family residing in a single-family home, though in 
reality, the wealth accumulation in the post-World War II period in the United States hat 
contributed to this ideal occurred through intense federal subsidization of white, 
suburban, nuclear families.   
The Federal Housing Administration created pamphlets like the 1938 Planning 
Profitable Neighborhoods to promote single-family homes and new housing 
developments, and sold the idea of home ownership to the public as the American Dream 
(Kline 2007).  The FHA’s Better Housing Program used nuclear family-centered rhetoric 
similar to that of the Better Homes campaign in the interwar period.  In a moment f 
waning faith in the economy and declining investments in new building, the Better 
Housing Program attempted to stimulate people’s desire for new or modernize housing.  
The FHA conducted a nationwide publicity campaign, turning dealers, manufacturers, 
and laborers into salespeople for the campaign, and like the 1920s Better Homes in 
America campaign, the FHA built model homes (See Images 3 and 4).  For exampl , the 
FHA sponsored “typical American family” contests at the New York World’s Fair (Kline 
2007, 164).  Wendy Kline writes, “The suburban family celebrated at the New York 
World’s Fair was pro-natalist in its promotion of home ownership and the child-friendly 
environment imagined in new suburban communities” (166).  Prior to the fair, each state 
chose a “typical American family” to represent the state, with the winners residing for 
one week in a Federal Housing Administration-built house on the fairgrounds.  The 
overall winner received a new automobile and a visit with President Roosevelt.  These
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demonstration houses and contests provided family-centered ideological support for the 
structural adjustments being made to the economy and in the social realm.     
The legacy of the Federal Housing Administration has been felt in inner cities as 
well, as FHA regulations contributed to urban decay (Katznelson 2005; Jackson 1985).  
Single-family, owner occupied housing developments that were supported with FHA-
backed loans tended to be located on the edge of metropolitan areas and diverted federal 
funding away from urban neighborhoods.  This focus on new single family home 
building increasingly drew white, middle-class households to the new suburbs.  Building 
code requirements that focused on lot size, separation from adjacent structures, and the 
width of the house, as well as numerous safety measures, meant that older homes in 
central cities would not qualify for FHA loan guarantees.  In addition, legislation required 
the FHA to place greater controls on the development of rental housing and there was 
little commitment in the initial legislation to insure multi-family building projects.  This 
would not change until the 1970s.  Further contributing to the mass disinvestment of 
urban neighborhoods was the home valuation system that was adopted by the federal 
government under FHA, which Guy Stuart (2003, 46-68) traces in Discriminating Risk: 
The U.S. Mortgage Lending Industry in the Twentieth Century.  As part of its mandate to 
insure house mortgages, the Federal Housing Administration was required to develop 
appraisal rules and risk ratings.  Both guidelines were outlined in the FHA’s 
Underwriting Manual, first published in 1936, and mirrored the insurance underwriting 
standards that were prevalent in the banking industry.  In order to define the fair value of 
a house and its property within a certain housing market, the Manual set up a system of 
valuation based on the principle of uniformity.  The Manual defined the best residential 
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areas as those in which property values are clustered within a narrow limit.  Appraisers 
would use comparative sales data within a certain area to determine the value of the 
house.  The stated rationale behind the theory was that residents with similar stand ds of 
living would lead to greater neighborhood stability and desirability.  This methodological 
structure and the reliance on comparative sales data to determine the value of a house, 
Stuart observes, would “shape the residential settlement patterns of metropolitan areas 
throughout the country” (2003, 48).  In a sense, like the nuclear family, the house 
valuation system in the United States has become naturalized as a function of market 
forces, when in reality it was created in the 1930s.  The Manual also included a 
description of how future value should be considered as part of the valuation process.  
Thus, the current value of the residential property was partly contingent upon the abili y 
of the property to produce returns for the owner.  The Manual indicated that 
neighborhoods that were occupied by the same economic and racial groups would be the 
most stable over time and produce the highest returns.  Although the appraisal rules 
already in some sense included a risk assessment, an additional risk rating process was 
established, and included consideration of the property, the location, the person 
borrowing, and the whole mortgage.  This specific risk data was then used in the 
valuation of properties (51-52).     
The FHA home valuation system reflected the dominant prejudices of the time 
and provided protection to those who feared minority movement into white 
neighborhoods, which was for some considered a mark of neighborhood decline.  Since 
the method used to calculate the value of a property and its risk rating was demographic-
specific, it was nearly impossible for non-white applicants to qualify for FHA-secured 
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loans.  Properties located in non-white and integrated neighborhoods were appraised at 
low value and viewed as far riskier investments under this system.  The neighborhood 
boundary drawing that reflected the racist valuation system and was central to FHA 
lending practices is known as redlining.34  In an effort to more accurately chart the 
residential location of blacks and other groups considered less desirable to the stability of 
a neighborhood, the FHA accumulated detailed reports and now infamous maps, and 
relied on local appraisals to assess the characteristics of a neighborhood.35  The 
information was then used to determine where it would insure mortgages.   
Using the valuation and risk rating system described above, the Federal Housing 
Administration could segregate its mortgage recipients by race and class, but the model 
would not prevent natural transitions in land use and racial and ethnic changes unrelated 
to federal mortgage insurance.  Although the models were, in part, based on zoning-
related philosophy, new zoning regulations were not considered a significant enough 
source of protection from outside influences (Stuart 2003, 56).  As a result, the FHA also 
endorsed the use of restrictive covenants in its Underwriting Manual to supplement local 
zoning ordinances in the maintenance of homogenous neighborhoods.  Restrictive 
covenants were private agreements attached to property deeds to prevent the purchasof 
                                                
34 For more on appraisals and redlining, see Arnold R. Hirsch. "'Containment' on the Home Front: Race and 
Federal Housing Policy from the New Deal to the Cold War". Journal of Urban History 26, no.2 (January 
2000): 158-189 and Kenneth T. Jackson. ”Race, Ethnicity, and Real Estate Appraisal: The Home Owners’ 
Loan Corporation and the Federal Housing Administration,” Journal of Urban History, 6(4): 1980, 419-
452. 
35 The Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC) created residential security maps for 239 cities across the 
country between 1935 and 1940 as part of the City Survey Program conducted for the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board (FHLBB). HOLC used "map consultants"—primarily local lenders, realtors, and appraisers—
to survey and assess real estate conditions. Together with HOLC staff, they completed survey sheets for 
each graded area on the maps in addition to detailed reports of each city. Information about how HOLC and 
FHLBB used this information is limited, but archival records indicate that the maps were shared with only 
a limited number of people outside HOLC, primarily federal agencies, including the Federal Housing 
Administration. For more information, including maps and survey sheets, see Amy E. Hillier. "Redlining 
and the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation". Journal of Urban History 29, no.4 (May 2003): 394-420. 
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homes by certain minority groups, which at the time included blacks, Jews, and Italians.  
The FHA Manual did not openly endorse racial covenants, but given its stated interest in 
maintaining racial segregation to produce higher property values, there is sufficient 
evidence that racial covenants were quietly promoted.   In fact, it was not until 1950 that 
the FHA announced that it would not insure mortgages on properties with restrictive 
covenants.  Paradoxically, unlike more affluent areas that mobilized to form legally 
enforceable restrictive covenants or were governed by FHA redlining practices, many 
exurban working class communities had no similar ability to restrict access to 
newcomers.  In the early twentieth century in some metropolitan areas, similar to b acks 
who faced severe affordable housing shortages, Russian, Polish, and Jewish immigrant 
families might not be able to rent, but these European immigrants could purchase 
properties (Satter 2009, 17).  FHA-supported redlining lasted into the mid-1960s and left 
minority urban neighborhoods severely overcrowded (Lamb 2005; Hays 1995).  An 
administrative rule change from the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 
cabinet level department created in 1965 and under which the FHA is now administered, 
directed the agency to alter its lending practices to include lending in urban and minority 
areas.  The agency dramatically shifted its lending practices, though often worked in 
consort with the lending industry to refuse mortgage credit to Blacks.  The Housing Act 
of 1968 further chipped away at the racial elements of FHA lending practices by 
prohibiting discrimination in housing, including house financing.  The 1968 Act also 
created the Government National Mortgage Association, also known as Ginnie Mae, to 
help finance the development of low-income housing projects.  A series of legislation in 
the 1970s and 1980s required the private lending industry to report lending statistics, such 
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as the race and sex of applicants, and the location of approved mortgages (Vale 2005, 
170-171).  The FHA institutionalized a racially separate and unequal system of house 
financing that favored suburban building for whites while precluding insurance for 
houses in racially mixed and nonwhite neighborhoods in the inner city.  With the 
Housing Act of 1934 and the creation of the Federal Housing Administration, federal 
housing policy became racialized and gendered.  Housing policy was racialized through 
the FHA's racially discriminatory mortgage insurance, lending, and appraisal gu delines.  
Thus, the FHA subsidized the creation of segregated, white, middle-class suburbs but it 
also institutionalized gendered citizenship, as male breadwinner house ownership was 
supported through government lending and New Deal wage earner and labor policies.  
 
Soldier, Worker, or Nuclear Family 
Housing reformers from the Progressive era lined up along various divergent 
paths in the New Deal and post-World War II period in the United States.  Lawrence 
Veiller, founder of the National Housing Association in 1910, was one of public 
housing’s most vocal opponents.  Veiller believed the sensitive supply and demand 
equilibrium of the private real estate market would be disrupted by municipal housing 
plans (Henderson 2000, 49).  The same forces that had pushed for public housing during 
the Depression, labor unions, and progressive housers such as Edith Elmer Wood and 
Catherine Bauer, lobbied for its expansion after the war.  Wood maintained the profit-
driven real estate market could not meet the demand for low-income housing.  She was 
critical of reformers who advocated for restrictive housing legislation wthout providing a 
means for the production of safe and healthy housing (Henderson 2000, 50).  Mary 
Simkovitch, another former settlement house worker and leader of the National Public 
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Housing Conference (NPHC), founded in 1931, supported the creation of local public 
housing authorities and in 1933 the federal government the Public Works Administration 
(PWA) was authorized to provide grants to local housing agencies (Henderson 2000, 53).  
Bauer and liberal unions (through the Labor Housing Conference, founded in 1934), 
pushed for well designed, mixed-income, noncommercial, government-subsidized 
housing projects, including resident-owned cooperatives sponsored by unions, other 
nonprofit organizations, and government agencies.  Bauer, a journalist, planner, 
organizer, and political strategist worked vigorously to hold together the fragile liberal-
labor coalition for housing (Oberlander and Newbrun 1999; Radford 1996).  According 
to Eugenie Ladner Birch (1985), although early housing reformers such as Jacob Riis and 
Wood documented the ways in which women carried the brunt of inadequate dwelling, 
“the women these reformers were concerned with were usually part of conventional 
families” (22).  Birch concludes, “As their successors recorded and assessed housing 
quality in America, they too regarded the nuclear household—mother, father, and 
children—as the norm. … [C]onsequently, their solutions were premised on the 
collective belief that they were treating a family housing problem” (23).     
The Wagner-Steagall Act, also known as the Housing Act, passed in 1937, 
authorized the federal funding of housing programs for the poor (Hays 1995).  Rather 
than creating public housing to serve the unemployed and most in need of housing, 
however, “housing authorities followed congressional intent [through Housing Act 
provisions] and filled the first projects with stable two-parent families whose limited rent-
paying ability was presumed to result from a temporary delay in upward economi  
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mobility” caused by the Great Depression (Vale 2000, 9).  In fact, in many cities, families 
receiving ADC (established in 1935) did not qualify for public housing (Hays 1985, 92). 
 The Housing Act established local housing authorities to administer its public
housing program, which was intended to withstand legal challenges of the kind that arose 
over previous eminent domain challenges (Smizik and Stone 1988, 242).  Many contend 
that the realty, lumber, and construction industry effectively defeated any ch ces for a 
more extensive public housing production program for low-income families.  When the 
Housing Act was finally passed in 1937, New Deal momentum was already subsiding, 
and soon housing production would only benefit military industry workers and military 
families (Hays 1985, 89).  In the showdown over the magnitude and shape of public 
housing, the progressive reformers were outmaneuvered by the real estate industry and 
racial and gendered ideologies that were wedded to single family homeownership.  The 
1937 act provided funds for local housing authorities to build 117,755 units of public 
housing in place of razed slums, thus linking slum clearance and public housing.  It 
further required that one unit of public housing be built to replace every slum unit torn 
down (Davies 1966).  The public housing program was put on hold during World War II, 
and few units were built during the immediate postwar years.  Likewise, the FHA, 
created in 1934, insured relatively few mortgages until the war ended.  There was a 
severe housing shortage in both rural and urban areas, as veterans returned and the baby 
boomers were born.  The enormous pent-up demand fueled the political logic for new 
federal housing legislation, but earlier ideological and political efforts would prevail. 
In 1941, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) released a report, A 
Handbook for Urban Redevelopment for Cities in the United States, proposing the use of 
125 
 
federal subsidies and granting the power of eminent domain to local agencies to acquire 
and clear blighted land and sell it for reuse (Rowe 1995, 177-178).  By the mid-1940s, a 
number of cities and states had passed legislation to enable local governments to 
designate, acquire, and clear "slum" areas and sell the land to private developers.  Yet 
early on there were opposing views over whether public housing legislation was 
supposed to be "housing" legislation or whether it was "slum clearance" legislation 
(Hoffman 1996, 425; Marcuse 1986; Jackson 1985).  The 1949 and 1954 Housing Acts 
provided federal funds for local redevelopment authorities to designate "blighted" areas, 
acquire and clear land, and then sell the land to private developers or local housing 
authorities for public housing.  While the stated goal of Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 
was to provide a decent home and suitable environment for every American family, urban 
leaders and real estate elites treated the legislation as less as a "hou ing" program and 
more like an urban "redevelopment" program (Katz 2000).  Thus, the Housing Act of 
1949 did more to promote suburbanization, encourage businesses and middle-class 
households to abandon the cities, and exacerbate economic and racial segregation than to 
revitalize central cities. Fueled by the political clout of the highway and house-building 
lobbies, the federal government enacted policies that promoted both suburban sprawl and 
city distress, draining cities of much of their economic lifeblood (Katz 2000).  Outside of 
the Federal Housing Administration-administered house ownership-centered programs, 
subsequent housing legislation would continue to chip away at affordable housing and 
multi-unit dwellings. 
Although the FHA had been a highly successful program in terms of house 
building, it remains a part of what Gail Radford (1996) describes as two-tiered United 
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States housing policy in which generous federal funding through lending and tax 
expenditures promotes the development of single-family houses, while under-funded 
subsidies and deteriorating public housing development is reserved for groups that are 
less income stable.  Although the very poor had the most serious housing needs, the real 
impetus for a federal housing program came from the white, middle class whose need for 
both decent and affordable housing increased after the Depression and then again with 
post-World War II housing shortages.  Federal housing policy, therefore, stalled in this 
two-track condition.  White, middle-class and working class citizens were given the 
“right to housing” through a combination of federal subsidies and tax breaks, while 
everyone else was subject to the unmanaged private rental market or public housing.  
This also meant an increasing hardship for female-headed households, single-parent 
families, and unmarried low-income individuals who needed to move to geographically 
isolated areas to obtain affordable housing (Hayden 1984).  The hegemonic nuclear 
family that was inherent in the housing movements of the early decades of the twenti th 
century would take a more punitive turn in the latter decades as political dynamics 
changed and commitments to housing and other minimum economic provisions waned.     

















In 1965, the new Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was 
established to coordinate federal housing policies in the cities.  Its enabling leg slation 
made an additional $3 billion available for urban renewal and public housing.  The 1968 
Housing Act expanded federal funding both for public housing and urban renewal, and it 
added two new federal housing programs, Sections 235 and 236, which provided interest 
rate subsidies for low-income homeownership and multi-family rental housing 
respectively (Hartman 1975).  An annual average of 80,000 public housing units had 
been built between 1968 and 1971 (Bratt 1986).  The Johnson Administration extended 
relief benefits in a series of 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act (Piven and 
Cloward 1977, 264-361).  However, even as federal aid to urban areas increased and 
social provisions were extended to include more groups, urban policy programs of the 
1960s were unable to address ongoing structural problems and were limited to providing 
incremental and temporary improvements in the conditions of economically marginalized 
social and racial groupings in the major cities.  There was no attempt to build new 
institutions or sets of social relationships designed to address the structural roots of 
income poverty and unemployment.  In this way, the Great Society remained bound by 
the separate social and economic citizenship established during the New Deal.  Th  
nuclear family hegemony that was institutionalized under New Deal labor and housing 
policy would for decades become naturalized in the American housing scheme as well in 
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the collective imagination of what constitutes a proper home and family.  In terms of 
race, the business as usual of residential segregation continued.   
In Washington, D.C. the Department of Housing and Urban Development, along 
with other cabinet level offices were built on former slum areas.  In 1950, the Chicago 
branch of the NAACP argued that the Chicago Housing Authority was attempting to 
“move the Mason-Dixon line to Howard Street” when plans for 28 high-rise apartments 
buildings over a span of two miles on Chicago’s south side were introduced 
(Hendrickson 2002), and housing authorities around the country argued in court case 
after court case, that the purpose of public housing was to prevent blacks from moving 
into white sections of cities (Schill and Wachter 1995).  Slum clearance continued 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s and maintained racial boundaries as local housing 
authorities and city politicians made decisions on redevelopment.  Even though slum 
areas were cleared, new housing production rarely followed in its place—moving poor 
residents, many of whom were blacks moving to the industrialized North, to even more 
isolated areas of urban areas and (Goetz 1993, 22).  Federal housing programs were 
largely unchanged until the 1960s, when rent strikes, racial segregation, and deteriorating 
housing stock forced the government to address housing again.  Housing preservation and 
conservation became more popular and critics of urban renewal projects such as Herbert
Gans and Jane Jacobs became more prominent (Gotham 2001).  In the 1960s, redlining 
was becoming more apparent as a major hurdle to home ownership in poor, minority 
neighborhoods (Hays 1995).  The Housing Act of 1968 permitted federal mortgage 
insurance programs to extend into blighted neighborhoods and to persons with modest 
incomes, but just as the federal government was becoming more involved in poverty 
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issues and providing housing to the most economically vulnerable, public/private 
alliances were growing in the area of public housing and the idea of increased local 
control over housing was also developing (Hays 1995).  Instead of attacking the real 
causes of postwar social division and uneven development, Great Society programs 
attempted to redistribute the benefits of postwar growth and south/North migration to he 
social and geographical spaces left behind by that growth and prop up support in 
traditionally Democratic strongholds. 
By 1970, it became evident that the promise of urban redevelopment, often 
promoted by business interests in the 1950s and 1960s, was not fulfilled (Gotham 2001).  
Instead, urban renewal had reinforced out-migration of jobs and residents, exacerbating 
the problem.  In the early 1970s, civil rights groups were finally seeing some positive 
results from litigation (Orfield 1974).  The Court’s decision in the well-known Gautreaux 
case in Chicago held that the Chicago Housing Authority intentionally discrimnated 
against black public housing residents by restricting blacks from public housing 
developments in white neighborhoods (Hendrickson 2002).  But while the Courts were 
turning around with respect to racial segregation in public housing, they continued to 
“reach inside the household and regulate its composition” through zoning (Ritzdorf 2000, 
177).  In the 1974 decision of Village of Belle Terre v. Boras (1974), the Court permitted 
the continued municipal use of single-family zoning, which both endorses the regulation 
of the family and encourages traditional family structures (Ritzdorf 2000, 177).  This case 
has set up a jurisprudence of restrictive family definitions, as courts have continued to 
uphold zoning ordinances that have become increasing narrow. 
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Nuclear family hegemony, which had been constructed and naturalized through 
structural inequality and overt discriminatory policies, was subsequently carried out 
through Nixon’s New Federalism, Carter’s monetarism, and Reagan’s mrket-driven 
urban and suburban policies.  Categorical funding under Great Society programs tended 
to benefit older cities and their Democratic constituencies.  The New Federalism under 
Nixon sought to consolidate political support for the Republican Party by shifting federal 
funds to growth areas in the south and west, bypassing traditional Democratic 
strongholds in the older cities and regions.  Under Carter, urban policy was largely
aborted in favor of increased defense spending, financial deregulation, and the imposition 
of monetarist measures, all of which foreshadowed Reagan administration policies 
(Dilger 1982).  Like Nixon’s in the early 1970s, the Reagan fiscal program redirected 
federal funds to cities in the south and west.  Meanwhile, austerity measures were 
imposed upon groups already disciplined by the program cuts of the 1970s, including cuts 
in income maintenance, health care spending, energy assistance, and low-income housing 
(Center on Budget and Policy Priorities 1984).  In terms of housing, near exclusive 
reliance was placed on the Section 8 program which provides rental supplements to 
renters of private housing in the form of housing vouchers.  With less earning power than 
men and the potential for discrimination based on sex and family size while seeking 
rental housing, women were disproportionately impacted by this market-driven shift.  
During the 1980s there were severe cuts in funding for public housing, and funding for 
low-income housing remained low through the Bush administration.  A corruption crisis 
at the Department of Housing and Urban Development brought more attention to 
homelessness but also the need for public housing reform.  Unfortunately, the political 
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consensus between liberals and conservatives that was required to heal the wounds from 
the earlier scandal, along with changing attitudes aimed at addressing drugs and crime in 
and around public housing, resulted in the Housing Act of 1990 (Hays 1995).  However, 
one major program that resulted from the new direction in policy--the HOPE program 
(Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere)--was a throwback to the urban renewal 
projects from decades earlier.   
Nuclear family hegemony took a punitive turn during the Clinton administration 
as Congress passed legislation seeking to curb drug crimes and implementing “welfare 
reform” measures.  While financial and public support for public housing and affordable 
housing assistance programs waned, there was a dramatic change in the amount and tone
of social welfare controls.  The surveillance of some women was particularly punitive, as 
drug-dependent women were prosecuted for delivering controlled substances to fetu es in 
utero, female recipients of public assistance benefits were encouraged, and in some ca es 
forced, to undergo temporary or permanent sterilization, and shifts in theories relat d to 
child welfare and adoption sought the termination of parental rights over mother-child 
preservation.  Low-income, minority women were particularly susceptible to this assault 
from all sides of the policy-making spectrum.  Housing legislation passed during the 
1990s paralleled the shifts in cash assistance (TANF) and food security (food stamps) 
programs, with an emphasis on nuclear- and nuptial- family formation and self-
sufficiency (for certain groups).  The system of separate benefits for nuclear families and 
non-traditional households that was created decades earlier made public and subsidized 
housing ripe for attack in a growing conservative political atmosphere.  The HOPE VI 
program and the decision in the D partment of Housing and Urban Development v. 
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Rucker (2001) represent various ways in which the government implicated family in its 
attempts to regulate the homes of poor, non-traditional households that are often headed 
by single and elderly women.   
Congress and the Department of Housing and Urban Development created the 
HOPE VI program in 1992 with grants first administered in 1993.  The HOPE VI 
program was designed with a number of stated goals: revitalizing severely distressed 
public housing; increasing home ownership for low-income and moderate income 
families; reducing the housing authorities’ maintenance costs; deconcentrating poverty by 
creating mixed-income and lower-density housing; and making public housing and public 
entitlements a step towards less reliance on government assistance (FitzPatrick 2000; 
Hays 1995).  Revitalization of severely distressed federal public housing was based on 
new urbanism and related planning ideologies.  However, the result was an expensive 
program that caused displacement of non-traditional and women-headed households 
while promoting two-parent, nuclear family households.  Women’s citizenship in relation 
to the right to housing has always been qualified by one’s ability to perform well in the 
market, withstand substandard housing conditions in public and other low-income 
housing, or get by with little to no government assistance—though with the HOPE VI 
program, Congress, HUD, and local housing authorities managed to solidify nuclear 
family-centered ideology under the rubric of urban renewal.  The gentrification that is 
constitutive of HOPE VI developments may also be viewed as sanctions for the 
breakdown of the patriarchal family unit.  As singles, childless couples, and gays move 
into urban centers, including newly renovated mixed income housing developments using 
HOPE VI funding, and increase the cost of living for households in those neighborhoods, 
133 
 
they do not perform the traditional nuclear family, but whiteness and wealth gives them 
“property” in their personhood, and thus, legitimacy as consumer-citizens.  This critical 
gender perspective raises questions about other urban theories related to regime, 
displacement, and urban space.    
   
Urban Theories 
Robert Dahl’s Who Governs (1961) is a central text in the political science 
literature.  Dahl explores pluralism and the evolution of the political system in New 
Haven, Connecticut, focusing on the rise to power from different groups over time, 
including those involved in urban redevelopment.  Dahl concludes that decision making 
in the city was not restricted to a single group of elites (Hunter 1953), the dominant 
position at the time held by sociologists.  A diffusion of political power and resources, 
coupled with the population’s ability to exert influence through voting, ensured that 
power would not remain concentrated for a long period of time without the consent of the 
voting population.  His analysis was notable, in part, because less than ten years after 
publication, racial uprisings erupted across the city that Dahl described as highly stable 
and democratic.  Among the shortcomings of Dahl’s methodology was his view of the 
political realm.  Voting booths, party conventions, and the legislature are the locus of 
political activity and the dissemination of power.  This narrow understanding of politics 
ignores the production of power and downplays the material effects of other political 
activity.  By focusing on certain political relations, Dahl ignores how economic factors, 
such as investment, technology, and credit impact urban power relationships.  Dahl is
aware that racial politics plays an important role in one’s daily reality in urban areas; 
however, there is no understanding of a politics of space or the built environment as 
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shaping the urban regime.  Gender remains completely outside of his account.  Partly as a 
response to Dahl, in Whose City? (1975), sociologist Ray Pahl contends that one’s life 
opportunity is influenced by the spatial and social allocation of housing and 
transportation services.  Neither one’s relationship to the means of production, nor to 
elected officials, is the main constraint towards thriving in urban areas.  Everyday, 
people’s lives are determined by real estate developers, landlords, banks, mortgage 
lenders, non-profits, community organizers, and bureaucrats--all gatekeepers and 
managers who mold the use of urban space (1975, 203).  However, even as he points out 
Dahl’s shortcomings, Pahl (1975) fails to consider the full range of resource allo ation in 
urban areas: “housing and transportation are elements in my view of the city, fam l  
allowances and pension schemes are not” (10).  This view is particularly limited in light 
of what we now know about how gendered and racial social policies interact with the 
creation of the built environment. 
   Urban growth machine theory, developed by sociologists John Logan and 
Harvey Molotch (1987), places greater emphasis on the process of urban development.  
According to Logan and Molotch, the city acts as a “growth machine”--coalitions of 
property owners, local government, and place-bound stakeholders such as universities, 
retailers, and developers, promote land use development that increases the exchang  
value of urban real estate.  The growth machine thesis emphasizes the role of individuals 
and interest groups, challenging structuralist accounts that appeared to reduce human 
agency in the process of social change.  Only through exchange value on property can 
owners maximize the value on their holdings.  In order to maximize returns, property 
holders persuade developers and others with the expertise and resources to attract
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investment, and promote to the general public an ideology that economic growth will 
benefit the public good.  In line with critical elite theory, Logan and Molotch (1987) 
argue that the privileging of exchange value over use value means that “additional growth 
under current arrangements is a transfer of wealth and life chances from the general
public to the rentier groups and their associates” (Logan and Molotch 1987, 53).  Thus, 
the costs of growth will fall disproportionately on low-income communities.         
 Urban regime theory remains central to the study of cities in the fields of urban
planning, political science, and sociology, and offers a more sophisticated account of 
urban economic development than growth machine theories.  Urban regime theory was  
developed in the 1980s as a response and rejection of ecological, Marxist structuralist 
(and hence deterministist), and rationalistic economic approaches to urban studies, as 
well as traditional elite theory (Brenner 2009, 123).  Urban regime theory focuses on 
governing coalitions and policy formation and is not limited to election-center d 
pluralism or the controlling resources of elitism.  According to Elkin, “Politica  
institutions help to form what may be called the political way of life of a people.  But we 
as Americans do not wish for just any political way of life. We aspire to one that is 
worthy of us” (Elkin 1987, 110).  He continues, “I will call the desired political way of 
life the ‘regime’.  It encompasses what exists insofar as it conforms to our aspirations, 
and thus the term has both an empirical and normative dimension” (Elkin 1987, 110).  
Elkin’s philosophical notion of regime as the basic organizing principles of society, 
which was grounded in liberal political theory and integrated liberal assumptions 
regarding the separation of public and private spheres (here, state versus market) has been 
crystallized by many regime theorists as governance or coalition.  Emphasizing the 
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interplay of business interests and the promotion of economic growth, as well as th  
changing division of labor between markets and state institutions (Elkin 1987), urban 
regime theory analysis contends that city governments embrace the revenue generating 
activities of downtown businesses, despite the conflict that arises between city offi ials 
and community groups (Stone 1989).  More specifically, according to Elkin (1987), 
 
  The way in which popular control operates in contemporary cities 
  is largely a consequence of the division of labor between state and 
market as that is manifest in cities.  This division, which stems from  
the corresponding arrangement of the national political economy, 
means that ownership of productive assets in the city is largely placed 
in private hands.  Public officials share responsibility for the level of 
citizen well-being with these private controllers, but these officials 
cannot command economic performance, only induce it.  The concern 
of public officials with citizen well-being stems largely from their being 
subject to election or appointment by those who themselves have been 
elected. (18)   
 
Regime theory maintains that diverse and extensive patterns of interdependence 
characterize modern urban systems.  Lines of causation are not easily traced because 
there is often spillover from other areas of political life and unintended consequences of 
actions (Stone 1989, 227).  In order to be effective, Stone argues (1993), “governments 
must ‘blend’ their capacities with those of various non-governmental actors” (6).  
Regimes represent the way in which local actors mediate external pressures uch as 
economic changes, so the focus in regime analysis is on the internal dynamics of 
coalition building, civic cooperation, or informal modes of coordination across 
institutional boundaries.  Although regime theory focuses largely on elected officials and 
business, the role of labor unions, neighborhood groups, and other groups may be 
included.  Stone (1993, 19-22) defines four different regime types: maintenance or 
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caretaker regimes, which focus on routine service delivery and low taxes; development 
regimes that are concerned with changing land use to promote growth; middle-class 
progressive regimes, which include aims such as environmental protection, historic 
preservation, affordable housing, and linkage funds; and lower-class opportunity 
expansion regimes that emphasize human investment policy and widened access to 
employment and ownership.  Furthermore, Stone (1989, 7) makes the point that not all 
private interests are business interests, and other nongovernmental participants are 
included, an example being school reform, in which case business interests may be 
present but are not central to an education coalition (Henig 1999).   
Beauregard argues, however, that regime theory fails to account for larger 
structure and processes, such as social regulation (1997).  Furthermore, “issues of uneven 
spatial development, shifting intergovernmental relations, and the local consequences of 
actors operating at different spatial scales are all treated in a less than atisfactory 
manner” (1997, 173).  Beauregard concludes that regime theory focuses on “functioning 
rather than formation” (1997, 173).  This particular criticism may, however, be an issue 
relevant towards specific interpretations of regime theory rather than its original 
understanding.  Beauregard overlooks the potential for a deeper critique.  While there 
have been attempts to integrate theories of race (Whelan, Young, and Lauria 1994; Stone 
1989) and racialization (Fox 2000) of local governing coalitions into regime theory, 
gender, family status, and sexism is conspicuously absent.  This is particularly striking 




If we move beyond the market/state and private/public dichotomy (again, in the 
case of regime theory, private referring to the market and business interests and public 
referring to the state, government, and policymakers rather than home as private or 
intimate versus the public) and incorporate a more complete understanding of liberalism, 
new dimensions of urban structuring are opened.  Along a related line of criticism, Bailey 
(1999, 320) demonstrates the limitation of the regime framework for explaining urban 
political issues that are not directly economic in nature, such as the politics f identity.  
He argues for a conceptualization of cities as responding to a larger political environment 
that includes social movements focused on identity (civil rights, lesbian and gay rights) as 
well as reacting to economic forces.  Bailey advocates supplementing urban regime 
theory with other perspectives, maintaining that regime theory need not be stretched to 
accommodate all dynamics.  Indeed, recently Stone has encouraged exploring m re 
expansive and alternative lenses to understand urban politics (Stone 2008, 300).   
Similarly, Michael Brown (1999) thoughtfully explores the relationship between 
liberal democracy and urban regimes.  He points out that the work of a number of 
theorists such as Mouffe (1993) highlights politics beyond markets and the state, 
including social movements and identity politics.  Building on this point, Brown 
maintains that there “has been a mounting theoretical awareness that liberalism in its 
thought and practices is actually constitutive of multiple dimensions of public and private 
spheres” (1999, 47).  Therefore, Brown (1999) concludes,   
Recognizing the multidimensional nature of the public-private pinpoints a 
certain equivocation in Ekin's original formulation that needs redressing: if 
governance is produced at the intersection of public and private spheres in 
a liberal democracy -- and those spheres constitute governance 
multidimensionally -- then only looking at the juncture of 'state' and 
'market' institutions might curtail our ability to get at the complexity of 
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power dynamics in an urban regime. Moreover, it does so within 
liberalism itself', on the grounds of theoretical inconsistency. (49) 
 
It is important to note that “although established urban theories… provide a rich and 
vigorous account of restructuring effects on local politics, inattention to gender relations 
restricts their theoretical and empirical value” (Clarke, et al 1995, 205).  Feminist theory, 
as well as other critiques of liberalism, may allow one to identify different forms of 
governance within a regime.   
In an exceptional edited volume, The City in American Political Development 
(2009), Dilworth reviews the American political development literature and notes that 
cities are surprisingly absent.  Starting with Theda Skocpol’s States and Social 
Revolutions (1979) and Stephen Skowronek’s Building a New American State (1985), the 
topic of state-building became an increasingly popular avenue through which to 
conceptualize political phenomenon (Dillworth 2009).  This movement, “in which 
government was perceived as an important actor in shaping social and political outcomes, 
rather than being simply an arena in which interest groups and social movements battled 
for resources” as was the case in the urbanist literature, re-invigorated st -centered 
scholarship (Dilworth 2009, 2).  Orren and Skowronek’s important The Search for 
American Political Development (2004) laid out the conceptual framework for this new 
sub-discipline, focusing on stability and change, along with various modes of 
contradictory political authority.  Dilworth (2009) points out, cities and municipal 
government is not mentioned.  So while cities have not been addressed in the American 
political development literature, gender is doubly problematic: it is absent in both regime 
theory and more recent state-centered urban investigations in political science.   
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In general, contemporary feminist urban planners have tended to treat regime 
theory with suspicion.  Dominant themes in feminist theory take on even more 
significance when applied to a Fordist and post-Fordist North American metropolitan 
area because sex differentiated domestic roles and gendered social poliy is 
institutionalized through the material organization of the city, land use, and in 
transportation planning.  There is a sense that regime theories’ version of liberalism’s 
public/private divide has on one hand been constructed with only male interests in mind 
and on the other fails to represent women who are not white, middle-class, and 
heterosexual.  Garber and Turner (1995) observe that “[i]n cities, where group 
membership is defined, the economy organized, democratic politics regulated, social 
interactions mediated, culture produced, and space exploited, how these take place has 
profoundly different meanings for men and women” (x, Introduction).  The landscape of 
social, political, and economic forces operate within dimensions based on patriarchl 
values and institutions.  In terms of economic development, housing, social provisions, 
child care policies, transportation planning, and other features of the city and built 
environment, “the local state induces, even though it might not force, gender compliance” 
(xi).  Furthermore, according to Garber and Turner (1995, xii), public policies that imp ct 
the intimate sphere, such as policing private spaces and controlling household 
arrangements, are “inescapably gendered.”  Ultimately, economic restructuring and 
transformations in the division of labor has made the performance of gender in cities even 
less predictable.  Women who are unwilling or unable to perform standard gendered 
conventions assigned to them through society are particularly susceptible to diminished 
standards of living.  Feminist planners, therefore, ask important questions about the 
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interaction of politics, gender, and space.  More specifically, “once ensconced in 
institutions, how does gender physically shape the city, define men’s privilege over 
women, and differentiate between women?” (1995, xvi).  Home and housing policy lies 
at the intersection of land use, community, and domesticity, and exemplifies women’s 
relationship to politics and place.  Failure to incorporate gender into theories of urban 
politics leads to a partial understanding of women and the built environment.  This 
chapter utilizes an analysis of New Urbanism and the HOPE VI program in order t  
address this issue and highlight the dimensions of nuclear family hegemony in 
contemporary urban renewal.  Using gender as an analytic tool may balance the 
shortcomings in regime analyses and state-centered approaches that have tended to ignore 
urban politics.  Looking to urban theories of space can also highlight important features 
of urban renewal that are normally beyond the purview of political science.   
 
The Public Spatial Turn in Urban Politics 
Different building forms produce different meanings, and there are a significant 
social and political norms captured in the multiple building forms and the built 
environment that society constructs.  In the context of house building, this dynamic is 
even more powerful than the creation of ideology alone because building—and the area 
surrounding it--occupies physical space.  In the urban planning theory literature, the issue 
of public space is typically understood in two different ways.  The Jane Jacobs camp 
maintains that walkable neighborhoods develop a natural sense of trust and security.  
Physical isolation and single-purpose neighborhoods circumvents the ease and casu l 
nature of urban life.  In the other camp are those who view public space as a public good 
that promotes diversity and is constitutive of democratic institutions (Reichl 2005).  The 
142 
 
spatial dynamics of politics gained more attention in postmodern political theory, yet 
many accounts focus on discursive power rather than materiality.  Despite the nherently 
political nature of public space, the relationship between space, place, and democratic life 
is largely under-theorized in political theory, though the increasingly popular “sp tial 
turn” in urban theory (Smith 1996; Zukin 1991; Harvey 1985) is beginning to attract 
attention in political science.  Space is both “the ‘perceived space’ of material spatial 
practices and the ‘conceived space’ of symbolic representations and epistemologis” 
(Soja 1999, 74).  Farrar (2008) notes that space is not only a stage for political behavior 
to be played out; instead, it is always an active part of the cast.  The built environment 
establishes and maintains freedom, security, domination, and responsibility, and it is also 
involved in the process of subjectivity (Farrar 2008, 12).  From shopping malls to parks 
to urban redevelopment projects, “we plan for the subjects we have; we also plan for the 
subjects we want” (12).  From Nietzsche’s “mnemotechnics” to Foucault’s “political 
anatomy of detail,” the corporeal is written into memory and space, and indeed, “urban
planning discourses not only create subjects but also create citizens” (2008, 13).   
 Historically, public space has been viewed in a variety of ways: as a guaranteed 
site of access to the city, the essence of pluralism and political particition, and a place 
to exhibit personal freedom (Amster 2008, 45).  Public spaces are the arena in which 
public acts of the political can be demonstrated openly (Mitchell 1995).  Streets, 
sidewalks, parks, and public transportation--common property with an egalitarian quality-
-are places where anyone may be (Waldron 1991).  However, public space has often been 
a site of contestation and exclusion (Mitchell 1997).  The public space that is invoked as 
a site for democratic openness is more often an ideal than reality.  Cities now employ 
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various tactics to exercise control over public spaces, including surveillance cmeras 
(Koskela 2000), municipal ordinances to regulate behavior or access and increased 
policing (Smith 1996).  Access to public space is further eroded by privatization (Sorkin 
1992).  Some commentators argue that new regimes of surveillance and militarization are 
characteristic of a post-Keynesianism neo-liberalism (Harvey 1985).  Some of these 
forms of neo-liberalism are exercised at the level of the city and developm nt and “the 
idea that all of this is intimately tied to processes of gentrification and redevelopment is 
certainly not a revelation” (Lloyd and Auld 2003, 344).  It is more instructive, however, 
to see current events as an evolution of urban dynamics, consistent with and not different 
than earlier periods.  The specific means and ends might be different, but the overall 
ideologies of gendered power and control remain the same.  This project seeks to 
illuminate some of these gendered ideologies to contribute to a fuller telling of the story 
of federal housing policy development from the interwar period to the present.   
In the classic text, Gentrification of the City (1986), Neil Smith and Peter 
Williams observe that an increase in corporate and corporate-related activities in city 
centers leads to an increase in bourgeois entertainment facilities.  The resulting 
displacement of the economically and socially vulnerable members of the community has 
been observed by many scholars (Kawash 1998; Williams 1996).  More recently, cities 
have lured middle- and upper-income singles and couples specifically to urban centers in 
an attempt to increase tax revenue and spending without burdening the public 
entitlements and social services systems (Lees 2003).  Geographers and urban theorists 
have observed a radically new relationship between urban planning, space, and economic 
regimes.  As part of the post-Fordist, services-oriented economy that developed in th  
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late twentieth century as a replacement for large scale manufacturing production and 
employment, “cultural” industries have played an important role in the transformati n of 
urban economies.  Many cities have been shaped historically by trade and visitors; 
however, in a process described as tourism urbanization, cities are being built and 
developed expressly for tourists.  Whether new cities, such as Las Vegas and recently 
developed resort areas in Mexico, or historic cities, such as Barcelona and Venice, 
significant energy and resources are devoted to tourist flows (Sorkin 1992).  Similarly, in 
the influential Variations on a Theme Park: The New American City and the End of 
Public Space (1992), Michael Sorkin argues that theme park cities, with synthetic and 
sanitized experiences, an obsession with security, technologically-centered 
overstimulation, and restricted speech have replaced the complexities of urban life.  This 
move towards sanitized cities may represent the contemporary version of the suburb, in 
which land use is highly regulated and political potential is curtailed:  “There are no 
demonstrations in Disneyland,” writes Sorkin (1992, xv).  For David Harvey (2006), no 
amount of ‘new urbanism’ understood as urban design, can promote a greater sense of 
civic responsibility and participation if the intensity of private property arrangements and 
the organization of commodity as spectacle (of which Disneyfication is the prim  
example) remains untouched” (33).  Judd (2003) maintains that cities dominated by 
tourism are characterized by standardized control of nearly every aspect of the tourist 
experience, as planning and administration is devoted to preserving places of cultural
consumption.  In addition to insulating visitors from areas outside of tourist enclaves, a la 
Potemkin Villages, municipalities are urged to finance new infrastructure to support these 
cultural economies (Fainstein 2003, 6).  Rather than public investment being used for 
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housing and other city services, public funds are increasingly used for places of festival, 
such as professional sports stadiums, aquariums, historic streetscapes, or urban parks 
(Lees 1998; Sorkin 1992).  With these new modes of financing come new institutional 
arrangements, such as business improvement districts and development authorities.  
Neighborhoods are replaced by generic urbanism that is increasingly controlled by quasi-
public agencies and corporations.  And in some historically black enclaves, cultural 
tourism centers on the communities as incubators of a safe racialized space.  On th  
surface this celebration of historically minority-controlled space and minority-owned 
businesses is enticing; however, it must not be forgotten that many minority enclaves 
were created as a response to segregation.  Though created through forms of resistance, 
they nevertheless represent the institutionalization of racism and segregated land use 
policies, mortgage lending, and municipal zoning.     
Privatization of the public realm substitutes the private corporation for public 
institutions as the repository of trust, legitimacy, and communal identity in our society.  
The ideology of privatization effectively depoliticizes policy making by systematically 
excluding all those voices and interests who reject the sanctity of the "free-mark t" and 
the desire to maximize private profits through the use of public policy and government 
subsidies.  The effect is to insulate the government policy making process from public 
influence and scrutiny, stymie groups supporting alternative strategies, and promote 
policies that favor private actors and corporations rather than the public good.  Business 
improvement districts (BIDs), in particular, have generated a great deal of criticism from 
scholars (Kohn 2004).  BIDs are viewed as embodying the power of the state with none 
of the responsibilities or protection of democratic government.  They limit access to 
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space and define appropriate behavior, and may potentially circumvent constitutional 
provisions that require local government to respect civil liberties.  These new public, 
urban spaces are akin to the suburban mall—they are pseudo-public space because they 
are no longer open to all (Crilley 1993).  This new form of property is neither wholly 
public nor private.  These forms of space and property allow uneven levels of 
participation for different groups.  For example, some spaces which may be hostilto 
ethnic minorities and low-income groups, others might open up spaces of visibility and 
freedom from public assault for gays and lesbians (Pain 2000; Goss 1996).  Against 
Crilley’s pseudo-private space, Mitchell and Staeheli (2006) propose p udo-private 
spaces, those that “are formally owned by the state, the public, but that are subject to 
control and regulation by private interests” (153).  These include public sidewalks th t 
are patrolled by business improvement district security guards and parks governed by 
conservatories.  In these pseudo-private spaces, public interaction is merely a means 
towards capitalist accumulation (153).  Public space, therefore, is seen “as themarker of 
urbanity” (Mitchell and Staeheli 2006, 152).  Places for gathering become viewed as 
what makes a city a city, and making those spaces safe is of utmost importance.  
Redevelopment often makes certain groups, such as the chronically homeless, become 
more prominent in public space (Schraeger 1994), and in many cases business support for 
social services providers increases in attempts to make the homeless invisible (Mitchell 
and Staeheli 2006, 158).  Many debates over urban redevelopment rely on a narrative of 
promoting health, safety, and the release of social tension in order to legitimize 
displacement and the use of public funds for private development (Farrar 2008, 19).  
More sobering still, some scholars observe that contemporary urban centers reflect 
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emerging dystopian dreams/nightmares (Wright 1997).  Sanitized communities, free of 
trash and marginalized populations, and awash in consumerism, remove all memory of 
the past.  Spaces that were once prized for their openness and diversity are eradicated to 
impose homogeneity and predictability.  Attempts to design more manageable public 
urban space, including Paris’ Haussmannization in the 1850s, Olmstead’s plan for New 
York City’s Central Park, and the federal government’s public housing redevelopment in 
the 1990s, rely on these longings for more perfect spaces (Farrar 2008, 19).  These 
cultural theoretical ruminations of urban life are perhaps more provocative than incisive.  
They tend to reduce urban theory to economic or technological determinism, which 
devalues human agency and political choice, and yet, they are telling of new modes of 
control that are utilized in urban areas.  Histories of white flight, inner-city disinvestment, 
and suburbanization during the post-war period are utilized and re-appropriated by real 
estate developers, real estate agents, city planners, and businesses in order to support 
redevelopment.  Reconfiguring public space, and along with it narratives of reclaiming it, 
is commonly used by parties involved in development (Magnet 2000).  However, recent 
urban renewal is adjusting the contours of public and private space.  Rather than opening 
up neighborhoods and public space, both urban and suburban, to new forms of 
democratic expression, urban renewal is making communities less accessible to many 
groups and individuals.  In addition, the resulting displacement revolves around the idea 
of normal families and recreates the idea that some are deserving and proper 




Urban Renewal and Practices of Displacement 
In The Language of Cities (1971), Charles Abrams describes the negative effects 
of urban renewal and displacement on low-income households.  Condemnation, eminent 
domain, and eviction are cited as examples that devastate low-income communities, a 
sort-of secondary victimization.  Even as we witness the intentional destruction of 
homeplaces in developing countries and criticize the practices of foreign governments, 
Americans tend to accept similar practices in the United States.  Geographers J. Douglas 
Porteous and Sandra E. Smith (2001) suggest a new term to describe the deliberate 
destruction of home that is against the will of the residents and which results in negative 
consequences for inhabitants: domicide (ix).  Albeit somewhat sensationalistic, domicide 
captures an array of institutional practices which cause displacement.  The destruction of 
home occurs at the local and global level and is frequently caused by political, 
bureaucratic, and corporate projects, including economic development and urban 
renewal.  “The elimination of home and homeland is justified as being in the public 
interest,” as those displaced are considered “victims of the common good” (2001, ix).  
Victims/survivors of domicide are not usually viewed as refugees or in exile.  Th y are 
not crossing borders nor receive protection from international NGOs, and thus, remain 
invisible.  Unplanned disasters, whether from nuclear power plants meltdowns, extreme 
weather, or chemical spills, are not viewed as domicide since these phenomenon are not 
deliberate.  Although the psychological effects of domicide and unplanned disasters may 
be similar, and government or corporations may be complicit in failing to protect the 
population or establishing appropriate procedures to ensure safety, such unplanned 
disasters are not engineered (2001, 19).  One larger than life example of domicide is 
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Robert Moses’ transportation planning in New York City (2001, 185).  His modernization 
projects involved building highways, tunnels, dams, bridges and other large-scale public 
works which cut through stable mixed-race neighborhoods.  When natural disasters cuse 
devastations to dwelling places there is significant attention and outcry, but when hom 
places are removed as a part of urban renewal projects--in the name of the public 
interest—there is little protest from the broader community.  Instead, “experts”—
remnants of Progressive-era managerial science--are frequently invoked to buttress 
support for redevelopment projects.  Planners are brought in to recreate theories of 
community development on the landscape and to develop so-called participatory 
procedures to satisfy community members, neighbors, and activists.   
Some are critical that planners are merely “evangelistic bureaucrats” who believe 
they are capable of defining the public interest for others (Davies 1972, 110).  The 
planner as evangelistic bureaucrat “legitimates his schemes not by reference to the actual 
consumer, but either in terms of his [sic] own self-induced charisma or by reference to a 
range of putative consumers whose wishes and wants he himself can, in impunity, 
define” (Davies 1972, 3).  Policy analysts develop reports that point out potential positive 
outcomes of development: improved test scores for school children, reduced geographic 
isolation from the broader community, improved safety, and racial/ethnic integration.  
Real estate agents laud increased housing value.  Business leaders and city bureaucrats 
emphasize increased tax revenue and opportunities for small business development.  All 
of these experts support a wave of near mythical improvements that will purportedly flow 
from sites of urban renewal and development.  Once started, the momentum is difficult to 
contain and nearly impossible to oppose, particularly after the Kelo v. City of New 
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London (2005) decision in which the Supreme Court ruled that local governments could 
justify takings on eminent domain grounds and support community redevelopment.  
Community meetings are carried out to explain proposed changes and gain community 
input in the planning process.  Some planning scholars, however, describe how 
participatory planning practices merely act as a veil for the practices of planner and 
developers (Kaza 2006).  In reality, the decision to redevelop a place is frequently made 
in board rooms and government offices; not all strategies and plans are made public.  
Community assessment is a more recent manifestation of managerial social science in the 
field of planning and economic development.  Impact assessments are carried out to 
evaluate the level of change that might occur within a particular community from the 
development process (Hindemarsh 1988).  The assessment process may explore 
quantifiable indicators such as population density, income, and transportation use, as well 
as indicators that are far more difficult to quantify, such as community cohesion, 
neighborhood satisfaction, civic identity, and social service needs (Bowles 1981; 
Soderstrom 1981).  However, despite the dearth of community and social impact 
assessments by real estate developers, municipal economic development professionals, 
and community planners, there is growing criticism that public participaton is limited, 
social indicators of positive change are usually set by those managing development (and 
not the community), and more critically, that the process is used for public relations 
purposes rather than to assist in asset-based community development participatory action 
research (Lang and Armour 1981).  This bureaucratization and specialization of planning 
functions rationalizes the result and overlooks the practices being carried out in the name 
of the common good, increase tax receipts, economic development, or safety.    
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Within all of these procedures, there are few parties that legitimately represent the 
interests of community members and residents.  Indeed, there is little understa ing that 
“what is uprooted may be the very meaning of people’s lives” (Porteous and Smith 2001, 
11).  These Faustian bargains on which municipalities increasingly rely for development 
have the power to further embed sex difference and racialization into public and private
space.  For the purposes of this project, the concern is that the state and federal 
government and the courts--those promoting and defining urban economic growth--are 
promoting a physical reconstruction and redefinition of space, one in which women with 
limited financial means are likely to feel the negative impact rather than benefit.  Women 
are less likely to have the political power to guide development and financing schemes or 
access to the decision making process.  This also means that residents commonly viewed 
as embodying unappealing aspects of urban life are increasingly restricted from 
participation in urban public space.  There is a sense that by policing, purifying, and 
controlling space, redevelopment can shape appropriate lifestyles and families.  Th  point 
here is not to mourn the loss of public space.  Nostalgia for an idealized version of public 
space in which a democratic citizenry can interact, communicate, and deliberat , is at the 
very heart of many urban renewal visions that contribute to displacement, including neo-
traditional planning.  Furthermore, the goal of urban renewal projects is normally for the 
benefit of citizen/worker/consumers or those most able to consume and contribute to 
increased tax revenue.                              
 
New Urbanism and the Nuclear Family 
Herbert Muschamp, architecture critic of the N w York Times, described new 
urbanism as “the most important phenomenon to emerge in American architecture in the 
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post-Cold War era”.36  New urbanism is an architectural design movement that began in 
the late 1980s and became more mainstream in the 1990s.  An early response to so-called 
"cookie cutter suburbs" and "unhealthy sprawl" of conventional suburbia was 
"neotraditionalism," a form of architecture that evolved from the urban historic 
preservation movement of the 1970s (Ellin 1996).  Neotraditionalism as a design 
approach was popularized with the traditional neighborhood designs of self-styled "town 
planners" known as DPZ—Duany and Plater-Zabek (Katz 1994; Duany and Plater-
Zyberk, 1991).  New urbanism developed as a specific type of neo-traditional architecture 
and evolved into a full-scale planning movement.  New urbanism’s initial aim, advocates 
claim, was to reform all aspects of real estate development, including addressing 
suburban sprawl, environmental deterioration, and race and income segregation (Katz 
1994).  In its charter, The Congress for the New Urbanism (CNU), which was founded in 
1993 by a group of architects in the San Francisco area to promote new urbanism’s goals, 
cites these planning issues not as problems but as interrelated community-build ng 
challenges.  The charter maintains that the CNU is a coalition of community activists, 
government officials, and public and private sector professionals representing a diverse 
group of citizens and “committed to reestablishing the relationship between the art of 
building and the making of community, through citizen-based participatory planning and 
design” (CNU 2001, 1).  The CNU plays a large role in the marketing of new urbanist 
design and planning philosophy through producing reports on issues such as trends in the 
housing market, suburban sprawl, and the connection between new urbanism and charter 
schools.  The CNU asserts that housing consumers want to live in communities where 
                                                




land is used efficiently and there is reduced traffic, all contributing to a better way of life.  
New urbanism is “dedicated to reclaiming [emphasis added] our homes, blocks, streets, 
parks, neighborhoods, districts, towns, cities, regions, and environment” (2). 
As farmland was increasingly sold to private developers, urban centers were 
becoming more deteriorated or segregated, and there were few places where families
could afford to live that did not involve long commutes to jobs in the city, new urbanists 
sought to restore towns into communities with neighborhoods and distinct districts.  This 
could be achieved by working against suburban sprawl and infilling older, obsolete 
suburban and urban areas with new, planned, mixed-use neighborhoods.  One of the 
founding principles of new urbanism focuses on building walkable, mixed-use 
neighborhoods where houses are situated within walking distance of stores, restaurants, 
and parks (Langdon 1994).  High-density housing with a mix of apartments, condos, and 
single-detached houses are supposed to encourage social diversity, provide more public 
spaces, and promote a sense of community.  The new urbanists’ ideal is the pre-World 
War II American city: a place with a "traditional" main street and city center.  Although 
precious neighborhoods with white picket fences are the stereotypical image of the neo-
traditional planned community, advocates of new urbanism maintain that local 
architecture styles are observed in design (Langdon 1994). 
Ellin (1996) argues that neo-traditional towns became successful on the 
marketplace in the 1980s and 1990s due to their romantic character and by appealing to 
nostalgic notions of 1920s era American life.  By the mid- to late-1990s, new urbanists 
had begun to develop a wider range of projects, including within inner city 
neighborhoods and in developing countries (Dunlop 1997).  Advocates of new urbanism, 
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maintain that the design and planning movement go beyond nostalgia and address land 
use problems, automobile-driven lack of mobility, and alternative zoning ordinances 
which emphasize multiuse and higher density developments (Talen 2000).  Other critics 
of new urbanism argue that the success of new urbanist projects should be evaluated by 
their results, not simply their lofty aims (Krieger 1998).  Talen (2000) was more positive 
in her evaluation of new urbanism, even though she recognized problems with 
implementation.  In general, she argues that the underlying framework is sound and 
reflects a long-standing and history-based reformist perspective on urban problems and 
their solutions.  New urbanists claim to have promoted governance structures for their 
developments that differ from those typical of planned urban developments or post-war 
master planned communities.  Furthermore, they advocate for participatory community 
planning.  By the end of the 1990s, new urbanist influence had extended to the ways 
private-public partnerships were institutionally and legally structured in federal urban 
development and renewal projects.  New urbanist principles were utilized by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s affordable housing developments, 
including the HOPE VI public housing redevelopment scheme (Dunlop 1997). 
More recently, social scientists have begun to investigate the relationships 
between design, the built environment, human behavior, and sense of place in new 
urbanism developments, with mixed results (Ford 1999).  Geographers who focus on 
equitable social-spatial relations have been particularly critical of new urbanist 
philosophy (Till 1993).  Dowling (1998) argues that neo-traditionalism—a set of 
conservative reactions to current economic and social changes that upholds ideas of th  
past solutions to problems of the present—is changing American urban and suburban 
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areas.  The extent to which social and economic segregation has been successfully 
addressed through new urbanist planning remains questionable.  Urban professionals, 
Young (1990) argues, in their efforts to make that world a better place to live, must 
remain open to the differences, creative impulses, and alternative understandings of "the 
real world" that are associated with its messiness and unpredictability.   To some critics, 
new urbanism wants to create spaces that are not only free from social woes such as 
crime and poverty, but from the very essence of city life.  Both cities and suburbs appear
anarchic to new urbanists; it is that sense of chaos, in part, that new urbanism attempts o 
address.  Although cities and suburbs are chaotic in very different ways, new urbanism 
approaches both similarly.  Benjamin Barber (2001) argues that “the new urbanism has 
addressed the loss of vitality in the suburbs in a primarily cosmetic way, opting for the 
appearance of cities but avoiding those essential urban traits such as class and race
mixing, the delight real urban dwellers take in the unfamiliar, tolerance and eve  affinity 
for disorder, and the ubiquity of risk” (210).  New urbanist developments, whether as 
urban infill and redevelopment projects or suburban developments, look like retreats from 
urban city life.  They have none of the elements that make cities lively and interesting 
places in which to interact with other people.  In fact, although new urbanism 
theoretically places a high premium on civic interaction and participation, there is little 
room for that in reality.  Richard Sennett (1999) concurs with Barber and observes, “the 
pristine, white-gleaming small towns produced by the movement called the new urbanism 
are a world apart from the everyday disorders of life; the kitsch, the pseudo-small towns 
now being built as an antidote to suburban sprawl provided no home for differences--
differences of the sort that lead to conflicts of ethnicity, race, class, and/or sexual 
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preference” (278).  Even as new urbanism rejects the chaos of the city, it has the
appearance of supporting democratic ideals and multiculturalism.  In reality, it fails to 
make any substantive connection between democracy and the built environment and 
ignores the ways in which sex and racial difference is played out through urban design 
and the built environment. 
 Neil Smith (1995) argues that the 1990s marked a shift in urbanism from the 
Keynesian and New Deal economics towards a revanchist urban regime.  Smith adopts 
the 1890s French concept of revanche, loosely translated as revenge, to express the 
current backlash that is occurring in the United States against liberal urban policy (1995, 
185).  Smith says “as critics around the world understand, the decline and fall of 
Keynesian interventionism--from the welfare state and urban policy to state cent red 
models of international development--marks a structured political adjustment toward 
what is widely understood as neo-liberalism” (1995, 197).  Smith points out that with the 
growing illegitimacy of the state, “the market and intense policing operate simultaneously 
and most intensely” (199).  Market forces, along with the drive for order and control, are 
becoming even more powerful.  Although Smith is specifically looking at New York
City, he asserts that the new urban revanchist trend is not isolated to New York City or 
even within urban centers (186).  He argues that the middle-class, politicians, and 
property developers are attempting to assert control over cities as a response to social ills 
that have characterized the last few decades in American cities, such as homelessness, 
crime, and noise (12).  He adds, these “deep-seated fears and insecuritie are enlisted to 
fuse and conflate physical and psychic safety” so that “the symptoms are the cause”
(188).  In essence, crime, violence, poverty, and homelessness are blamed for the 
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dysfunction in cities, rather than viewing those characteristics as an outgrowth of 
problems already existing within the city and society in general.  Whereas racism and 
oppression were once seen as the root cause of many social problems, a century later, 
racism, sexism, and poverty are being removed from the table as points of discussion in 
social policy debates.  As a result of the social problems that remain, in order to instill 
order and assert control, some feel that “sanitizing the landscape will reverse th  city’s 
decline, opening up the possibility of a glorious new urban destiny” (1995, 188).  Aside 
from the impact on social policy, sanitization of the cities comes in the form of local 
quality of living legislation, such as banning panhandling or preventing homeless from 
sleeping in certain public spaces.  Smith’s characterizations of new urban revanchism do 
not directly parallel his critique of architectural new urbanism, but he asserts that “the 
impulse that gave rise to the nostalgic traditionalism of so-called new urban a chitecture, 
every bit a struggle to reclaim a lost bourgeois order, is shared with the new urban 
revanchism” (186).  The revenge of new urbanism is not manifest in the same way as
new urban revanchism.  Whereas New York City had the Giuliani administration and the 
attack on the homeless, prostitutes, graffiti artists, and unruly youths, architectural new 
urbanism represents escapism in the form of cookie cutter traditional-styled homs, 
excessive codes and regulations, and an image that is more exclusionary than welcoming 
(194).   
While Smith’s observations are important and insightful, and urban scholars 
certainly have reason to worry, historically, revanchist ideology has been pr sent for 
women and minorities attempting to obtain affordable housing absent of government 
policing.  The severe societal costs of welfare state dismantling and the privatization of 
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housing policy about which Smith warns should not be underestimated; however, 
focusing on recent neo-liberal reforms and redevelopment governance practices s th  
object of criticism obscures nuclear-family hegemony.  These critiques divert attention 
away from understanding the multiple ways in which United States’ housing policy has 
reproduced class, race, and gender bias since the federal government was involved  
housing.  The privatization and corporatism to which scholars of neo-liberalism tend to 
refer has always been a part of federal housing policy.   
New urbanism also maintains that it is sensitive to local culture and vernacular 
architecture.  It has adopted the language of critical urban planning, with its focus on 
creating dynamic public spaces and human scale architecture.  In fact, in its attempts to 
appeal to local history and culture, new urbanism’s literature is highly racialized.  For 
example, in “Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design: Creating Communities of 
Opportunity”--a joint venture of The Congress for the New Urbanism and the Departmnt 
of Housing and Urban Development--the porch as a housing design element is 
conceptualized as analogous to jazz:   
If we investigated the origins of Jazz, we would understand the origins 
of the Porch.  The porch represents the fusion of European and African 
architectural expression.  The porch serves a dual purpose: the vestibule  
to the occupant’s private residence, and the occupant’s vestibule to the  
street.  Perhaps Architects, Designers, Planners and Owners should use  
the science of Ethnomusicology for inspiration when revitalizing inner  
city communities. (27)37   
 
These planners and architects who claim the porch as a mixture of European and African 
architectural expression are articulating a curious revisionist history of the American 
                                                
37 “Principles for Inner City Neighborhood Design: Creating Communities of Opportunity,” Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/principles.pdf (Accessed 
February 2, 2003). 
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single family house.  Combining the idea of the porch with Afro-Caribbean heritage on 
the one hand, feeds into the stereotype that only minorities utilize affordable housing, and 
on the other, attempts to re-appropriate symbols of Afro-Caribbean culture for civic and 
consumer consumption.  New urbanist advocates may be aware that “urban renewal” has 
become understood as the synonym for “black removal” in some urban communities.  
Nuclear family hegemony is expressed through the single family house, and in this case, 
the front porch takes on new meaning.  Sennett concludes (1999), this type of “identity 
talk… leads to isolation rather than interaction” (278).  In general, the imagery of new 
urbanism’s neo-traditional architecture harkens back to a time when sex different ated 
roles and racial segregation was well defined.  That new urbanism gained such 
widespread popularity and the federal government would redirect significant fin cing to 
programs based on neo-traditional design, speaks to the extent to which gendered and 
racial elements still exist in American culture and policy prescriptions viewed as neutral 
and legitimate.       
 
HOPE VI as Gendered Urban Renewal 
As federal funding cuts led municipalities to rely more on property tax revenues, 
cities have become more dependent on and subsidizers of the real estate market through 
public giveaways of land, zoning policies, city planning commissions, and subsidies that 
funnel tax dollars to developers.  The state facilitates this process by clearing the land, 
improving streets and utility hook-ups, and providing parks, libraries, new police station , 
and schools.  HOPE VI, one feature of this trend, shifted public housing to the market 
through privatization of management, vouchers in the housing market, and mixed income 
developments financed by public private partnerships that use tax dollars to subsidize 
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private developers.  A key 1995 revision eliminated one-to-one replacement, so residents 
could be displaced without guarantee of return to new or rehabbed units.  Public housing 
was one of the few remaining policy obstacles to gentrification, and this revision 
eliminated a significant barrier, opening up public housing sites to large scale private 
market-rate development (Hackworth 2007).  The Quality Housing and Work 
Responsibility Act of 1998 further institutionalized the rollback of federal support for 
public housing by requiring reconstructed sites to have a mix of incomes with no more 
than 40 percent of residents considered “poor,” strict work requirements, expanded 
reasons to terminate leases, and limited relocation rights (Ranny and Wright 2004, 15).  
The major housing-related elements of the 1998 legislation included increased use of 
vouchers and Section 8 certificates, increased local and private control over housing, 
encouraged more house ownership, and theoretically integrated social services into low-
income housing planning.  While the additional social services and service coordination 
funding was welcomed by many low-income communities, many of the other provisions 
in the legislation had a disproportionate negative impact on women, particularly those 
affected by urban renewal programs that involved displacement.  Households impacted 
by public housing demolition and relocation might be eligible for housing vouchers; 
however, since source of income is not a federally protected fair housing class, there is no 
guarantee that residents being displaced could obtain market rental housing with the 
vouchers.  Even without displacement, the increased use of housing vouchers as a 
replacement for affordable housing production meant that more households were forced 
to seek housing on the open rental market.  Far more difficult is the loss of kinship 
networks that non-traditional households rely on in low- and moderate-income 
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neighborhoods and in affordable housing communities for child care, emergency cash 
assistance, and other basic needs.  These household forms and networks of care–whether 
extended family, “other-mothers,” neighbors, community based organizations, or church
members–exist alongside traditional families; they provide social cohesion and constitute 
important, intentional support networks.  Housing policy that leads to widespread 
neighborhood transitions and displacement undermines these networks of support that are 
crucial resistance-building and survival techniques for many non-nuclear family
households. 
Research has shown that family-centered political rhetoric escalated between 
1984 and 2000 (Elder and Green 2006).  While both parties invoked the family as part of 
their ideological agenda, it was to buttress different policy endeavors (2006).  Suzanne 
Mettler points out that through the 1998 welfare reform, both Congress and the President 
acted to further firm up divided gendered citizenship (1998, 226).  She argues that the 
move away from the neutral, federal entitlement of AFDC (Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children) to state controlled TANF (Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families) signaled a new type of intergovernmental relationships, one in which the 
gendered nature of the New Deal administrative state further embodied sex differentiated 
citizenship (227).  It is important to note that AFDC, however, also had state-determined 
elements.  R. Claire Snyder (2003) points out that the family-centered theories of 
Galston, President Clinton’s deputy assistant for domestic policy, were startlingly close 
to that of members of the Christian Right, including James Dobson and David 
Blankenhorn (157).  It was within the Democratic administration that women’s gdered 
citizenship took a punitive turn in the realm of affordable housing.    
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Congress and the Department of Housing and Urban Development created the 
HOPE VI program in 1992 with grants first administered in 1993 to provide a flexible 
source of support for investments in public housing developments and their residents.  
The HOPE VI program was conceived after a three-year U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) study was commissioned by Congress to focus on the 
problems of severely distressed public housing (FitzPatrick 2000, 435).38  The 
commission found that traditional, large-scale public housing projects failed to provide 
adequate housing and were very expensive to maintain (2000, 435).  The HOPE VI 
program was designed with a number of stated goals: revitalizing severely distressed 
public housing; increasing home ownership for low-income and moderate-income 
families; reducing the housing authorities’ maintenance costs; deconcentrating poverty by 
creating mixed income and lower density housing; and making public housing and public 
entitlements a step towards less reliance on government assistance (HUD 1999).  In order 
to implement this new program, one that would replace severely distressed public 
housing and replace it with mixed income, mixed use properties, HUD collaborated with 
the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU), to develop their “Principles for the Inner City 
Neighborhood Design.”39  To obtain funding, local municipal housing authorities would 
submit a proposal to the Department of Housing and Urban Development for a HOPE VI 
grant which HUD evaluated based on the following elements: “level of obsolescenc  of 
the current project, consultation and cooperation with residents, density and income mix 
                                                
38 See also, The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, “An Historical Baseline 
Assessment of HOPE VI,” http://www.huduser.org/publications/pubasst/hopevi.html (Accessed August 2, 
1999). 
39 “Creating Communities of Opportunity: HOPE VI and the New Urbanism,” A Collaboration of the 
Congress of the New Urbanism and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, 
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/principles.pdf  (Accessed May 14, 2005).  
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of the proposed project, leveraging of outside resources, family self-sufficiency plans for 
residents, size of new development, and the need for funding” (HUD 2001).  Other 
conditions that were considered included potential for success and proof that the housing 
authority sent out notices to tenants and held at least one meeting about possible changes.  
From 1993 to 2000, the Department of Housing and Urban Development awarded nearly 
$4 billion to local housing authorities to fund demolition, planning, and revitalization 
through HOPE VI (HUD 2001).  However, the result was an expensive program that 
displaced large numbers of low-income households in order to make room for income- 
stable families. With the HOPE VI program, Congress, HUD, and local housing 
authorities promoted nuclear family-centered ideology under the rubric of new urbanism 
and urban renewal. 
The rehabilitation of severely distressed housing projects requires relocation for 
households living in properties slated for demolition. Since 1996, although the local 
housing authorities were required to increase funding through private investment, this 
necessitates setting aside a large portion of the new or renovated housing for middle-
income families, leaving many low-income families, and especially single women, 
locked out of the new program.  These attempts to integrate market rate housing with 
public housing limits the amount of available space for low-income households and the 
emphasis on homeownership means that fewer women will be able to access the new 
properties (NLIHC 2000).  Advocates of the HOPE VI program assert that mixed income 
housing will deconcentrate poverty in the poorest neighborhoods of inner cities and bring 
in residents with higher incomes, leading to healthier and more stable communities 
(FitzPatrick 2000).  However, just as many other HUD programs historically have 
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developed differently in relation to housing blacks, other minority racial groups, whites, 
and lower versus middle-income families, so too does HOPE VI.  Since the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development is committed to deconcentrating poverty, many of 
the poorest families must relocate to new neighborhoods.  Generally what happens when 
a housing project receives a HOPE VI grant from HUD is that only 30 percent of the 
original residents are permitted to return after renovation, as a large portion is set aside as 
market-rate housing.  Since 1996, although the local housing authorities were required to 
increase funding through private investment, which necessitates setting aside a large 
portion of the new or renovated housing for middle-income families, many low-income 
families, and especially single women, are locked out of the new program (FitzPatr ck 
2000).  These attempts to integrate market rate housing with public housing limits the 
number of available space for low-income households and the emphasis on home-
ownership means that fewer women will be able to access the new properties.  In 
addition, when HOPE VI was first funded, 20 percent of the total budget was reserved for 
resident relocation and on-site services for residents able to return.  The community 
services available included job and vocational training, drug treatment, and remedial 
education.  The theory behind the community services funding is to increase the 
likelihood that households will be able to move towards self-sufficiency (FitzPatrick 
2000).  To make matters even worse for lowest-income families, starting in 1999, in an 
effort to mix incomes in public housing projects, public housing authorities were no 
longer required to accept only the poorest tenants.  Nationally, the average wait for public 
housing is eleven months, but the largest cities have waits as long as five to eightyears 
(NLIHC 2001).  It is within this depressing housing situation that the Department of 
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Housing and Urban Development has relied on revitalization through income mixing 
with its HOPE VI program.  However, only the most income stable public housing 
residents are viewed as deserving enough to qualify for a space in the new developm nts.   
Although the goals of HOPE VI are ambitious, the program does not address the 
more systemic problem of poverty.  The HOPE VI program may ultimately create an 
even larger housing crisis because as more low-income housing projects have been 
demolished low-income households are left with fewer affordable housing options.  The 
Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard reported in 2001 that severe housing 
problems remain “in part because of the dwindling supply of unsubsidized units 
affordable to very low-income households” (25).40  The Joint Center reports that the loss 
of even more units because of rent increases or demolition has intensified the problem.  
The forecast is bleaker in the subsidized housing market.  Landlords with properties in 
desirable areas have been taking advantage of opting out federal programs for market 
rentals.  Properties with long term agreements with HUD began expiring in the 1980s 
when appropriations was low, and now nearly 10-15 percent of existing long term 
contracts are set to expire in three years (26).  For low-income tenants with housing 
vouchers, the situation is not much better.  In 1994, over one in eight households with 
vouchers had to return them partly because they could not find landlords to accept the 
vouchers (26).  Finally, the Joint Center reports that even though there is the demand for 
more housing, there are more properties slated for demolition.  The number of units that 
are supposed to be rebuilt or rehabbed cannot meet the housing demand (26).  Although 
working poor homeowners and renters are struggling, they have less of a burden to 
                                                
40 Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, “State of the Nation’s Housing: 2001,” 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu (Accessed December 1, 2007). 
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shoulder than the lowest income group.  Nationally, the average wait for public housing 
is eleven months, but the largest cities have waits as long as five to eight years (NLIHC 
2001, 1).   
Advocates of the HOPE VI program claim that mixed income housing units will 
deconcentrate poverty in the poorest neighborhoods of inner cities, but relocating 
residents has a number of negative side effects.  Recent studies demonstrate that 
relocating the poorest residents of a city is not deconcentrating poverty.  The Urban 
Institute conducted a study of families relocating through the HOPE VI program and 
prepared the report “HOPE VI and Section 8: Spatial Patters in Relocation” for HUD.  
The study showed that “in some places not much deconcentration is taking place--that too 
many of the relocatees wind up in other seriously distressed high-poverty neighborhoods 
not far from the original site” (1).  Other former residents are moving to othervery poor 
neighborhoods and may actually destabilize those neighborhoods (1).  In the District of 
Columbia, the HOPE VI program has been criticized by housing advocates and Maryland 
State politicians for moving poor, African American families across the District line into 
Prince Georges County, Maryland, where changing demographics are already taxing st te 
resources creating fragile communities.  Therefore, income-mixing and deconcentration 
of poverty--one of the primary goals of the HOPE VI project--seems to lead, not to 
revitalization, but to higher concentrations of poverty in other areas.  
In Chicago, from 1995 to 2002, nearly 50 percent of families forced to relocate 
with housing vouchers moved to “high-poverty” neighborhoods (Wilen 2008).  
Researchers predict 12–20 percent of former CHA high-rise residents will be able to 
relocate to new mixed-income developments (Wilen and Nayak 2006).  Projected 
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replacement units do not equal those demolished. Mixed-income developments are 
designed to be one-third “affordable” (household income of 80–120 percent of 
metropolitan area median income of $75,000 a year), one-third market rate, and one-third 
public housing units.  Also, the 1998 Quality Housing and Work Reform Act codifies 
exclusion and policing of low-income tenants in HOPE VI mixed-income 
developments, demarcating the “deserving” from “undeserving poor” by excluding those 
with recent felony records, CHA lease noncompliance, failure to work or be in a qualified 
education or training program or verified job search (Wilen and Nayak 2006).  Under the 
One Strike rule, tenants can be evicted if a family member commits a criminal offense on 
or off public housing property or violates special behavior rules.  As HOPE VI reached 
the end of its first decade, critics argued that the policy had made things worse for many 
public housing residents.  Far fewer units had been built than were lost under the policy, 
and few residents had returned to their communities refashioned as mixed income.  
Residents suffered the trauma of dislocation, some numerous times (Smith 2006). 
The flip-side of moving residents out of the community is that new residents are 
being lured in by the affordable house purchase.  Middle-class neighbors are expect d to 
act as role models, and provide the social capital and political clout low-income people in 
need (Popkin et al. 2004; Brophy and Smith 1997) while work requirements provide the 
discipline.  According to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, “The 
intentional mixing of incomes and working status of residents” will “promote the 
economic and social interaction of low-income families within the broader community, 
thereby providing greater opportunity for the upward mobility of such families” (quoted 
in Smith 2006, 20).  Although contested, these claims are deeply embedded in ideologies 
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of poverty and race.  They resonate with ingrained cultural explanations for poverty and 
recycle culture of poverty theories with a new set of racialized and gendered claims on 
the city (Brophy and Smith 1997).  Michael Katz (1989) outlines a long history of 
moralizing poverty in which notions of the ‘undeserving poor’ “represent the enduring 
attempt to classify poor people by merit” rooted in morality, culture, and individual 
motivation (9).  The deconcentration thesis recalls this tradition in its most racialized 
form, echoing Oscar Lewis’s (1966) influential thesis on the intergenerational 
transmission of a “culture of poverty” among Puerto Ricans, and Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan’s (1965) claim that the “dysfunctional” Black family was at the root of a 
“tangle of pathologies” that locked African Americans into poverty (Katz 1989).  
Although temporarily discredited in public policy discourse in the 1970s, sociologist 
William Julius Wilson’s (1987) influential underclass theory provided new fuel. Bruce 
Katz, of the Brookings Institute, and others (Massey and Denton 1993) picked up 
Wilson’s thesis to support deconcentration of public housing, while neglecting Wilson’s 
argument for economic redistribution.  The civilizing–moral regeneration narrative is 
pervasive in HOPE VI.  Bruce Katz cites public housing as “the most egregious exampl  
of how spatial concentration of poverty leads to welfare dependency, sexual promiscuity, 
and crime” (Bennett, Hudspeth, and Wright 2006, 194).  Depicted as “marginal citizens,” 
public housing residents are subject to the “guidance,” “placement assistance,” and 
behavior rules and training by what Polsky calls “the therapeutic state” (Imbroscio 2008, 
120).  The deconcentration thesis is joined to the architectural determinism of new
urbanists who contend that the architecture of public housing shapes the destiny of poor 
people.  These accounts leave out the history of racism and deindustrialization, the 
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impoverishment of residents, and disinvestment in the buildings that produced the 
deplorable conditions of public housing.  As urban sociologist Janet Abu-Lughod (2005) 
sums it up, “The awful conditions in the projects were redefined as a ‘new pathology’ 
caused by the high-rise architecture itself” (299).  Conflation of race, poverty, and social 
pathology is prevalent in media accounts of the benefits of gentrification for min ity 
neighborhoods.  The civilizing narrative that underpins HOPE VI urban renewal recalls 
early twentieth-century race literature that tied whiteness, the nuclear family, and 
homeownership to normalcy.   
Public housing location and architecture is frequently marked by advocates of th  
deconcentration thesis as separate, institutional, and deviant.  In the discourse of urban 
renewal and HOPE VI, conventional high rise public housing buildings took on a new 
character as jungles and chaotic.  Indeed, the built environment in many high rise public 
housing communities was worrisome.  Many buildings were structurally unsound, lacked
necessary basic repairs, and contained residents who were involved in illegal activity.  
However, the physical structures of high rise buildings do not in themselves create 
deviance.  It is the economic circumstances of residents and the systematic failure to fund 
basic repairs and capital improvements that were the source of public housing problems.  
Indeed, high-rise buildings in other parts of cities house middle-class and affluent 
residents.       
Welfare and housing assistance programs are administered through separate 
federal offices, but the recipients of the funds often overlap.  Many of the same famili s 
affected by the 1998 welfare reform have also been affected by the housing policy 
changes that result from HOPE VI.  In the worst-case scenario, families ay be left 
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without adequate housing and financial support.  In some cases, when local housing 
authorities apply for HOPE VI grants, they have to demonstrate that some of the exis ing 
residents and almost all returning residents are moving towards self-sufficiency.  The 
housing authorities assume (and include in their calculation) that because of the time 
limits imposed by welfare reform, many of their residents will be self-sufficient, whether 
there is any real evidence to support that or not.  The disciplinary power of local housing 
authorities was buttressed by HOPE VI welfare “reform” measures.  Mindy Fullilove 
(2005) discusses the loss of community and the psychic pain of displacement experienced 
by people uprooted by urban renewal from 1949 to 1973. It is disturbing that the lessons 
from this period are not recalled in the current round of urban displacement.  Fullilove 
describes the experience of displacement as “root shock”—“the traumatic stress of the 
loss of [one’s] lifeworld” (2005, 20).  The meanings of community and traumatic 
experiences of displacement are not to be found in planners’ seemingly benevolent 
designs to eliminate low-income communities of color and their schools to pave the way 
for mixed-income development.  The racially coded discourse of cultural and moral 
deficiency underlying this social engineering obscures the reality of displacement and 
disregards the value of existing social and cultural connections in communities 
experiencing race and class oppression.  As critics of the deconcentration thes s argue, 
“choice” should also mean enhancing “the right to stay put” (Imbroscio 2008, 120).  
HOPE VI represents one way in which housing policy turned punitive under the Clinton 
administration.  Welfare reform was coupled with urban renewal redevelopment to 
displace low-income households, many of which are headed by single and elderly 
women.  Indeed, nuclear family hegemony turned punitive under the Clinton 
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administration as low-income, public housing residents were displaced from their 







































Chapter 5:  HUD v. Rucker: Constructing the Racialized 
Family in Federal Public Housing 
 
 
In the 2002 Supreme Court case the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development v. Rucker the Court ruled that public housing authorities are permitted to 
evict tenants when they, their household members, or their guests are involved in illegal 
drug activity; the Court agreed that such evictions are permissible even if th tenant has 
no knowledge of, or control over, the criminal activity, and even if the activity takes 
place away from the housing unit.  With this decision, the Court affirmed the racial and 
gendered nature of the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD) housing 
policy, whereby extended family is linked to the housing unit and property interests, 
transforming the familial relationship, in a sense, into what political scientist Patricia 
Strach calls a “shadow bureaucracy” (2004).41  I use this term to describe a dynamic 
similar to Strach’s conception.  In numerous policy areas the state uses the family as a 
conduit through which rights and responsibilities flow.  I add to this understanding that 
the family is utilized to carry out policy and argue that the familial relationship is both 
constructed and destroyed by racial and gendered ideology, as well as by legislativ  and 
judicial practices.  In the case of Department of Housing and Urban Development v. 
Rucker (2002), the Court upheld punitive measures that serve to discipline non-traditional 
households and minority families residing in federal public housing.  This decidedly 
                                                
41 Political scientist Patricia Strach uses the term shadow bureaucracy to describe how policymakers use 
family to accomplish their goals.  As part of her PhD thesis titled “All in the Family: Policy Process, 
Structure Change” (University of Wisconsin, Madison, 2004).  This should not be confused with the idea of 
shadow governments used by planning scholar Gerald F ug and architect Andres Duany to explain quasi-
public entities that govern citizens, such as homeowner associations or TICs (a co-op board is one example 




undemocratic decision resembles traditional clan retribution, in which families and 
associates bear the responsibility for the transgressions of another. 
Critics of the Court’s decision argue that the law is draconian and the legal 
decision transfers criminal responsibility from the people participating in criminal 
activity to their family members living in public housing—yet another example of the 
government reaching inside the home to define legitimate family, which is shifting and 
contingent across the spectrum of rights, groups affected, and policy.  While numerous 
housing and community activists quickly criticized the decision and the ruling has had 
profound implications in terms of the criminalization of poverty and the heightened 
surveillance poor and often minority women undergo, the case has received little 
scholarly attention beyond the narrow confines of law review articles that focus on 
doctrinal questions of due process, property rights, and statutory interpretation. Those 
observations are important, yet remain limited because they tell us little about the ways in 
which race and gender are implicated in lawmaking and jurisprudence.  Furthermore, the 
politics of public housing and the related representation and treatment of poverty issues 
has received far less attention by feminist scholars than policy issues such as reproductive 
rights, women’s labor, drug policy, and public entitlements.  Examining the links 
between nuclear family-centered and government regulation of the family unit, through 
cases like Rucker, will provide new insights into the logic of government control and 
regulation in the shape of social welfare policy, and illuminate practices that are often 
overlooked in understanding the construction of the law and social and political practices.  
My goal, therefore, is not to add to the doctrinal story of the slow train of privacy 
progress from Loving through Lawrence.  In fact, there have been significant positive 
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developments for women with respect to custody, child support, intimate partner 
violence, sexual harassment, and reproductive rights.  Rather, this chapter is an attempt to 
illuminate elements of the family that have not always been apparent and which remain 
invisible unless we look beyond the confines of traditional legal doctrine.  I examine the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker to illustrate the ways in which 
the family unit has been both constructed and distorted for the purposes of legitimizing 
racial and gendered social policy aimed at advancing particular conceptions of the family 
and household composition.  Indeed, the war on drugs and urban renewal team up to 
further restrict the rights of the poor who, either by choice or circumstance, might 
maintain non-traditional households. 
 
The War on Drugs Meets Urban Renewal 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s drug related violent crime drew the 
attention of the media, the American public, and lawmakers.  The United States spent an 
estimated $4.7 billion a year on the war on drugs and by 2002 that amount had risen to 
$26 billion (Stinson 2004, 442).  Although numerous studies illustrate that the rates of 
illegal drug use are spread evenly across all racial groups, African-Americans and 
Latinos are far more likely than other groups to undergo police surveillance and to be 
arrested and convicted (Zatz and Krecker 2003).  This “harsh system of arrest, 
prosecution, and imprisonment” is understood by criminologists as “punitive prohibition” 
(Provine 2007).  According to Loic Wacquant (2009), modifications to social policy are 
linked with penal policies and act as a “double regulation” (xviii) of the poor.  Economic 
deregulation and retrenchment are felt not only in levels of cash assistance (and other 
direct services to the poor and the transformation of wage labor), the police, the courts,
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and other judicial bodies constitute an ever growing penal welfare state.  Rather th n 
merely enforcing the law and dealing with criminality, the contemporary American penal 
system has been converted into a political institution which renders social problems 
invisible (2009, xxii).   
Convictions related to the illegal narcotics market and violent interpersonal 
crimes have radically changed the demographics of poor, urban neighborhoods.  Despite 
increased spending for the war on drugs, during the Reagan administration, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development’s budget was cut from $26 billion to 
under $8 billion (Stinson 2004, 442).  While financial and public support for public 
housing and affordable housing assistance programs waned, there was also a dramatic
change in the amount and tone of social welfare controls.  Minority males have not been 
the only group to suffer intense government intervention.  Low-income, minority women 
were particularly susceptible to this assault from all sides of the policy-making spectrum.  
The surveillance of some women was particularly punitive, as drug-dependent women 
were prosecuted for delivering controlled substances to fetuses in utero, female r cipients 
of public welfare benefits were encouraged, and in some cases forced, to undergo 
temporary or permanent sterilization, and shifts in theories related to child welfare and 
adoption sought the termination of parental rights over mother-child preservation.  Social 
controls extended into the housing realm as well.  First seen as a way station to market 
rate housing for different ethnic groups, the projects became associated with 
“predominantly poor, single-parent households, most headed by females and with 
boarders, hidden spouses, and relatives living off the books” (Venkatesh 2000, 65).  
Increasingly, large public housing projects were viewed as the seedbeds of drug dealin
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and drug abuse, with deteriorating infrastructure, out of control children, lazy residents, 
and overall dangerous and chaotic living conditions.   
Congress capitalized on the anti-drug sentiments and hostility directed towars 
recipients of cash assistance and public housing residents to enlist support for the passag
of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADAA) in 1988.  The ADAA amended the United States 
Housing Act of 1937 that established local housing authorities.  The ADAA provides: 
Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful  
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal  
activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant,  
any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under  
the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of the tenancy. 
 (quoted in Johnson 2000, 64) 
 
Thus, a tenant could be evicted and stripped of one’s public housing without having 
committed a crime.  The ADAA was subsequently amended in 1990 by the Cranston-
Gonzales National Affordable Housing Act, making criminal activity grounds for 
eviction if the tenant’s behavior “adversely affects the health, safety, and quiet enjoyment 
of the premises” (quoted in Johnson 2000, 64).  The law asserts that “eviction would not 
be the appropriate course if the tenant had no knowledge of the criminal activities of h s 
of her guests or had taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to prevent the 
activity” and further advised that “each case will be judged in its individual merits and 
will require the exercise of humane judgment by the [HA] and the eviction court” (q oted 
in Castle 2003, 1449).  The authorizing statute was never amended to reflect these 
alterations; however, the Department of Housing and Urban Development permitted 
housing authorities to “consider all of the circumstances of the case, including the 
seriousness of the offense, the extent of participation…and the effects that the evic ion 
would have on family members not involved in the proscribed activity” (in Castle 2003, 
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1449).  The Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 extended the scope of 
drug-related evictions under the ADAA and Cranston-Gonzalez.  Under the Housing 
Extension Act, reference to drug-related criminal activity was changed to “on or near 
such premises” from “on or off such premises” (Housing Opportunity Extension Act of 
1996).  
 In addition to his 1994 State of the Union address remarks calling for a “one 
strike and you are out” policy, President Clinton followed the signing of the Housing 
Opportunity Extension Act by ordering the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development to issue standard guidelines for all public housing authorities in the 
adoption of the “One Strike” policies.  As a result, HUD issued a notice to public housing 
authorities in April 1996 that called for “decisive action must be taken to provide for the 
safety and well-being of families who live in public housing” (quoted in Castle 2003, 
1451).  The notice also asserted that HUD would provide incentives for implementation 
of the One Strike policies through an evaluation system.  The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s Public Housing Assessment System (PHAS) measured the quality 
of local public housing authorities by considering the following: condition of the 
properties, financial well being of the public housing authority, quality of management, 
resident evaluations, and security measures (Castle 2003, 1453).  In addition to these 
primary indicators, as part of the security measures, HUD would grade publichousing 
authorities on lease and eviction proceedings. The assessment system provides: 
PHAs that have adopted policies, implemented procedures and can 
document that they appropriately evict any public housing residents who 
engage in certain activity detrimental to the public housing community 
receive points … This policy takes into account the importance of eviction 
of such residents to public housing communities and program integrity, 
178 
 
and the demand for assisted housing by families who will adhere to the 
lease responsibilities. (quoted in Stinson 2004, 452) 
 
Public housing authorities were advised to consider the following, as a part of their 
security assessment: applicant screening, tracking and reporting crime, lease 
enforcement, and grant program goals.  Public housing authorities that used aggressive 
resident eviction policies would receive a higher score (Castle 2003, 1453).  Ultimately, 
PHAs would be classified as high, standard, or low performers.  Those PHAs that were 
scored to be high performers would require little additional oversight, while those 
considered low performers would receive further monitoring.  Therefore, public housing 
authorities are under a great deal of pressure not only to maintain physical infrastructure 
and financial solvency, but to closely monitor tenant activity and weed out those 
considered undesirable.   
Despite the fact that public housing authorities may take the tenants’ 
circumstances into account in determining whether to terminate the lease, it is not 
required to do so.  The assessment system provides little room to consider individual 
circumstances when third-party evictions will enable the PHA to boost its security grade.  
Public housing authorities can take steps to mitigate eviction.  They “may allow a tenant
to remain on the condition that she exclude the ‘culpable household member’ whose 
actions warrant a lease termination” and “may also consider whether a household 
member who has engaged in illegal drug use or alcohol abuse has successfully completed 
a rehabilitation program and is no longer engaging in such behavior” (Stinson 2004, 452).  
Therefore, even under the most lenient course of action from the PHAs, household units 
may be broken apart in order to protect the leaseholder from eviction.  Breaking up 
household units that might already be strained in its attempts to provide childcare and 
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financial security can be devastating.  The Public Housing Assessment System leaves 
little actual discretion for the public housing authorities and fails to consider the fragile 
composition of the households affected.  In fact, the public housing authorities’ discretion 
to press for eviction is held, by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
supporters of the One Strike provisions, as the counterbalance to the legislation and 
regulations—when in reality fairness is hardly possible under such a framework.  
All levels of public housing administrators were required to pursue One Strike 
evictions.  In fact, in 1999, the Code of Federal Regulations was changed and provides: 
In determining whether to deny admission or terminate assistance because  
of an action or failure to act by members of the family, the PHA has 
discretion to consider all of the circumstances in each case, including the 
seriousness of the case, the extent of participation or culpability of 
individual family members, mitigating circumstances related to the 
disability, and the affects of denial or termination of assistance on other 
family members who were not in the action or failure.  
 (quoted in Johnson 2000, 69) 
   
Despite confusion over the interpretation of the new housing and drug crime laws, 
housing authorities became increasingly focused on using third party drug arrests to evict 
tenants.  Low-income housing advocates suggest that the upsurge in drug-related 
convictions coincided, not only with attitudes towards drugs and crime in and around 
public housing, but with new federal housing programs that were originally intended to 
renovate and rehabilitate severely distressed public housing.  Before existing properties 
could be demolished, tenants needed to be relocated or evicted.  Low-income housing 
advocates argue that housing authorities were relying on drug arrests to decrease the 
number of tenants who would be eligible for relocation by the public housing authority, 




Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker was the 
culmination of litigation occurring across the country to clarify the terms of 42 U.S.C. 
1437d (l)(6), a clause that permitted local housing authorities to evict tenants for the
criminal acts of a third person.  In this particular case, Pearlie Rucker, 63, Willie Lee, 71, 
Barbara Lee, 63, and Herman Walker, 75, were residents of housing units operated by the 
Oakland Housing Authority.  Each received eviction notices for violation of their leases, 
specifically, the provision that “any member of the household, or another person under 
the tenant’s control, shall not engage in … any drug-related criminal activity on or near 
the premises” (quoted in Hannaford 2003, 143).  The tenants claimed that they were 
unaware of the lease violation.  Rucker’s mentally impaired daughter was arrested for 
possessing cocaine a few blocks from Rucker’s apartment, Walker’s home heath aid  
kept cocaine in his apartment, and Lee’s and Hill’s grandsons were arrested for smoking 
marijuana in a parking lot near the apartment complex (Hannaford 2003, 143).  Upon 
receipt of the notices of lease termination, the residents brought an action against the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Oakland Housing Authority, and its 
director in United States District Court seeking injunctive relief against the action 
(Rucker v. Davis 1998).  The tenants alleged that the lease provision violated 
Congressional intent, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, state contract law, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments.  
All four residents claimed that they acted within the provisions of the lease.  
Rucker indicated that she regularly searched her daughter’s bedroom for drugs.  Lee and 
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Hill informed their guests of the housing authorities’ drug policy and were not aware of 
their grandsons’ drug use.  Walker informed his guests of the housing authorities’ drug 
policies and was also physically unable to prevent his caretaker from possessing drugs in 
his apartment.  The plaintiffs claimed that the primary problem was the language of the 
lease provision and the Act on which it was based because “it imposed a standard of strict 
liability on tenants without leaving then any defenses” (Hannaford 2003, 144).  As such, 
plaintiffs without knowledge of illegal drug activity had no possible defenses, as there 
was no innocent tenant defense.  The plaintiffs argued that the lease provision violated 
due process by evicting the tenants even though they had no knowledge of the illegal 
conduct by family members.  The plaintiffs also claimed that the state’s in rference with 
the tenant’s right to association violated the First Amendments.  Finally, Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment violation claims were based on search and reporting requirements.  Most 
significantly, the plaintiff’s relied on Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority o 
buttress the due process and First Amendment claims (Hanneford 2003, 144). 
 Throughout the 1990s, state courts attempted to resolve the issue that was 
ultimately brought to the Supreme Court.  Courts were split over how to interpret the 
obtuse language of the “One Strike” provisions, and very few extended their decisions to 
account for the problematic dynamics captured in the provisions.  For instance, in 
Memphis Housing Authority v. Thompson, the court prohibited the eviction of innocent 
public housing tenants for the illegal activity of relatives, holding that the court cannot 
rely on equitable principles to determine whether or not a tenant breached a lease 
agreement, whereas in Minneapolis Public Housing v. Lohr, the court allowed landlords 
to evict tenants who claimed they were unaware of criminal activity on the premises.  In 
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Tyson v. New York City Housing Authority, an earlier case in which an entire family was 
threatened with eviction due to the illegal activities of a son residing off the premises, the 
court determined that the parent-child relationship should not be grounds for an eviction.  
However, Tyson was decided before the Anti-Drug Abuse Act was passed, which 
theoretically modified the lease for all public housing residents, contractually obligating 
all public housing residents to prevent any third party illegal activity on the premises 
(Johnson 2000, 68).   
   The Department of Housing and Urban Development views the lease provision 
as a step towards the public housing goal of offering “decent, safe, and sanitary housing” 
and claims the general well-being of the entire public housing community will be 
promoted though termination of tenancy related to third party illegal activity (Johnson 
2000, 69).  In its “Public Housing and Grievance Procedures” regulations from 1991, 
HUD provides four reasons for its eviction policies.  First, it argues that contra tually 
obligating all residents is typical in landlord-tenant law and facilitates better 
management.  Residents should not have the ability to opt out of the contract once a lease 
violation occurs.  Second, the possibility that tenancy will be terminated is likely to 
motivate the household into preventing illegal activity.  Third, if evictions were fault-
based, HUD argues, the local public housing authorities would have a very difficult time 
establishing that tenants knew or could have prevented the illegal activity.  Family
members who do not cooperate with the contractual obligations could be removed from 
the lease and barred from the residence.  Finally, HUD justifies it’s polices by noting that 
families that do not try to prevent illegal activity are threats to other housing residents 
(Johnson 2000, 68, 69).  Although the authorizing statute and the regulations are silent on 
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the issue of on the standard of liability, HUD concluded that Congress intended to hold 
tenants to a standard of strict liability for the illegal activity of guests and family 
members.  Though while HUD may be promoting the strict liability standard, it had 
previously indicated in its regulations that local housing authorities should use their own 
discretion and expected that “each case will be judged on its individual merits and will 
require the wise exercise of humane judgment by the PHA” (Hornstein 1996, 263).     
 In Rucker v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit held that HUD’s interpretation permitting 
eviction of innocent tenants was inconsistent with congressional intent and should be 
rejected under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.  The Chevron test 
“requires a reviewing court to first determine whether or not Congress has spoken 
directly to the matter in question.”  That does not, however, make it clear whether 
‘congressional intent’ is read to include a textual review of statutory language or the 
legislative history (Piety 2002, 392).  Therefore, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, the Ninth 
Circuit held that it was necessary to review the legislative history to interpre  
congressional intent.  The Court contended that because of the ambiguity of the One 
Strike provision, the statutory scheme should be considered within the context of 
previous legislation.  The Court also considered a civil forfeiture provision that appeared 
in the subtitle of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.  The Controlled Substance Act 
“provided for an innocent owner defense and recognized an innocent owner as one who 
either did not know of the conduct giving rise to the forfeiture, or did all that could 
reasonably be expected under the circumstances to terminate such criminal conduct” 
(Saghir 2003, 379).  The Department of Housing and Urban Development argued that the 
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statute was only applicable in civil forfeiture cases—not lease eviction hearings—and 
that the ADAA and the Controlled Substance Act were two different statutes.  The court, 
however, determined that while the statutes were different, they covered the same 
subjects and were passed at the same time, thus, it was reasonable to assume that 
Congress intended them to be interpreted together (Saghir 2003, 397). 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in an 8 to 0 decision, reversed the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision.  Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the decision for the Court.  
While the Ninth Circuit relied primarily on Congressional intent, the Supreme Court 
looked at the language of the One Strike provisions, as well as Congressional intent.  The 
Court determined that Congress did intend to hold public housing residents to a standard 
of strict liability in crime-related eviction cases.  The One Strike provisions that were 
captured in residents’ leases were clearly written and allowed PHAs to evic for drug-
related offenses regardless of whether the tenants had prior knowledge that theillegal 
activity was occurring (Schuller 2004, 1190).  The Court noted that Congress’ intention 
to deter drug-related crime was evident in the plain meaning of the legislation.  The Court 
pointed out that Congress knew how to create an innocent tenant defense because it had 
done so in previous legislation.  According to the Court, had Congress been interested in 
establishing such a defense for the public housing residents, it would have done so, as it 
had in civil forfeiture cases (Schueller 2004, 1191).  Furthermore, the Court dismissed the 
due process claims, contending that the government was acting in its role as landlord, not 
sovereign, and the state court eviction procedure was enough to satisfy procedural due 
process.   
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Citing Lyng v. International Union (1988), the Court also dismissed the First and 
Eighth Amendment claims.  In Lyng, a section of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1981 was challenged by striking workers, claiming it had violated their right to 
freedom of association and freedom of expression by prohibiting striking workers from 
qualifying for food stamps.  The Supreme Court, however, held that the statue was 
constitutional, and since the statute did not violate any fundamental rights, stric scrutiny 
was not necessary.  Furthermore, since the state has the power to establish or eliminate a 
benefit, it may also impose conditions for receipt of the benefit, the Court argued 
(Hannaford 2003, 147).  The Court also concluded that looking to the legislative history 
was unnecessary where the “plain language” was “unambiguous” and it conducted a 
somewhat bizarre textual analysis of the One Strike provision, focusing on rules of 
grammar rather than legal analysis (Piety 2002, 393).  
 In response to the Ninth Circuit’s argument that allowing the eviction of innocent 
tenants would have absurd results, the Court held that: 
The statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the 
lease provision.  Instead, it entrusts that decision to the local public 
housing authorities, who are in the best position to take account of, among 
other things, the degree to which the housing project suffers from 
“rampant drug-related or violent crime,” the seriousness of the offending 
action, “and the extent to which the leaseholder has … taken all 
reasonable steps to prevent or mitigate the offending action.”  It is not 
absurd that a local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who 
had no knowledge of the drug-related activity … Strict liability maximizes 
deterrence and eases enforcement difficulties.42 
 
The Court was seemingly convinced by the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development and other supporters of One Strike laws that the statute was the best way to 
insure the safety of all public housing residents.  Since PHAs, theoretically, cou d still 
                                                
42 HUD v. Rucker 535 U.S. 125 (2002) 237 F.3d 1113, at 8 
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take individual behavior into account when considering eviction, local housing 
authorities and not the courts were in the best position to consider all of the elements of a 
household situation in determining whether to evict or not. In various amicus briefs in 
support of HUD, local housing authorities emphasized that PHA discretion would 
provide enough fairness to balance concerns with respect to overzealous evictions 
(Hannaford 2004, 455).  However, although the Court emphasized the “potential for 
discretion,” the Court failed to discuss whether the Oakland Housing Authority did, in 
fact, take individual circumstances into account (Hannaford 2004, 455).  
While some commentators agree that the language of the statute suggests that 
Congress did intend to establish strict liability, there should still be “outer limits” to the 
reach of the statutory and regulatory coverage (Castle 2003, 1457).  Ruckerhas certainly 
made it easier for local housing authorities to enforce the lease provision; however, it 
may do little to ensure the safety and well being of public housing residents.  Since ma y 
third-party evictions involve criminal activity near public housing, and not inside public 
housing units, the aggressive eviction procedures serve only to displace more residents, 
while maintaining the same physical and potentially harmful criminal enviro ment.  
Although the lease provision indicates that the tenant becomes liable for all persons 
recorded on the lease, guests, and anyone else under their control, the Court did not 
question how these terms should be defined, nor did it scrutinize the way in which 
household associations are connected to liability.   
The Court’s decision also renders potential action that is contrary to the alleged 
intentions of the One Strike provisions.  The statute does not maintain that is not 
appropriate to evict when actions have been taken by the tenant to keep the offending 
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party away from the unit and the facility.  All four respondents in Rucker claimed that 
they made attempts to mitigate the illegal behavior—purportedly the desired effect the 
One Strike provisions should have—yet it was not enough to prevent eviction 
proceedings or to stop the illegal activity.  The goal of the One Strike provision was to 
keep public housing facilities free from illegal drug and gang activity; however, tenants 
who report such offenses and make attempts to stop it receive no statutory protection.  
The public housing authorities may still move to evict the tenants, and based on the 
assessment system and the need to reduce those eligible for new housing, they have every 
incentive to carry out the evictions aggressively.  Furthermore, households are not the 
only units covered by the One Strike provisions.  Since the statute indicates that eviction 
is permissible when illegal activity occurs “on or off” the premises, theoretically, there is 
no limit to the range of coverage.  Such evictions would indeed render absurd results, 
though it remains a logical next step given the Court’s decision.  Another thoughtful 
commentator argued that Supreme Court overlooked the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions that was apparent in the plaintiff’s due process claims (Hanneford 2004, 148).  
But in an era of eroding rights of the poor, it is no surprise that the Court failed to 
consider the importance of placing a check on government regulation. 
 
Nuclear Family Hegemony and Rucker 
In the opening pages The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, Volume 1 (1978), 
Michel Foucault discusses the ways in which the Victorian sexual regime influ nced 
contemporary, western sexual practices and norms.  Foucault says, 
Sexuality was carefully confined; it moved into the home.  The conjugal 
family took custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of 
reproduction.  On the subject of sex, silence became the rule.  The 
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legitimate and procreative couple laid down the law.  The couple imposed 
itself as a model, enforced the norm, safeguarded the truth, safeguarded 
the truth, and reserved the right to speak while retaining the principle of 
secrecy.  A single locus of sexuality was acknowledged in social space as 
well as at the heart of every household, but it was a utilitarian and fertile 
one: the parent’ bedroom.  The rest had only to remain vague; proper 
demeanor avoided contact with other bodies, and verbal decency sanitized 
one’s speech.  And sterile behavior carried the taint of abnormality; if it 
insisted on making itself too visible it would be designated accordingly 
and would have to pay the penalty. (3-4) 
 
Of course, Foucault was much more interested in exploring not why there is sexual 
repression, but the forces by which repression had been created and recreated 
discursively.  A pure Foucauldian analysis of Rucker might explore the rationalization 
and systematization of sexuality, family, and crime through legislation, the courts’ 
interpretations, police reports, prisons, and housing authority ordinances.  Such a 
perspective is beyond the purview of this project.  Foucault’s insights on the dynamics of 
family and sex, and more specifically the modes of surveillance of sexuality, are helpful 
towards understanding how privacy is shaped differently in various contexts.  The white, 
two-parent, heterosexual nuclear family continues to garner the most cultural respect in 
the American context.   
Since the dwelling place is the primary location for the performance of family, the 
single family house, condominium, rural farmhouse, apartment, and other dwelling types 
become the place where familial ideology is carried out.  As Patricia Hill Collins (2005) 
observes with regard to black men and responsibility, “possessing property and the power 
that it commands operates as yet another benchmark of hegemonic masculinity” (192).  
Real men are not dependent and they take care of their families’ financial responsibilities.  
The unemployed and underemployed fail to live up to these norms of responsibility.  The 
inability to provide for children means that these men are seen as sexually immoral 
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(2005, 192).  In addition, blackness itself forms an exclusionary factor in hegemonic 
masculinity.  Therefore, Hill Collins claims, “the best that Black men can do is to achieve 
an ‘honorary’ membership within hegemonic masculinity by achieving great wealth, 
marrying the most desirable woman (White), expressing aggression in socially sanctioned 
arenas (primarily as athletes, through the military, or law enforcement), and avoiding 
suggestions of homosexual bonding” (193).  Black women are further subsumed in this 
hierarchy of acceptable identity norms.  Hill Collins states that the main benchmark of 
hegemonic femininity is to not be like men.  Other criteria for hegemonic femininity 
include aquiline physical features and light skin color, submissiveness, and appropriate 
heterosexuality—pleasing a male sex partner, but within in the context of marriage (195-
197).  Sex workers, lesbians, and other women who engage in various sexualities and 
those who do not easily fit into the western sexual order are viewed as being less 
feminine, and also less of a person.  Black women are susceptible to this same judgent.  
Viewed as both sexually deviant and unwilling (or unable) to align their lives to the terms
of ordered citizenship, black women have been stigmatized (198).  In terms of political 
economy, black women also do not fit into mainstream norms.  Historically, black 
women have labored.  The nuclear family norm and male wage-earner model proscribes 
women as a group to a place of domestic labor within the home.  All women who are 
wage laborers outside of the house and are financially independent become suspect;black 
women who work outside of the house are seen as usurping male authority (199).  Black 
women’s mothering is also a mark of suspicion: those who are not partnered in a legally 
sanctioned marriage are therefore not appropriately submissive to male authority and 
nuclear family norms.   
190 
 
All of these factors comprise an ideology that diverts attention from the structural 
causes of black social problems and contributes to a broader cultural rhetoric that 
continues to construct women’s unequal citizenship.  Therefore, fixing (or controlling) 
urban communities becomes more about prescribing nuclear family hegemonic norms for 
low-income households.  When Daniel Patrick Moynihan published his 1965 report, The 
Negro Family: The Case for National Action, more commonly known as the “Moynihan 
Report,” the racial and gendered messages were overt: black redemption would come 
when they adopted white family patterns.  According to Moynihan, one of the causes of 
black family breakdown was the matriarchal family structure: 
At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of the Negro society is the 
deterioration of the Negro family.  It is the fundamental cause of the 
weakness of the Negro community…. In essence, the Negro community 
has been forced into a matriarchal structure, which, because it is so out of 
line with the rest of the American society, seriously retards the progress of 
the group as a whole. (1965) 
 
Moynihan’s “tangle of pathology” thesis related to black matriarchy, as well as 
comments on black women’s alleged hyperfertility and promiscuity, would take on 
different forms in the following decades as the concept of “welfare queen” crpt into 
common American usage and justified ideologically specific forms of public poliy.  In 
contemporary debates over housing policy, the references to family are coded and 
symbolic racism replaced overt racism.  The result, however, is the same: the white, 
heterosexual, nuclear family and its norms are elevated, while other family orms are 
criticized.  Surveillance, displacement, and ongoing labels of pathology are assigned to 
those households unable or unwilling to adopt mainstream cultural norms of productivity, 
femininity, masculinity, and nuclear family.  Single mothers who work are viewed as 
amoral because they violate patriarchal norms which maintain that women should be 
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caring for children at home.  But single mothers who receive cash assistance and other 
forms of public entitlements are considered irresponsible for “living off” of the state and 
not raising their children to be citizen-workers.   
With housing in particular, the interplay of race, gender, and sexuality alongside 
places viewed as public or private, decent or indecent, deserving or undeserving, yields 
different protection from the government.  Domesticity and nuclear family norms are at 
their most unstable in public housing communities.  The Rucker decision symbolizes the 
confluence of structural racism and poverty with American norms of productivity, 
privacy, and family.  The privacy of the home and family is a mainstay of American 
political ideology and yet households and dwelling forms that fall outside of the single 
family house norm are vilified.  These homes—public housing buildings and individual 
units—are constantly on display, not dissimilar to the living practices of settlem nt house 
residents during the Progressive era.  Daily life is interrupted by social workers, building 
maintenance workers, law enforcement, and property managers such that publicity and 
privacy is not stable.  In order to reconstitute the boundaries of privacy, public housing 
residents are continually forced to adapt.  Under these difficult circumstance , space 
appropriation--the ability to create and maintain homeplaces, which involves emotional 
and psychological health and the creation of meaning in our spatial environment--is 
challenging.  Household members residing in units but not formally on the lease ar  
forced to live secret lives.  In some instances modes of political resistance and advocacy 
may arise from resident adaptation; however, even those important movements are not 
enough to counteract policy-drive displacement and humiliation.  According to 
architectural historian and sociologist Daphne Spain (1995), both public housing and the 
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beguinage are urban gendered spaces that hold “surplus” women in abeyance until 
socially sanctioned roles are created for them.  Creating spaces predominantly for women 
was not the original intent of public housing, as it was for the beguinage.  Yet both have 
warehoused women who live outside the married-couple ideal (and, in the case of public 
housing, increasingly outside a changing labor market).  By housing unmarried poor 
women in such places, society contains spatially the problems associated with the growth 
of female householders: poverty, out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and a general threat to th  
patriarchal social order (256-257).   
Public housing residents are not afforded the same level of privacy as other adults. 
In “Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s Out” (1991), legal scholar Martha Minow 
describes the tension between the functional family and official, legal forms of arriage 
and family composition.  While recognizing the problem of making law reflect what 
everyone wants it to be, she argues that “unless we start to make family law connect with 
how people really live, the law is largely irrelevant or merely ideology: merely statements 
of the kinds of human arrangements the lawmakers do and do not endorse” (8).  The gap 
between law and practice is evident as science and technology has extended family 
formation beyond the biological family.  Minow points out a number of problems with 
the functional approach to family.  Commenting on the HUD regulations that allow 
evictions of family members and other engaged in criminal activity, Minow notes how 
“family” is treated expansively by the government.  In the case of standard zoning 
regulations it is appropriate to include grandparents and other closely related household 
members as “family”; however, the HUD regulations seem to accept these persons as 
“family” but only as punitive measures which impact innocent or helpless household 
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members.  Minow observes that these regulations recall “man-in-the-house” stipulations.  
In those cases43, the Supreme Court’s narrow, formal definition of family allowed 
recipients of cash assistance to maintain their benefits (13).  However, according to 
Minow, the government “continue[s] to try to assert family or familylike relationships in 
order to avoid or reduce public responsibility for a family’s economic dependency” 
(1991, 13).  Minow’s intuition about family and the government’s punitive measures 
against intentional families is similar to those expressed in this dissertation, but it does 
not capture the wide range of racial and familial ideology that is involved in soc al policy.             
Nuclear family hegemony took a punitive turn during the Clinton administration 
as Congress passed legislation seeking to curb drug crimes and implementing welfare 
reform.  Urban renewal programs including HOPE VI resulted in displacement for many 
low-income households.  The trend in punitive, family-centered regulations culminated  
the Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Rucker.  These actions represent 
various ways in which the government implicated family in its attempts to regulate the 
homes of low-income, non-traditional families that are often headed by single and elderly
women.  Although a number of legal regimes outside of the United States punish family 
members for the crimes of relatives—either through fines, shaming, or corporeal 
punishment--it is chilling that this form of collective sanction is acceptable in a 
democratic state.  These extreme punitive measures are racial and gendered by design and 
in their enforcement.  This collective sanction scheme illustrates the lack of privacy 
enjoyed by public housing residents, the conscription of households to law enforcement, 
and the ways in which urban renewal is used as foil to cleanse neighborhoods of those 
considered undeserving, undesirable, or failing at self-sufficiency—all of which rest on 
                                                
43 King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) 
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norms of the proper family being one which resides in single family, owner, occupied 












































Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
In 2008, the New York Times ran a story titled “Ownership Society: White House 
Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire.”44  The article examined how President George W. 
Bush entered office seeking to spread the dream of homeownership.  What followed 
during the Bush administration, the article states, were lax lending standards, inflated 
house prices, a wave of mortgage defaults, and a global credit meltdown.  The article was 
remarkably absent of historical analysis of homeownership in the United States.  Indeed, 
the Bush administration had no almost urban policy to speak of, other than some modest 
attempts at extending house purchase to minorities and middle-income families.  
Nevertheless, the American obsession with single family house ownership extends as far 
back as the interwar period when Herbert Hoover became the Secretary of Commerce in 
1921.  Since then the single-family house and the homeownership ideal have become 
sacrosanct in the eyes of the public, business, and policymakers, and have garnered near 
universal approval.  A string of administrations supported policies which directly 
subsidized and promoted single family house ownership, incorporating more benefits 
over the years and buttressing the vision of the American dream.  The single-family- 
house-centered rhetoric of the early decades of the twentieth century still resonates today.  
As commitments to other social programs changed, such as cash assistance and 
affordable housing, single-family house ownership--centered on the hegemonic nuclear 
family--stood at the center of policymaking.  Family is connected to home in our social 
and political imagination and exposes an interesting dilemma in America’s ideology: the 
                                                
44  Jo Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, and Stephen Labaton, “Ownership Society: White House Philosophy 
Stoked Mortgage Bonfire,” The New York Times.  December 21, 2008. 
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home remains a site of dependence and mutual support, and yet ownership of a house 
reflects a prevailing individualist ethos in the United States.   
Contemporary federal low-income housing programs continue to bear the mark of 
early housing programs, characterized by male-headed nuclear family and single-family 
home rhetoric organized around a male breadwinner model, and thus they reinforce the 
nuclear family ideal.  Although federal housing policies have been shaped by numerous 
competing interests, the nuclear family has acted as the legitimate norm around which 
policy has been organized.  Both the federal government and the courts have contributed 
to this gendered structure of housing policy; the federal government, through the creation 
of public policies and the support of private business interests and the courts through the 
adjudication of housing-related issues, both of which nurture, tolerate, and endorse 
gender-stratified policies.  The HOPE VI program and the decision in HUD v. Rucker 
represent various ways in which the government implicated family in its attemp s to 
regulate the homes of low-income, non-traditional households that are often headed by 
single and elderly women. Obtaining and maintaining housing in the United States relies 
on the performance of gender, and more specifically, on the formation of nuclear or 
quasi-nuclear families.   
Women’s citizenship in relation to the right to housing has always been qualified 
by one’s ability to perform well in the market, partner with a breadwinner, withstand 
substandard housing conditions in public housing, or get by with little to no government 
assistance.  Although the recent housing lending and foreclosure crisis has raised an 
interest in housing policy, most observations are grounded in the same gendered and 
racial institutional assumptions that were pervasive prior to the crisis.  There have been 
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few challenges, in both political science and the policymaking arena, to the widespread 
ideological issues embedded in federal housing policy.  Without seriously exploring 
nuclear-family hegemony as it relates to housing planning and practices, the Uni ed 
States will continue to build upon troubling undemocratic, gendered and heteronormative 
practices and ideologies.  The federal government continues to emphasize goals largely 
unrelated to the primary needs low-income households and women, focusing instead on 
the industry, investment, and community development facets of housing.  Furthermore, 
although many American households no longer fall into the model of the male 
breadwinner, housing policy and much regional planning, including transportation, 
schools, and child care, rests on these assumptions.   
 This dissertation has introduced the concept of nuclear family hegemony as a 
guiding ideology that has impacted both the creation of federal housing policy and its 
present shape in the United States.  The aim of the project is modest: tracing the 
dynamics of nuclear family hegemony from its rise during the interwar period through 
contemporary manifestations adds an additional lens through which to understand federal 
housing policy development.  Mainstream literature in political science looks to business 
interests, political parties, urban regimes, and race to explain housing policy histor .  The 
approach I use in this dissertation acknowledges those influences and seeks to help creat  
a fuller understanding of housing policy.  Gender and family has largely been ignored in 
the political science and urban politics literature related to housing policy, in general, and 
low-income and affordable housing, specifically.  The research I present here advances 
the literature in feminist theory, urban planning, and United States social policy
development.   
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In addition to contributing to the scholarly literature in these areas, this 
ideological tracing highlights potential negative implications for the functio ing of 
representative democracy.  If we take race, gender, and sexual equality seriously in this 
democratic regime, how might policy makers, urban planners, and political scienti ts 
develop models that respond to criticisms and adjust policies to integrate various f mily 
formations and household arrangements?  Women’s increased involvement in paid work 
may have weakened the United States’ economic and social commitment to the male 
breadwinner model; however, this shift has not translated into structural adjustments in 
federal housing policy.  Moreover, as Ange-Marie Hancock (2004) observes, social 
identity, such as race, gender, and sexuality, becomes manifest as civic identity n the 
public realm.  These elements of our personhood become public identities.  This public 
identity then interacts with and influences public deliberation.  The results raise concerns 
about democratic regimes’ ability to ensure equal participation due to moraljudgments, 
negative stereotypes, and frames based on ascribed characteristics, including family 
status.                 
Devolution and the move towards increased public/private partnerships has had 
significant impact on social policy making and since these trends disproportionately 
affect women and children, it raises concerns for women’s equal citizenship and access to 
government services increasingly dominated by the market.  Moreover, while this 
dissertation does not address the extent to which policymakers directly impacted the 
formulation of federal housing policy, it does offer evidence that nuclear family 
hegemony has so thoroughly saturated our perspectives on family and housing that it has 
garnered bi-partisan support.  An investigation of how United States political actors have 
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relied historically on shifting images of the family may help us understand other
contemporary movements towards family-centered policy.  Examining perceptions of the 
family in the home may also move us closer to understanding under what types of 
ideological conditions states model housing policy, and contribute to the dialogue related
to whether welfare states formulate social policy based on institutional designs, economic 
forces, or cultural values.  
Although both western and non-western countries continue to wrestle with 
matters of ethnic, social, and political identity in this modern world, in the global north, 
political theorists are increasingly re-centering their thought on the anxity that continues 
to grow from capitalism and controlling economic structures.  We see many political 
theorists turning attention away from identity and towards how communities, 
governments, and the self are confronting changing economic structures and the new
faces of capitalism.  There are numerous likely factors driving this trend: globalization, 
profound social and familial changes in non-western countries, declining prosperity 
spurring concerns in global north/developed countries, population centers shifting from 
rural to urban areas, rights increasingly centered on individuals, and changing 
technologies.  However, many explorations continue to fail to take the family and 
familial ideology into consideration.  This is particularly surprising since global 
urbanization is the source of significant family upheaval and is creating new modes of 
social and civic understanding.      
 
House of Cards  
In an example of past being prologue, in The Future of Housing (1946), Charles 
Abrams worried that federal housing policy “seems now to be directed not toward 
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keeping private and public efforts separate, but toward subsidizing private effort, 
socializing its losses, and removing the elements of stake and risk which always lay t the 
root of free enterprise” (quoted in Henderson 100).  The financial crisis that followed the 
bursting of the housing bubble should force us to step back and re-examine our policies 
and attitudes toward house ownership.  However, it seems that there has been no serious 
re-thinking of federal housing policy and housing markets.  In fact, the recent $8,000 tax 
credit for first-time home buyers is a return to earlier efforts to try to e-inflate the 
housing market by (artificially) stimulating demand.  On a related issue, the Mortgage 
Interest Tax Deduction--another example of how nuclear family hegemony has led to a 
reification of the owner-occupied, single family house—which is processed through the 
tax code, has taken on a mythology of being a natural property right.  Any discussion of 
revoking or scaling back the deduction on mortgage interest is tantamount to treason.  
Even while the federal government faces a record deficit, the loss of tax revenue from 
this housing-related tax deduction is overlooked. 
In a recent article in The Guardian, economist Joseph Stiglitz argues that the 
continued propping up of the United States housing market is dangerous and confusing.  
Distorted interest rates, mortgage guarantees, and tax subsidies encourage continued 
investment in real estate, when the economy needs is investment in technology and clean 
energy.  He continues, 
It is perplexing because in conventional analyses of which activities 
should be in the public domain, running the national mortgage market is 
never mentioned. Mastering the specific information related to assessing 
creditworthiness and monitoring the performance of loans is precisely the 
kind of thing at which the private sector is supposed to excel.45 
                                                
45 Joseph Stiglitz, “A better way to fix the US housing crisis: Government policies to prop up the housing 




Continued support of the housing market, Stiglitz argues, will make the private, business 
sector more reliant on the federal government and future policymakers will face increased 
pressure from the real estate and house building lobbies, making it even more difficult for 
the country to wean itself from its real estate addiction.  Powerful political interest groups 
on both sides of the aisle are also pushing for the blinders to be put back on.  The 
National Association of Realtors, the Mortgage Bankers Association, and the National 
Association of Home Builders--all of which tend to support Republicans--serve as 
powerful cheerleaders for inflating the housing market. And community-action groups, 
the Congressional Black Caucus and civil-rights organizations--mostly on the left--have 
also firmly opposed efforts to tighten lending policies.  They see a loosening of credit as 
a way to redress the decades of discriminatory patterns in lending that led to 
disinvestment in inner-city, minority communities.   
Scholar/activist Peter Dreier observes that there is a lack of ideological debate 
over housing in contemporary discussions of housing policy, especially in the area of 
affordable housing (2002).  While housing may be discussed as a social and economic 
issue, it is not politicized.  Dreier continues, “the catalytic role of organized labor and 
radical housing reformers during the Depression and postwar periods and their virtual 
absence within the current housing coalition—along with their bold ideas that expanded 
the public debate about government’s responsibility—account for much of the difference 
between then and now” (Dreier 2000, 330).  There is neither a general agreement that 
housing is a serious problem nor a wide spectrum of views about what role the federal 
                                                                                                                                                 
9, 2010.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/sep/09/us-housing-crisis-policies  
(Accessed September 27, 2010). 
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government should play in addressing it.  Although he points to an absence of radical 
housing reformers and labor leaders in the current housing debate, he overlooks other 
potential ideological factors.  The nuclear family has so thoroughly saturated our social 
imagination that any political positions outside of that dominant frame are viewed as 
highly oppositional, or worse, irrelevant. 
 
Areas of Future Research 
Political context, a key product of political culture, is commonly considered a 
primary influence on policy decisions.  Although I do not employ a language of political 
culture or political context in this dissertation, the concept is instructive towards 
understanding family-centered policy making and nuclear family hegemony.  Political 
culture includes more than shared beliefs, values, and norms.  It also encompasses 
identity, such as race, sexuality, and gender.  While there may be genuine debate in a 
democratic state regarding the contours of political culture and the salience of some 
issues over others, there are some features of political culture that are difficult to 
operationalize because there are underlying assumptions that shape deliberation, history, 
and experience.  Ideology related to the nuclear family and family status is one of these 
assumptions.  Existing government policy impacts our perception, interpretation, and 
manipulation of meaning accorded to the nuclear family, and in turn, these 
characterizations are reinforced in politics and the broader culture.  Thus, conducting 
research related to nuclear family hegemony using traditional quantitative tools in which 
familial concepts are operationalized may not be instructive.  Utilizing political 
psychology in the examination of social identity may be one fruitful avenue towards 
understanding familialism or family status as an underlying feature of political culture 
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and identity.  Another is exploring framing and cognitive-discursive approaches which 
explore the multiplicity of meanings embedded in public discourse.  How groups frame 
their demands and the discourses they use is as important a factor in whether they g t
heard as is whether they have political voice and visibility. But this is also part f a 
dynamic, because how these claims are then reinterpreted by state institutio  and the 
frames they use will shape their implementation--or not--and their outcomes.  Finally, 
detailed content analysis of political texts in which gender and family norms are 
incorporated can highlight the familial features of policymaking.  All of these approaches 
can also link political theory to empirical political science.  
 
Women and Housing Tenure 
 In the 1970s the Department of Housing and Urban Development created a 
“Women and Mortgage Credit” program under the slogan “If a women’s placeis in the 
home, it might as well be her own” (Keller 1981, 39-46).  The short-term results of thi 
program showed some success; however, more in depth research by architects and urban 
planners revealed more structural problems in the nature of housing design and 
homeownership promotion that negatively impacted women.  It was not until the 1970s 
and 1980s that house purchase became possible for women in the United States.  
Homeownership was typically related to marriage.  Emily Card (1980) notes that 
historically there were three socially acceptable models of homeownership for women: 
separated and divorced women might retain the primary residence, widows might inherit 
the family property, and single women might inherit a house from parents or other 
relatives (216).  In 1968 the Fair Housing Act prohibited discrimination in the housing 
arena based on race, religion, and national origin, but did not prohibit discrimination 
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based on sex.  It was not until 1973 with the passage of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA) that marital status and sex became covered in terms of mortgage credit and in 
1974 Title VIII amended the 1968 Housing Act to include sex discrimination as a 
protected class (Card 1980, 218).  
Although house owners have garnered most of the attention in the media during 
this downturn in the American economy, renters are also struggling.  Unemployment, 
changes in cash assistance benefits, and reductions in state and federal funding for 
affordable housing means households which rent are placed in even more precarious 
positions.  In February 2010, the New York Times published an article related to the 
pervasive images of Eagle moving trucks in many low-income communities in 
Milwaukee.46  Eagle Movers is contracted by the city to accompany the sheriff’s office 
staff during legal evictions.  The movers will either place apartment contents on the street 
or move them into storage.  The article also noted how common eviction remains for low-
income women, especially black, single mothers.  Sociologist Matthew Desmond (2010)
notes in the article that just as incarceration has become typical in the lives of poor black 
men, eviction has become typical in the lives of poor black women.  In his 2002 study of 
rental and eviction patterns in Milwaukee, Desmond found that while women constitute 
13 percent of renters in the city, they make-up 40 percent of evicted tenants.  These 
figures represent legal, court-ordered evictions; the actual number of displaced residents 
through informal eviction procedures is likely significantly higher.  And yet, while entire 
fields of study have sprouted up around the issue of race and male incarceration, minority
women and rental housing—an area salient to women’s lives--is generally beyond the 
                                                





pervue of academic analysis.  Narrow, liberal democratic rights-based approach fails to 
address the entire social, political, and legal structure in which women find themselv s 
situated.  When political theory does make room for feminist texts it tends to ghet ize 
them rather than incorporate feminist theory and related critiques into the mainstre m 
literature.        
 
Housing as a Human Right? 
 In last decade, a number of scholars have developed the idea of shelter as a basic 
human right (Michael E. Stone 2006).  Part of the support for this notion comes from 
international human rights activists seeking to secure housing rights.  Industrial 
development has lead to a significant rise in urbanization, one which has never before 
been seen.  As nations cope with large scale social challenges that parallel these 
widespread economic changes, many housing activists seek to secure housing tenure, 
especially for those considered the most vulnerable—the elderly, women, and households 
with children.  Some feminist scholars, however, argue that access to decent housig 
would require more than a legal status right (Saegert and Clark 2006).  The combination 
of “domestic centrality” and “economic marginality” frequently makes women dependent 
on men (2006, 296).  In theory, a right to housing would provide women and marginal 
groups with safety, stability, a space to enhance one’s personal development.  
Nevertheless, “To the extent that a Right to Housing fails to challenge and ch ge the 
racialized and gendered order of education, employment, wealth accumulation, and 
access to services, its contribution to the improvement of women’s lives would be 
limited” (2006, 298).  A right to housing would also need to address dominant patterns of 
development, zoning, transportation, and alternative housing forms in order to be aligned 
206 
 
to the needs of women.  Ultimately, advocates for a right to housing are overlooking the 
broader challenges that women face in obtaining safe and affordable housing.  It is also 
instructive to remind oneself of Carole Pateman’s suggestion that in the story of modern 
political theory, the dynamics of sexual contract mean that women are unable to contract 
as equals; thus, any contract based on rights is an empty one for women.            
Other recent litigation may prove more promising in securing housing tenure for 
women, including low- and middle-income women.  In response to proposed austerity 
measures in Great Britain, a women’s rights organization filed a complaint with he high 
court asserting that the budget did not consider the effect the measures would place on 
women.  The Fawcett Society maintains that “the government violated a four-year-old 
amendment to Britain's 1975 Sex Discrimination Act mandating that officials g ve ‘due 
regard’ to gender inequality when drafting plans.” 47  Since women would be 
disproportionately impacted by the cuts, the lawsuit claims, the measures needed to be 
removed from the budget.  This type of creative legal advocacy has the potential to keep
women from bearing the brunt of market-driven changes and budgetary austerity 
measures.    
 
Theorizing Housing Policy 
There are political and social theorists who have theorized dwelling, home, and 
homeplaces.  Yet none of these explorations articulate the ways in which home is 
presented in popular literature, the media, or though housing-related business and 
professional associations, all of which has endorsed a gender-stratified housing policy.  
                                                
47 Anthony Faiola, “Women Set to Bear 72% of British Austerity Cuts,” The Washington Post, August 30, 
2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article /2010/08/30/AR2010083003436_pf.html 
(Accessed, August 30, 2010). 
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The political and ideological are at the very heart of housing discourse, and still, social 
scientists and political theorists have largely overlooked these connections.  Perhaps there 
is a fear of turning the descriptive into the normative and appearing non-scientific or 
neutral.  But by ignoring the political dimensions of housing, as well as discussions of 
ideology, specifically gender ideology, scholars are avoiding what is at thecrux of 
contemporary social and public policy: the changing relationship between the state and 
individuals.  
Features of both liberalism and classical republicanism are evident in ideology 
surrounding home and family.  The single-family house represents elements of 
liberalism: norms of privacy, self-sufficiency, the lack of intrusion of the sate into the 
intimate realm, and a place in which parents raise consumer citizens.  The house als  
captures features of classical republicanism: norms of designing one’s private life based 
on the common good, virtuous women mothering to raise citizen soldiers, sexual self-
discipline, paternal authority, and a close relationship between the polis and household.  
While in practice all of these values are myths to some degree or another, they contribute 
to a powerful story about the American home and proper family life.  Both theoretical 
orientations in their contemporary form promise a commitment to democratic pluralism, 
but both reinforce conceptions of home and family that can be construed as undemocratic 
in practice.  Moreover, the discourse of public and private, of the household and its 
relationship to citizens, has remained but it has been transformed by modern bureaucratic 
governance and the state’s investment in the meaning of family and home.  The idea tat 
the household is the necessary foundation for citizenship--whether explicit or implied in 
liberalism and classical republicanism--is significant in the grounding of United States 
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housing policy.  The ambivalence that these conflicting values present are played out at 
the level of social policy and is further manifest through the interaction with race and 
class; however, much of this contestation remains invisible to the public and scholars in 
political science and urban politics.                
Although current housing policies reflect changed policy commitments from 
multiple administrations, present access to housing remains family-composition specific, 
which means gender and sexuality—alongside the more commonly recognized factors of 
race and class—is an integral part of the complex policy-making matrix.  More
specifically, nuclear family hegemony serves to reify distinctions based on sex; it
incorporated women’s economic dependence as an essential component of housing 
finance and endorsed a single standard for what a good family looks like.  This nuclear- 
family hegemony crystallized in the 1920s under the Hoover administration, escalatd 
through suburbanization, urban disinvestment, and market reforms from 1950s to 1970s, 
and in the 1990s developed into policymaking that was increasingly punitive for those 
outside the nuclear- and nuptial-family norm.  Many feminist scholars have pointed to the 
Reagan administration and the subsequent conservative revolution as constitutive of 
contemporary pro-traditional family centered policymaking.  However, this dissertation 
illustrates that with regard to housing policy, the seeds of family-centered though  were 
planted decades earlier.  Shifting commitments to means-tested cash assistance programs, 
changing views on crime and punishment, and reluctance towards addressing the causes 
of poverty rather than its effects created an opportunity for policymaking to become 
punitive, but the ideology is one that has existed in American culture since the early years 
of the twentieth century.  Criminality, child welfare, and safety are relevant public policy 
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issues, but they should not be dealt with through disciplinary housing policies that 
disproportionately impact certain households over others.  
In United States housing policy, a cycle of bad policy had been established and 
re-formulated for nearly a century.  Without acknowledging the complexity of dwelling, 
lawmakers unwisely assume that the single family house is the solution to all shelter-
related problems.  American home ownership has a mythical quality that makes 
otherwise rational persons overlook obvious obstacles and historic lessons.  Coupled with 
images of the traditional, nuclear family, house ownership has been consistently invoked 
as the solution to poverty, changes in gender roles, economic downturns, racial strife, 
threats of communism and anti-Americanism, immigrant assimilation, and veteran 
returning from service.  The overwhelming central tendency in United States housing 
policy towards single family house ownership undoubtedly reflects certain characteristi s 
of many families.  Because of the type of housing it encourages and the judgments about 
what counts as normal, it makes it harder to maintain household styles beyond the nuclear 
family.  The hegemonic nuclear family does much more than to exclude certain groups 
from receiving the same goods and social recognition.  It creates and perpetuat s a 
culture in which a wide range alternative ways of life and expressions of desire are 
unthinkable.  Moreover, the social and cultural norms of the nuclear family permeate our 
legal and legislative schemes which have placed specific groups under assault for f iling 
to observe those norms.  Contemporary household repression is not a sudden response in 
an era of devolution and neo-liberalism nor an anomaly in the history of women and 
housing tenure.  Rather, it is the culmination of a much longer and slower process of 
state-building during which the state came to define and regulate the nuclear, 
210 
 
heterosexual family across many decades.  In drawing boundaries around citizensh p 
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U.S. Census Bureau 
Current Population Survey (CPS) - Definitions and Explanations  
(Abbreviated listing) 
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Family. 
A family is a group of two people or more (one of whom is the householder) related by 
birth, marriage, or adoption and residing together; all such people (including related 
subfamily members) are considered as members of one family. Beginning with the 1980 
Current Population Survey, unrelated subfamilies (referred to in the past as secondary 
families) are no longer included in the count of families, nor are the members of 
unrelated subfamilies included in the count of family members. The number of families is 
equal to the number of family households, however, the count of family members differs 
from the count of family household members because family household members include 
any non-relatives living in the household. 
 
Family group. 
A family group is any two or more people (not necessarily including a householder) 
residing together, and related by birth, marriage, or adoption. A household may be 
composed of one such group, more than one, or none at all. The count of family groups 
includes family households, related subfamilies, and unrelated subfamilies. 
 
Family household. 
A family household is a household maintained by a householder who is in a family (as 
defined above), and includes any unrelated people (unrelated subfamily members and/or 
secondary individuals) who may be residing there. The number of family households is 
equal to the number of families. The count of family household members differs from the 
count of family members, however, in that the family household members include all 
people living in the household, whereas family members include only the householder 
and his/her relatives. See the definition of family. 
 
Household. 
A household consists of all the people who occupy a housing unit. A house, an apartment 
or other group of rooms, or a single room, is regarded as a housing unit when it is 
occupied or intended for occupancy as separate living quarters; that is, when the 
occupants do not live and eat with any other persons in the structure and there is direct 
access from the outside or through a common hall.  
A household includes the related family members and all the unrelated people, if any, 
such as lodgers, foster children, wards, or employees who share the housing unit. A 
person living alone in a housing unit, or a group of unrelated people sharing a housing 
unit such as partners or roomers, is also counted as a household. The count of households 
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excludes group quarters. There are two major categories of households, "family" and 
"nonfamily". (See definitions of Family household and Nonfamily household). 
Household, family, or subfamily, Size of. 
The term "size of household" includes all the people occupying a housing unit. "Size of 
family" includes the family householder and all other people in the living quarters who 
are related to the householder by birth, marriage, or adoption. "Size of related subfamily" 
includes the husband and wife or the lone parent and their never-married sons and 
daughters under 18 years of age. "Size of unrelated subfamily" includes the referenc  
person and all other members related to the reference person. If a family has a related 




A nonfamily household consists of a householder living alone (a one-person household) 




The householder refers to the person (or one of the people) in whose name the housing 
unit is owned or rented (maintained) or, if there is no such person, any adult member, 
excluding roomers, boarders, or paid employees. If the house is owned or rented jointly 
by a married couple, the householder may be either the husband or the wife. The person 
designated as the householder is the "reference person" to whom the relationship of all 
other household members, if any, is recorded.  
The number of householders is equal to the number of households. Also, the number of 
family householders is equal to the number of families. 
Head versus householder. Beginning with the 1980 CPS, the Bureau of the Census 
discontinued the use of the terms "head of household" and "head of family." Instead, the 
terms "householder" and "family householder" are used. Recent social changes hve 
resulted in greater sharing of household responsibilities among the adult members and, 
therefore, have made the term "head" increasingly inappropriate in the analysis of 
household and family data. Specifically, beginning in 1980, the Census Bureau 
discontinued its longtime practice of always classifying the husband as therefer nce 
person (head) when he and his wife are living together. 
Step family. 
A Step family is a married-couple family household with at least one child under age 18 
who is a stepchild (i.e., a son or daughter through marriage, but not by birth) of the 
householder. This definition undercounts the true number of step families in instances 
where the parent of the natural born or biological child is the householder and that 
parents spouse is not the child’s parent, as biological or step-parentage is not ascertained 





A subfamily is a married couple with or without children, or a single parent with one or 
more own never-married children under 18 years old. A subfamily does not maintain 
their own household, but lives in the home of someone else.  
Related subfamily. A related subfamily is a married couple with or without children, or 
one parent with one or more own never married children under 18 years old, living in a 
household and related to, but not including, the person or couple who maintains the 
household. One example of a related subfamily is a young married couple sharing the 
home of the husband’s or wife’s parents. The number of related subfamilies is not 
included in the count of families. 
Unrelated subfamily. An unrelated subfamily (formerly called a secondary family) is a 
married couple with or without children, or a single parent with one or more own never-
married children under 18 years old living in a household. Unrelated subfamily members 
are not related to the householder. An unrelated subfamily may include people such as 
guests, partners, roommates, or resident employees and their spouses and/or children. T e 
number of unrelated subfamily members is included in the total number of household 
members, but is not included in the count of family members. 
Beginning in 1989, any person(s) who is not related to the householder and who is not the 




























Questions on FHA credit report, 1935  
Source: Federal Housing Administration, 1934-1940. 
 
Identity 
A. Is this person’s name correct as given above?  (If not, give correct name.) 
B. About what is his age?  What is his racial descent (Answer whether Anglo-Saxon, 
Greek, Hebrew, Italian, Negro, etc.)? 
C. Is he married? (How many dependent on him?) 
Character 
Is he regarded as steady and dependable? 
Is his general reputation as to character, habits, and morals good? (If not, state nature of 
unfavorable reports.) 
Did you learn of any domestic difficulties? 
Is his personal reputation as to honesty good? 
Attitude Towards Obligations 
What is his general attitude towards contractual obligations? 
Does his wife lend encouragement to him? 
Does he have the reputation of living within his income? 
Does his family have the reputation of living extravagantly? 
Has he the reputation of willingness to pay, if able? 
Ability to Pay 
What is his annual income earned from his employment of business? 
About what income, if any, has he from other sources? (From investments, rentals, or 
contributions of other members of family or household expenses.) 
What would you estimate his net worth? 
If married, does his wife follow a gainful occupation? 
What is his wife’s independent annual income, if any? Independent net worth? 
If above person does not live in property, give its monthly rental. 
Business History 
What is the nature of his business, and what position does he hold? 
About how long has he been in present connection? 
Does he work full time steadily? (If not, how many days per week does he work?) 
What is his reputation for real estate transactions? 
Is or was he a “legitimate” speculator or promoter type of borrower? 
Is he considered a chronic litigant? 
Has he ever been insolvent? When? (Explain in remarks and give circumstances.) 
Does the cause now exist? (Explain under remarks.) 
Prospects for Future 
What are his prospects for future? 
Is he making efforts to improve himself in his work? 
Is he self-satisfied or ambitious? 
Associates 
What is class of his business associates? 




1. Amplify his business history. 
2. Amplify fully unusual and unfavorable information. 
3. If a woman, cover husband’s or father’s reputation, business history, worth and 
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